Langham v. City of Beaumont

152 S.W. 869, 1912 Tex. App. LEXIS 1352
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedDecember 19, 1912
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 152 S.W. 869 (Langham v. City of Beaumont) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Langham v. City of Beaumont, 152 S.W. 869, 1912 Tex. App. LEXIS 1352 (Tex. Ct. App. 1912).

Opinion

PLEASANTS, C. J.

This appeal is from an order of the judge of the district court of Jefferson county refusing an application for temporary injunction. The suit was brought by Thomas H. Langham and other citizens and taxpayers against the city of Beaumont, its mayor and board of aldermen, and against the Manufacturers’ Appraisal Company of Cleveland, Ohio, and its agent, William H. Young. The petition alleges in substance: “That the city council, the names of its component members being hereinbefore set out, on the 4th day of June, 1912, entered into a contract with the Manufacturers’ Appraisal -Company of Cleveland, Ohio, acting through its agent, William H. Young, where, in consideration of the installation of the so-called Somer’s System of Taxation, they agreed on behalf of the city to pay to the said Manufacturers’ Appraisal Company of Cleveland, Ohio, the sum of $750 a month for the services of a land valuation man, and a like sum per month for the services of a building pricer,-said company approximating that it would take about $5,000 to install said system. That the installation of said system, as-contracted for by said city council with said company, would,be the incurring of a debt without making provision for its payment within the meaning of article 11, § 5, of the state Constitution; that the placing of said land valuation man, the building pricer, and others upon the pay roll of the city was an attempt to evade such law by making them officers'of the city, whose salaries would be paid out of the current funds of the city. The contract in truth and in fact was with the Manufacturers’ Appraisal Company of Cleveland, Ohio, to whom the money for the installation of said system was due. That at that time, to wit, the 4th day of June, 1912, said contract was entered into, the city had no available funds for paying the $5,000 that would become due for the installation of such system, but that they were in debt, and behind; that the current revenue belonging to said city during the year had been pledged and obligated; and would be, more than consumed by the ordinary running expenses of the city; and that there was no reasonable expectation that the incoming revenues would be sufficient to meet the debts already incurred and outstanding *870 against the general fund. That the said William Young and others, who were in truth and in fact acting as the agents of the Manufacturers’ Appraisal Company of Cleveland, Ohio, were paid by the issuance of notes with city warrants attached thereto as collateral, which notes would, by agreement with the bank where negotiated, mature or become due at such time as to be a charge upon the revenue of the city in future years. That the making of said contract and its enforcement was ultra vires and void, because annulling and canceling so much of the city charter of Beaumont as requires the appointment of a board of equalization; that said board as created by the charter was acting and ready to perform their duty, and that the Manufacturers’ Appraisal Company of Cleveland, Ohio, acting through its agent, William Young, and others, were usurping the functions of said body, exercising its powers and duties in violation of the city charter, by virtue of said contract and resolution; that the result of such contract is to employ a foreign corporation, with no permit to do business in Texas, to perform the functions of a city officer.”

The prayer of the petition is as follows: “The premises considered, these plaintiffs pray that your honor will issue a temporary restraining order, restraining the said Emmett A. Fletcher, as mayor of Beaumont, and J. T. Booth, S. G. Burnett, H. G. Brown, E. J. Diffenbacher, Tom J. Lamb, and C. C. Roberts, from permitting the said Manufacturers’ Appraisal Company of Cleveland, Ohio, or William Young, or any of the servants or employés of the said Manufacturers’ Appraisal Company of ’Cleveland, Ohio, from exercising any of the duties or functions of the board of equalization of said city of Beaumont; and that you will restrain said mayor and each of said aldermen from paying, or causing to be paid, to the said Manufacturers’ Appraisal Company of Cleveland, Ohio, or William Young, or any other servant or employé or representative of the said Manufacturers’ Appraisal Company of Cleveland, Ohio, any sum of money, or voucher, or warrant representing money, under and by virtue of said pretended contract, or for the pretended services of said Manufacturers’ Appraisal Company of Cleveland, Ohio, or any of its servants or employés, under and by virtue of said pretended contract here-inbefore fully set up made by said city council with said Manufacturers’ Appraisal Company of Cleveland, Ohio, and that the said Manufacturers’ Appraisal Company of Cleveland, Ohio, and its agent, William Young, and all other agents or servants and em-ployés of said company, be restrained and enjoined from performing or attempting to perform any of the duties of the board of equalization as defined by the charter of Beaumont, and that they and each of them be restrained and enjoined from collecting or attempting to collect any money or moneys, or representative of money from the city of Beaumont under and by virtue of the pretended contract herein set up; and that, upon a hearing thereof, said pretended contract or agreement between the city of Beaumont and the said Manufacturers’ Appraisal Company of Cleveland, Ohio, be annulled, canceled and held for naught, and that the restraining order be made permanent and perpetual, and for costs and general equitable relief in the premises.”

Defendant’s answer, filed the 18th day of July, 1912, contained a general demurrer with several special exceptions. Neither the demurrer nor special exceptions were ruled on by the court. The answer set up that the debt so incurred was for current expenses; that the revenue derived and to be derived within the year would pay for same; and that the said Manufacturers’ Appraisal Company of Cleveland, Ohio, acting through its agent, William Young, and others, were in no way interfering with the said board of equalization, but were merely giving it aid and scientific information upon which to base its judgment in arriving at values and in performing its other duties. This appeal is from an order of the district judge refusing to grant a temporary injunction.

Appellees have filed' a motion to dismiss this appeal on the ground that the subject-matter of the suit has ceased to exist, and which contains the following allegations: “Appellees would further show the court, as reasons why this appeal should be dismissed, that the subject-matter of this litigation has ceased to exist, and that the controversy herein is at end, for the reason that the said Manufacturers’ Appraisal Company, and the said William Young, and all other servants, agents, and employés of the said Manufacturers’ Appraisal Company, have long since completed the contract referred to and set out in plaintiffs’ petition, and have completed the installation of the said Somer’s System of Taxation for the said city of Beaumont; that the board of equalization for said city has long since completed its labors for the year 1912, and adjourned, and that the tax rolls of said city for said year have been completed and turned over by the said board of equalization to the collector of taxes for the collection of taxes thereon, and that the said collector is proceeding to collect the taxes assessed thereon without let or hindrance.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
152 S.W. 869, 1912 Tex. App. LEXIS 1352, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/langham-v-city-of-beaumont-texapp-1912.