Langford v. Langford

337 S.W.2d 181, 1960 Tex. App. LEXIS 2372
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJune 22, 1960
Docket13608
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 337 S.W.2d 181 (Langford v. Langford) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Langford v. Langford, 337 S.W.2d 181, 1960 Tex. App. LEXIS 2372 (Tex. Ct. App. 1960).

Opinion

*182 MURRAY, Chief Justice.

This is a contested divorce suit. Frank Langford instituted the suit in the District Court of Webb County, against his wife, Jennie Langford, a resident of Tar-rant County, Texas, seeking a divorce. The trial was to a jury, and based upon the verdict of the jury, the trial court on September 14, 1959, rendered judgment granting the divorce, from which judgment the wife, Jennie Langford, has prosecuted this appeal.

Appellant has raised the issue that Frank Langford was not an actual bona fide inhabitant of this State for a period of twelve months, and a resident of Laredo, Webb County, Texas, where the suit was filed, for six months next preceding the filing of same, and that, therefore, under the provisions of Article 4631, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.Stats., the District Court of Webb County, Texas, was without jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. We sustain this contention. This matter was submitted to the jury in the following two issues:

“Special Issue No. 2:
“Do you find from full and satisfactory evidence that the plaintiff, Frank Langford, has had a true and real intention to make his permanent abode in Laredo, Texas?
“In this connection, by ‘permanent abode’ is not meant necessarily the ownership of a home or the possession of a family circle in a specified locality; it is enough if a choice becomes apparent through overt acts that the locality or community has been , chosen as the place wherein life is to be lived permanently, and from which place one may absent himself temporarily but always with the intention to return to continue living in said locality or community.
' “Answer ‘Yes’ or‘No’.
“We, the jury, answer Yes.
“If you have answered the above Special Issue No. 2 ‘yes’, you will answer the following special issue; otherwise you need not answer same.
“Special Issue No. 3:
“Do you find from full and satisfactory evidence that the plaintiff, Frank Langford has had such an intention, if you have so found, for a period longer than one year prior to the date of the filing of his petition herein, April 14, 1959 ?
“Answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’.
“We, the jury, answer Yes.”

These issues as worded did not submit to the jury the all important question of whether Frank Langford was a bona fide inhabitant of the State of Texas, for a period of twelve months, and a resident of Webb County for six months next preceding the filing of this suit, in keeping with the provisions of Art. 4631, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.Stats. The fact that appellee may have been an inhabitant of Texas for twelve months, and a resident of Webb County for six months at some time prior to the filing of the suit does not meet the requirements of Art. 4631, supra. The requirement is, that such inhabitancy and residence must have been for such periods next preceding the filing of the suit.

It is true that in a divorce suit the verdict in many respects is not binding on the trial court and is advisory only, but when a jury trial is had the burden is upon the plaintiff to offer proof and secure a jury finding on all issues essential to the granting of the divorce, unless such facts are conclusively established by the evidence. In the case at bar the questions of inhabitancy in the State and residence in Webb County were sharply disputed issues.

In Ballard v. Ballard, Tex.Civ.App., 186 S.W.2d 294, 295, Justice Norvell, in speaking for this Court, said:

*183 “In order to obtain a divorce in this State by means of a trial to a jury, Article 4632, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.Stats., requires that the plaintiff procure jury finding's affirming the material facts alleged in the petition; save and except as to those facts only which are established as a matter of law, and consequently need not be submitted to the jury under our special issue practice. Scannell v. Scannell, Tex.Civ.App., 117 S.W.2d 538, 545. Plaintiff must also satisfy the mind of the trial judge that the evidence relied upon to support a decree of divorce is ‘full and satisfactory.’ Article 4632, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.Stats.; Moore v. Moore, 22 Tex. 237; McCrary v. McCrary, Tex.Civ.App., 230 S.W. 187.”

Even if the issue had been properly submitted to the jury and an affirmative answer given, we are still of the opinion that the evidence on this matter was not full and satisfactory, as it is required to be by the provisions of Art. 4632, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.Stats.

In 1950, appellee and appellant were married and lived together for several years at Mansfield, Tarrant County, Texas. Both had been previously married, such prior marriages having been terminated by death and not by divorce. In 1954, appel-lee was confined in the Veterans Hospital at Waco, Texas, where he remained for about one year, and during which time he had one lung removed. When he was able to leave the hospital he returned to Mansfield and lived there for a while with appellant. He testified that she had changed, and was unhappy because he was in frail health; that she refused to care for him and stated that she was not going to be “saddled with any more old crow-bait” and .told him to leave, which he did.

According to appellant there was no trouble between them. She did not call him an old crowbait, and did not ask him to leave. He told her he was going to Old' Mexico and write a story and then return. She helped him to pack his clothes and they parted on the best of terms. This was in the fall of 1955. He first went to Hot Springs, Arkansas, stayed there one month and then went to Laredo, Webb County, Texas. Appellant said that after he had resided in Laredo for about a year and a half he decided to make it his permanent home. He found that the dry climate helped his bronchial trouble. When he left Mansfield he placed his bank account with the National Bank of Commerce, Fort Worth, Texas, where it remained until shortly before the trial of this case in Laredo. He received a pension check from the Veterans Administration, which was deposited in the Fort Worth Bank without his endorsement, and he would then draw checks on such account.

While residing in Laredo, appellee would make trips into Old Mexico. He used up two six months visas not consecutively, however, while living at or near San Luis Potosí, which is some five or six hundred miles in the interior of Old Mexico. While there he joined the Catholic Church, and at the time of the trial his membership was still there. Appellee was trying to be a writer and painter, and went to Old Mexico looking for material to paint or write about. After he returned to Laredo on May 25, 1959, and after filing this suit on April 14, 1959, he wrote the following letter to a friend named C. H; Harrison:

“May 25/59
“Mr. C. H. Harrison,
Mansfield, Texas.
“Dear Chas:

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Bluebook (online)
337 S.W.2d 181, 1960 Tex. App. LEXIS 2372, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/langford-v-langford-texapp-1960.