Langer v. Nenow

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Chris Langer, Case No.: 18-cv-01670-GPC-BGS

12 Plaintiff, AMENDED ORDER GRANTING 13 v. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, DISMISSING 14 Nancy L. Nenow and Does 1-10, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 15 Defendants. SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND DISMISSING THE ACTION. 16

17 [ECF No. 16, 18.]

18 On January 10, 2020, the Court decided two motions: Defendants’1 motion to 19 dismiss Plaintiff’s first cause of action arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 20 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., as moot and to dismiss Plaintiff’s second cause of action 21 arising under California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51–53, for lack of 22 supplemental jurisdiction, (ECF No. 18), and (2) Plaintiff’s motion for summary 23 24

25 1 W.K.S. Frosty Corporation (“WKS”), as Defendant Nancy L. Nenow’s lessee, attests that it is 26 responsible to maintain the Restaurant and its property, and to indemnify Defendant Nenow in litigation. (ECF No. 18-4, Feinour Decl. at ¶ 3.) Thus, the Court refers to Defendant Nenow and WKS collectively 27 1 judgment on both causes of action. (ECF No. 16.) The Court granted Defendants’ motion 2 in full and dismissed Plaintiff’s motion as moot. (ECF No. 26.) 3 As part of its ruling as to the first motion, the Court ordered that Plaintiff’s second 4 cause of action be remanded to state court. (Id.) Now, the Court VACATES its January 5 10, 2020 Order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 as the relief ordered by 6 the Court was clearly erroneous. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60(b)(1) (permitting a court to grant 7 relief from an order in the event of a “mistake”); Smith v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 727 F.3d 8 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted) (“A district court may properly reconsider 9 its decision if it . . . committed clear error”). Federal “district courts do not have the 10 authority to remand an action originally commenced in federal court.” Azodi v. TEPL, 11 Inc., No. 12-CV-3069-IEG, 2013 WL 3751869, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 15, 2013) (quotation 12 omitted); see also First Nat. Bank of Pulaski v. Curry, 301 F.3d 456, 467 (6th Cir. 2002) 13 (“while a district court has the discretion to remand a case removed from state court, it 14 may not remand a case that was never removed from state court”); Julianites Against 15 Shakedown Tactics v. Tejjr, No. 05-CV-2353-W, 2007 WL 3490253, at *4 (S.D. Cal. 16 May 1, 2007) (“As a matter of legal procedure, this Court lacks the ability to remand or 17 remove an original action to state court”). Because this action was originally filed in this 18 district, (see ECF No. 1), it cannot be remanded to state court. 19 The Court now issues this ruling as to the two outstanding motions. (ECF Nos. 16, 20 18). For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion, FINDING 21 that the first cause of action is moot and DISMISSING the second cause of action as the 22 Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over it. The Court also DISMISSES Plaintiff’s 23 motion for summary judgment for lack of jurisdiction. 24 I. Background 25 Plaintiff Chris Langer (“Plaintiff”) is a paraplegic who cannot walk and who uses a 26 wheelchair for mobility. (ECF No. 16-4, Langer Decl. at ¶ 2.) He has a specially 27 equipped van with a ramp that deploys from the passenger side to accommodate his 1 wheelchair. (Id. at ¶ 3.) 2 On April 10, 2018, Plaintiff went to a Wendy’s located at 1111 Camino del Rio 3 South, San Diego, California (the “Restaurant”) to eat and use the restroom. (Id. at ¶ 5.) 4 The Restaurant is located less than ten minutes from Plaintiff’s home and is a convenient 5 place for him to eat. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Upon arriving, Plaintiff observed approximately thirty 6 parking spaces in the Restaurant’s parking lot, with only one parking stall marked and 7 reserved for persons with disabilities. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Because a car was already parked in 8 that spot, and it was too difficult for Plaintiff to park without using a space specifically 9 reserved for persons with disabilities, Plaintiff left without parking, eating, or using the 10 restroom. (Id. at ¶¶ 7–10.) 11 On July 19, 2018, an investigator for Plaintiff, Zion Sapien, investigated the 12 Restaurant. (ECF No. 16-7, Sapien Decl. ¶ 3.) Mr. Sapien counted approximately 29 13 total parking spaces available for use by the Restaurant’s customers. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Mr. 14 Sapien noted that only one space was marked as reserved for persons with disabilities. 15 (Id.; ECF No. 16-8, Photos from Sapien Investigation.) Based on his own observations, 16 and Mr. Sapien’s investigation, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant Nancy L. 17 Nenow, the owner of the property located at 1111 Camino del Rio South in San Diego, 18 CA, and Does 1–10. (ECF No. 1.) 19 On December 17, 2018, Defendants hired an ADA-expert, Mr. Paul Deppe, “to 20 advise WKS with regard to the design of a new, second accessible parking stall.” (ECF 21 No. 18-4, Feinour Decl. at ¶ 4.) Defendants did so “in response to allegations within the 22 Plaintiff’s complaint.” (Id. at ¶ 4.) Defendants hired a construction company to build the 23 stall according to Mr. Deppe’s specifications. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Upon completion, Mr. Deppe 24 inspected the parking lot and issued Defendants a Certified Access Specialist (“CASp”) 25 “certificate noting that all exterior elements [of the Restaurant and parking lot] were in 26 compliance with state and federal access laws.” (Id. at ¶¶ 6–7; ECF No. 18-6, CASp 27 Certificate.) 1 In May 2019, Plaintiff’s expert, Mr. Paul Bishop, also inspected the parking lot. 2 (ECF No. 18-4, Feinour Decl. at ¶ 8.) Mr. Bishop issued a report of his inspection finding 3 that the lot was largely in compliance. (Id. at ¶ 9–10.) Mr. Bishop found two deficiencies 4 – an access aisle that was a few inches too narrow and a tow away sign that was missing 5 information. (Id. at ¶¶ 11–13.) Defendants then remedied these errors by directing an 6 employee to add the missing information to the sign on July 3, 2019 and hiring a 7 construction professional to restripe the access aisle on November 8, 2019. (Id. at ¶¶ 14– 8 17.) On November 11, 2019, Mr. Deppe returned to the Restaurant for a second 9 inspection, “found all exterior features to be compliant with state and federal access 10 regulations, and issued a CASp certificate so stating, dated Nov. 13, 2019.” (Id. at ¶¶ 18– 11 19; ECF No. 18-8, CASp Certificate.) 12 Defendants have since “instructed the Restaurant’s General Manager to inspect the 13 condition of the accessible features of the Restaurant on a regular basis, and to report 14 and/or repair any feature that requires maintenance.” (Id. at ¶ 20.) Defendants further aver 15 that “prompt action” will be taken “to ensure continued compliance with state and federal 16 accessibility regulations.” (Id.) 17 II. Legal Standards 18 A. Summary Judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56 19 “A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or 20 the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought. The court 21 shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 22 any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 23 P. 56(a). A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the 24 court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings and 25 discovery responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See 26 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the nonmoving party will have the 27 burden of proof at trial, the movant can prevail by pointing out that there is an absence of 1 evidence to support the moving party’s case. See id. If the moving party meets its initial 2 burden, the nonmoving party must set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 3 56, “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty 4 Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 5 In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the court does not make 6 credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence. Rather, it draws all reasonable 7 inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. 8 v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630–31 (9th Cir. 1987). The evidence 9 presented by the parties must be capable of being presented at trial in a form that would 10 be admissible in evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Conclusory, speculative 11 testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact 12 and defeat summary judgment. See Thornhill Publ'g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 13 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). 14 B. Mootness2 15 Federal courts are creatures of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. 16 of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Every federal court has a continuing obligation to 17 assure its jurisdiction. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999); E. 18 Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 932 F.3d 742, 763 (9th Cir. 2018). “Mootness is a 19

20 21 2 Notably, Defendant moves the Court for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) and frames its argument as a question of standing. However, Defendant “conflates the concepts of standing and mootness.” Ngoc Lam 22 Che v. San Jose/Evergreen Cmty. Coll. Dist. Found., No. 17-CV-00381-BLF, 2017 WL 2954647, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2017). “Standing and mootness are distinct issues that underlie whether the Court 23 has jurisdiction under Article III to adjudicate a case and are separate from the merits of the claims 24 asserted.” CRS Recovery, Inc. v. Laxton, No. C-06-7093 CW, 2013 WL 140084, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2013). “Mootness can be characterized as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite 25 personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).” Oregon Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1116 (9th Cir. 26 2003) (quotations and citation omitted). Thus, because Defendant challenges the current condition of the Property, rather than its condition when the complaint was filed, the challenge is properly characterized 27 1 jurisdictional issue.” Foster v. Carson, 347 F.3d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 2003). “If there is no 2 longer a possibility that an appellant can obtain relief for his claim, that claim is moot and 3 must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” Id. 4 “The voluntary cessation of challenged conduct does not ordinarily render a case 5 moot because a dismissal for mootness would permit a resumption of the challenged 6 conduct as soon as the case is dismissed.” Rosebrock v. Mathis, 745 F.3d 963, 971 (9th 7 Cir. 2014) (quoting Knox v. Serv. Employees Int’l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 8 (2012)). But voluntary cessation can yield mootness if a “stringent” standard is met: “A 9 case might become moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly 10 wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. 11 v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000). The party asserting 12 mootness bears a “heavy burden” in meeting this standard. Id. 13 To determine whether a danger of future violations warrants an injunction in an 14 ADA lawsuit, courts consider “the bona fides of the expressed intent to comply, the 15 effectiveness of the discontinuance and, in some cases, the character of the past 16 violations.” Watanabe v. Home Depot USA, Inc., No. CV-02-5088-RGK, 2003 WL 17 24272650, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2003) (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 18 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)). Courts are more likely to find a matter moot on the basis of a 19 voluntary cessation where the defendant remedies a “structural modification.” Zaldivar v. 20 City of San Diego, No. 15-CV-67-GPC, 2016 WL 5118534, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 21 2016). Such modifications are limited to physical alterations to the property at issue. See, 22 e.g., Lopez v. AND Grp. Corp., No. CV 18-4855-PSG, 2019 WL 6434493, at *3 (C.D. 23 Cal. July 30, 2019) (the re-grading and re-painting a parking lot); Sharp v. Rosa 24 Mexicano, D.C., LLC, 496 F. Supp. 2d 93, 98 (D.D.C. 2007) (the installation of a 25 wheelchair accessible sink); Grove v. De La Cruz, 407 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1130 (C.D. Cal. 26 2005) (the installation of grab bars). 27 C. Supplemental Jurisdiction 1 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), a court can decline to assert supplemental jurisdiction 2 over a pendant claim if one of the following four categories applies: (1) the claim raises a 3 novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the 4 claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court 5 has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional 6 circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. Underlying 7 the § 1367(c) inquiry are consideration of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to 8 litigants, and comity. “[I]f these are not present a federal court should hesitate to exercise 9 jurisdiction over state law claims[.]” United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 10 (1966). 11 A “district court can decline jurisdiction under any one of [the] four provisions” of 12 § 1367(c). San Pedro Hotel Co. v. City of L.A., 159 F.3d 470, 478 (9th Cir. 1998). When 13 a district court declines supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim pursuant to one 14 of the first three provisions of the statute, the court need not state its reasons for 15 dismissal. Id. Thus, while the elimination of all federal claims gives the court “a powerful 16 reason to choose not to continue to exercise jurisdiction,” the court’s decision to retain or 17 dismiss the remaining supplemental claims is discretionary. Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. 18 Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351–57 (1988). 19 III. Analysis 20 A. Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action Arising Under the ADA is Moot. 21 The Court begins its analysis with Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Defendants 22 contend that the case is moot because it has cured the deficiencies outlined in Plaintiff’s 23 complaint and asserts that such deficiencies are not reasonably likely to recur. (ECF No. 24 18-1 at 9–14; ECF No. 25 at 2–5.) Plaintiff only cursorily objects to the efficacy of 25 Defendants’ remedial actions, and instead argues that the Court should retain jurisdiction 26 over its motion for summary judgment even if the parking lot is ADA-complaint because 27 there is no guarantee Defendants will continue to comply. (ECF No. 23 at 6–13.) For the 1 following reasons, the Court agrees that Defendants have remedied Plaintiff’s allegations 2 and that the first cause of action is now moot. 3 Reviewing the evidence, the Court finds there is no genuine dispute that 4 Defendants’ conduct has fully addressed Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint. While 5 Plaintiff briefly asserts – without any citations or reference to legal authority – that the 6 proof submitted by Defendants is inadequate in the absence of a CASp report, Plaintiff is 7 mistaken. (See ECF No. 23 at 7.) Here, Defendants’ proof is sufficient. Defendants have 8 submitted a signed affidavit attesting to its efforts to construct a second, van-accessible, 9 ADA-complaint parking stall and to address the related “exterior elements” of the 10 Restaurant. (See ECF No. 18-4, Feinour Decl.) Defendants have also submitted Mr. 11 Bishop’s expert report, which notes the post-construction painting and signage 12 deficiencies, as well as Mr. Deppe’s declaration, which shows that Defendants corrected 13 those deficiencies. (ECF Nos. 18-5 at 9; ECF No. 18-7 at ¶¶ 5–6.) In addition, the two 14 CASp certificates,3 (ECF Nos. 18-6, 18-8), as well as the various photos of the 15 Restaurant parking lot contained in Mr. Bishop’s expert report, (ECF Nos. 18-5 at 5–8), 16 show that Defendants’ renovated lot complies with the ADA. Based on this evidence, the 17 Court finds that Defendants’ efforts have cured the alleged violations. 18 The Court, moreover, finds that the “allegedly wrongful behavior could not 19 reasonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189. Two cases are 20 particularly instructive here as they consider similarly situated Defendants who also 21 allegedly violated the ADA’s regulations on parking stripes. 22 First, in Dalton, a Minnesota plaintiff visited defendant’s gas station, found no 23 reserved accessible parking spots or van parking spaces, and filed an ADA complaint. 24

25 3 Oddly, both certificates bear the same inspection certificate number and inspection date. Compare 26 (ECF No. 18-6) with (ECF No. 18-8). Nonetheless, though Defendants have filed duplicate certificates, the Court does not discount Defendants’ argument as the most recent of the two certificates has been 27 1 Dalton v. JJSC Properties, LLC, No. 19-CV-522-SRN, 2019 WL 3802893, at *1 (D. 2 Minn. Aug. 13, 2019). After receiving plaintiff’s complaint, defendant hired an ADA 3 expert to examine the parking area and then implemented the expert’s recommendations. 4 Id. at *2. Those changes addressed Plaintiff’s allegations, as was evident from 5 defendant’s expert report, affidavits, and photographs. Id. at *4–5. Consequently, upon 6 defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Court found the alleged ADA violations were moot, 7 citing defendant’s “lack of prior complaints,” “expeditious actions to remedy the alleged 8 violations,” and “assurances . . . that the offending conduct is not reasonably likely to 9 recur.” Id. at *5. The Dalton Court specifically considered and rejected plaintiff’s 10 argument “that because paint is impermanent and subject to fading, [d]efendant ha[d] not 11 sufficiently shown how it [would] maintain the remedied conditions.” Id. 12 Second, in Lopez, a California plaintiff visited a liquor store where he observed 13 that “the paint and striping” on the parking lot’s reserved spaces “were badly faded and 14 barely visible.” Lopez v. AND Grp. Corp., No. CV-18-4855-PSG, 2019 WL 6434493, at 15 *1 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2019). In response to Plaintiff’s complaint regarding the paint 16 stripping, defendant hired a Certified Access Specialist (“CASp”) to inspect the liquor 17 store, hired a contractor to fix any identified deficiencies, hired a second contractor when 18 the first proved inept, and re-hired the CASp to re-inspect the property once renovated. 19 Id. “[L]ooking at Plaintiff’s complaint, [the CASp’s] declaration, and his two CASp 20 reports together,” the court determined that the defendant’s remedial conduct had cured 21 the plaintiff’s allegations. Id. at *3. Consequently, upon defendant’s motion to dismiss, 22 the Court found the alleged ADA violations were moot, citing defendant’s lack of prior 23 ADA violations, efforts to make the parking lot ADA-complaint, “expressed intent to 24 comply with ADA requirements,” and “implementation of an annual inspection policy.” 25 Id. at *4. Here too, the Lopez Court specifically considered and rejected plaintiff’s 26 argument that “Defendant may fail to maintain the accessible parking spaces by letting 27 the paint to fade away or painting them over once the case ends.” Id. at *3. 1 The Court finds that the same factors animating the decisions in Dalton and Lopez 2 show that Defendants’ violations here are not reasonably likely to recur. First, as with 3 Lopez and Dalton, there is no allegation that defendants’ have ignored their own, existing 4 ADA-compliant policy, or repeatedly violated the ADA. Cf. Lozano v. C.A. Martinez 5 Family Ltd. P'ship, 129 F. Supp. 3d 967, 971 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (rejecting defendant’s 6 motion to dismiss where they had constructed compliant parking space after settling a 7 prior ADA lawsuit and were now again in violation). Second, Defendants have instructed 8 the Restaurant’s management to regularly inspect the Restaurant for, and promptly fix, 9 ADA violations, and aver that they will take prompt action going forward to ensure 10 continued compliance. (ECF No. 18-4, Feinour Decl. at ¶ 19.) Third, though unsuccessful 11 at first, Defendants tried to resolve Plaintiff’s complaint “expeditious[ly]” by building a 12 new parking space within approximately six months of the complaint’s filing date. 13 Dalton, 2019 WL 3802893, at *1 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 2019). 14 In light of these facts, the Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that 15 “because the parking lot striping will fade and will need to be repainted every few years, 16 it is very easy for the defendants to return to their previous ways.” (ECF No. 23 at 11– 17 12.) Plaintiff’s cited cases are factually distinguishable from Defendants’ violations in 18 that Defendants’ violations have not been remedied by actions that could be undone 19 almost immediately, including, by hiring a worker that could be easily fired, see Feldman 20 v. Pro Football, Inc., 419 F. App’x 381, 388 (4th Cir. 2011) (where defendant’s cure 21 involved hiring someone to provide captioning), or by adopting new policies that could 22 be “rescind[ed]” at any time. See Moeller v. Taco Bell Corp., 816 F. Supp. 2d 831, 860 23 (N.D. Cal. 2011). Rather, Defendants’ actions here – e.g., building a new parking space, 24 painting lines and an access aisle, and putting up signs – are more akin to “structural 25 modifications” unlikely to be easily reversed. See Zaldivar, 2016 WL 5118534, at *10. 26 In addition, that the Moeller court treated “parking striping” as “subject to frequent 27 change” is not dispositive here. Moeller, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 862. The court’s finding in 1 Moeller was based on three facts not in evidence here: (1) express testimony from 2 defendant’s former employee that certain practices at that defendant, including paint 3 striping, were subject to frequent change, (2) an upcoming renovation scheduled for that 4 specific restaurant that might entail re-painting the stripes, and (3) an interrogatory 5 response from defendant that it would be too burdensome to describe all alterations to the 6 restaurant as they were so frequent. Id. Here, there is no testimony as to a similar policy 7 at Defendants’ Restaurant or evidence of an upcoming renovation. And, Defendants’ 8 interrogatory response to the number of past alterations to the Restaurant is merely that 9 “Defendant is unaware of any alterations.” (ECF No. 16-11 at 1–2.) 10 Thus, considering the parties’ arguments and the applicable law, the Court finds 11 that Plaintiff’s ADA allegations are now moot, and that the Court no longer has 12 jurisdiction to hear the first cause of action in Plaintiff’s complaint. 13 B. The Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s 14 Unruh Claim and Dismisses it. 15 The Court must also decide whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the 16 second cause of action now that the first has been found moot. Defendants contend that 17 the Court should dismiss the Unruh claim because the ADA claim is moot, while Plaintiff 18 maintains that jurisdiction over the Unruh claim is appropriate regardless of the state of 19 the ADA claim given the procedural posture of the case. (See ECF No. 18-1 at 15–16; 20 ECF No. 23 at 12–27; ECF No. 25 at 6–8.) 21 Here, the Court declines to extend jurisdiction. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), 22 the Court “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction” and may now 23 decline to hear the first cause of action. Also, as the Court has found that Defendants 24 remedied the alleged wrongful conduct such that it is not reasonably likely to recur, 25 Plaintiff’s insistence that the Court now retain jurisdiction and enforce the state law 26 claim’s damages remedy suggests that the state law claim “substantially predominate[d] 27 over the” now-moot ADA claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2). Declining to exercise 1 || supplemental jurisdiction, moreover, is consistent with how courts of this district have 2 ||addressed comparable situations arising in Plaintiff’s most recent ADA suits. See, e.g., 3 || Langer v. 6830 La Jolla Blvd., LLC, No. 3:19-CV-1790-GPC, 2020 WL 353601, at *4 4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2020) (declining supplemental jurisdiction of Unruh claim); Langer v. 5 || Deddeh, No. 19-CV-1879-CAB, 2019 WL 4918084, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2019) 6 ||(same); Langer v. Petras, No. 19-CV-1408-CAB, 2019 WL 3459107, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 7 || July 31, 2019) (same); Langer v. Badger Co., LLC, No. 18CV934-LAB, 2019 WL 8 2269951, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 24, 2019) (same); Langer v. Manuele, No. 18-CV-00104- 9 || BEN, 2018 WL 3019946, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 18, 2018) (same). 10 Consequently, the Court DECLINES jurisdiction over Plaintiff's second cause of 11 action and DISMISSES it. 12 C. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is Dismissed. 13 In the absence of jurisdiction to hear either cause of action in Plaintiff's complaint, 14 || the Court cannot adjudicate Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Consequently, the 15 ||Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s motion. 16 Conclusion 17 In light of the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion. The 18 Court FINDS that Plaintiff's first cause of action is moot and DISMISSES Plaintiff’ s 19 || second cause of action after declining to extend jurisdiction over it. (See ECF No. 18.) 20 || The Court also DISMISSES Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as it no longer has 21 ||jurisdiction to hear the motion. (See ECF No. 16.) This Action is thus hereby dismissed. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 Dated: February 12, 2020 24 Hon. athe Coke 5 United States District Judge 26 27 28