Langeberg v. Interstate Business Men's Accident Ass'n

231 N.W. 930, 57 S.D. 226, 1930 S.D. LEXIS 96
South Dakota Supreme Court·Decided August 12, 1930·No. File No. 6723·Published·Cited by 5 cases

Opinion

BROWN, P. J.

Plaintiff was insured by defendant against “loss of life, limb, sight or time, by reason of physical injury effected by accidental means, independent of all other causes.” By occupation he was a carpenter and had worked steadily at his trade ten or twelve hours a day in the neighborhood of Dell Rapids for more than three months immediately prior to the injury, hereinafter referred to. Having finished his work in the neighborhood of Dell Rapids, he took a job in the neighborhood of the Black Hills, some four hundred miles distant, finishing a modern house on a ranch. He worked on this job twelve hours a day for eight days, and while at work on the ninth, boring, with a brace and bit, holes in the edge of a door to make a slot for the insertion of a mortise lock, he encountered a knot in the wood which caused the threads of the bit to fill up so that he could not make the bit catch, and to continue cutting he forced his weight heavily against the head or “rose” of the brace. His foot slipped, the door which was held in place by a chisel driven between it and the floor swung loose, and he fell to the floor; the rose of the brace being driven heavily against the upper part of his abdomen. He felt a sharp pain in the region of the stomach, and going out to the porch vomited blood and at intervals during the afternoon and evening vomited large quantities of blood. The ranch was thirty miles from [228] the nearest railroad town, and efforts to procure a doctor 'by telephone were made but proved unavailing. As soon as it could be done a fellow workman started to take him home to Dell Rapids in an automobile, but at Chamberlain he was so ill that he was placed in the hospital there, where he remained five days and was then taken to his home in Dell Rapids. ■ After treatment there for about three weeks designed to build up his strength so that he could stand an -operation, an operation was performed, and it was found that the 'bleeding came from an area of the stomach in which there was an ulcer. He had experienced no pain or symptom of ailment prior to the accident. In an action on the policy, plaintiff recovered a judgment, from which, and from an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals.

A surgical expert, testifying as a witness for defendant, stated “that the sole cause of the hemorrhage was the existence of the ulcer in the upper part of the stomach which caused an erosion of the blood vessels in consequence of which they broke and that the pressure against his stomach by falling against the rose of the brace did not affect the ulcer.” On cross-examination he was asked, “if he had read Tice’s work?” to which he replied, “it is a pretty well padded work and I haven’t read all of it.” Thereupon, plaintiff’s counsel asked the question, “It is padded, is it not, by the opinion of Dr. Mayo on page 450, that the majority of stomach hemorrhages occur through means other than from gastric ulcers.” An objection on the ground that this called for hearsay was overruled, and the witness answered, “I don’t know.” In view of the answer it would seem too plain for argument that the assignment based upon this episode cannot be ■ sustained. Defendant clearly was not prejudiced by the ruling of the court or the answer of the witness.

It is to be kept in mind that this is an action to recover, not for death, but for loss of time resulting from the accident. Even if a gastric ulcer existed, it had caused plaintiff no inconvenience up to the time of the accident; he had no1 reason to even suspect it existed. But for the accident he might have gone on working as before, unaware of the ulcer until death overtook him from a natural cause entirely dissociated from the ulcer. Had it not been for the accident he might have lived out his life and never lost any time from work. With that possibility may it not be said [229] that the accident was the sole cause of the loss of time resulting from the injury?

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Langeberg v. Interstate Business Men's Accident Ass'n, 231 N.W. 930, 57 S.D. 226, 1930 S.D. LEXIS 96 (S.D. 1930).

231 N.W. 930 (Langeberg v. Interstate Business Men's Accident Ass'n) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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