Langdon-Warren Mines, Inc. v. Reynolds

52 F. Supp. 512
CourtDistrict Court, D. Minnesota
DecidedJuly 9, 1943
DocketNo. 695
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 52 F. Supp. 512 (Langdon-Warren Mines, Inc. v. Reynolds) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Langdon-Warren Mines, Inc. v. Reynolds, 52 F. Supp. 512 (mnd 1943).

Opinion

NORDBYE, District Judge.

Plaintiff, as sole distributee of the assets of the Pine Land Company, which was dissolved in 1939, is suing for a tax refund; of $34,403.43 plus interest from 1938. This sum represents the amount of a deficiency income tax which the Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed against the Pine Land Company on its income for 1938, and which plaintiff, as sole distributee, has paid. The parties to the action agree that the plaintiff’s rights to a refund depend upon the rights which the Pine Land Company had in 1938.

The facts upon which the case turns appear to be the following: In 1905, the Pine Land Company acquired a one-half interest in the Bruce iron ore mine on the Minnesota Mesabi Range, but no mining was done until 1925. About seventy drill holes were made prior to 1921 for the purpose of testing the ore. The results of these drilling operations were included in a Form D (Defendant’s Exhibit A) which the Pine Land Company submitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue in February, 1921, as a basis for determining the value of this mineral land for depletion purposes and its cost. In this Form D, the company declared that the total value of the property was $2,283,346.80 and estimated that the properties contained 12,685,262 tons of iron ore as of December 20, 1905.

The Bruce Mine was leased to'the International Harvester Company on March 30, 1920. By the lease, the Harvester Company agreed to pay the lessors (Pine Land Company owned the property with three other companies) a specified yearly royalty upon the tons of ore removed. It further agreed to pay the lessors $250,000 as compensation for various expenses they had incurred with respect to the mine since 1900 and that the yearly royalties would equal a specified minimum.1 The Harvester Company operated the mine until 1938. On January 14, 1938, the Harvester Company cancelled its lease, as the lease permitted, upon six months’ notice; so by July 18, 1938, the Harvester Company had removed all of its property, including the buildings, sintering plant, and all the mine equipment both above and below the ground, and the lease had terminated. The shaft was sealed.

The Pine Land Company deducted $719,-963.66 from its income tax for 1938 as a loss sustained, contending that the mine became worthless that year and was aban[514]*514doned by the plaintiff. The company’s books were kept, and its income reported on a cash receipts basis. The mine has not been worked since that time and the taxes have not been paid. The Board of Directors of the Pine Land Company passed a resolution in December, 1938, that the company was abandoning the mine, and that resolution was approved by the stockholders in January, 1939.

The Commissioner refused to permit the entire deduction and assessed the deficiency tax in question, basing his action upon the following premises:

(1) That the mine had value even after the cancellation of the lease by International Harvester Company, and there was no abandonment thereof by the taxpayer in 1938.

(2) That the $125,000 paid to Pine Land Company by International Harvester Company from 1920 to 1924 was in the nature of advance royalties, and $107,135.50 thereof was attributable to income for 1938.

(3) The amount of ore upon which International Harvester Company paid royalties under the minimum royalties agreement, and which it did not mine, cannot be considered depletion, and the royalties received therefor must be charged to the 1938 income.

Plaintiff takes issue with the Commissioner’s premises and resulting conclusions. Therefore, their correctness becomes the issue of this case. Plaintiff and defendant agree that if the Commissioner’s first premise is erroneous and plaintiff’s contention that the Bruce Mine was worthless is correct, then the second and third premises and issues become moot, for the deductions permissible, if the determination of the first issue favors plaintiff, would be greater than the amount due if the remaining issues are determined favorably to defendant.

Section 23(f) of the Revenue Act of 1938, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code, § 23(f), is the applicable statutory provision. It declares:

“In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
*****
“(f) Losses by corporations. In the case of a corporation, losses sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.”

Article 23(e)-3 of Regulations 101 provides: “When through some change in business conditions the usefulness in the business of some or all of the capital assets is suddenly terminated so that the taxpayer discards the business or discards such assets permanently from use in such business, he may claim as a loss for the year in which he takes such action the difference between the basis (adjusted as provided in Sec. 113(b) and Articles 113(a) (14)-1, 113(b)-!, 113(b)-2, 113(b)-3) and the salvage value of the property.”

To deduct a loss under this section, the taxpayer must prove (1) that the loss was realized or reasonably certain in fact and ascertainable in amount during the year for which it is deducted, Lucas v. American Code Co., 1930, 280 U.S. 445, 50 S.Ct. 202, 74 L.Ed. 538, 67 A.L.R. 1010, and (2) that the loss became fixed by an “identifiable event.” United States v. S. S. White Dental Co., 1927, 274 U.S. 398, 47 S.Ct. 598, 71 L.Ed. 1120; Dayton Co. v. Com’r of Int. Rev., 8 Cir., 90 F.2d 767. These are fact questions, Rhodes v. Com’r of Int. Rev., 6 Cir., 100 F.2d 966, Dayton Co. v. Com’r, supra, upon which the taxpayer bears the burden of proof. Dayton Co. v. Com’r, supra.

At the outset, it may be observed that: “A definitive sale of property is not required, and even in the absence of a divestiture of legal title a taxpayer may be considered in a very practical sense to have abandoned real estate.” Bickerstaff v. Com’r of Int. Rev., 5 Cir., 1942, 128 F.2d 366, 367. In contending that the mine was worthless in 1938, plaintiff largely relies on the testimony of C. J. Calvin and Frank M. Warren. Mr. Calvin was the engineer on the job for the Pine Land Company and the other fee owners of the Bruce Mine. After the International Harvester Company cancelled the lease, he made a survey to determine the condition and value of the mine, and reported to the owners that the mine could not be operated profitably and stated that, in his opinion, it would never be operated again. This report is identified as Exhibit 2, and while it was not formally offered in evidence, the Court has determined that it should be, and is now, received in evidence in that it establishes the information which came to the Pine Land Company regarding the situation with respect to this mine, and therefore it is material in so far as it may have a bearing upon the bona fides and finality of [515]*515the acts which the Pine Land Company assumed to take in connection with the abandonment of the mine.

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Bluebook (online)
52 F. Supp. 512, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/langdon-warren-mines-inc-v-reynolds-mnd-1943.