Langan v. Ætna Ins. Co.

96 F. 705, 1899 U.S. App. LEXIS 3274
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Northern Iowa
DecidedSeptember 14, 1899
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 96 F. 705 (Langan v. Ætna Ins. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Northern Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Langan v. Ætna Ins. Co., 96 F. 705, 1899 U.S. App. LEXIS 3274 (circtnia 1899).

Opinion

SHIKAS, District Judge

(orally). From the discussion had in this case upon the motion to strike out parts of the reply it is made clear to the court that there is involved in the issues a question of law, the decision of which will materially aid counsel in determining the evidence to be introduced in the further progress of the case; and, as the parties have been heard upon this question of law, the court will indicate the views taken thereof at the present time. The action is based upon a policy of insurance issued by the defendant company upon a brick dwelling house owned by plaintiff, and situated in the city of Clinton, in this state. During the lifetime of the policy a fire happened, greatly injuring the building. Notice thereof was given to the company; appraisers were appointed to estimate the amount of the loss, — the parties not being able to agree thereon; an award fixing the amount of the loss was made and signed by two of the appraisers, and 30 days from the signing thereof the company, in writing, notified the insured that it elected to repair the injured building. The question of law now presented to the court is whether, under the terms of the policy, it was open to the company to repair or rebuild the injured premises, after having participated in an appraisement, the purpose of which was to ascertain and determine in money the amount of the loss caused by the fire to the premises insured. . On behalf of the plaintiff it is claimed that if the company undertakes, in connection with the insured, to ascertain and determine the amount of the loss through the medium of an appraisement, it thereby loses its right to repair or rebuild the premises; that under the terms of the policy it is not open to the company to ascertain through an ap-praisement the' amount in money of the loss it may be called upon to pay, and then to elect whether it will pay this amount or whether it will repair the premises in lieu thereof; that this election to repair the property must he exercised before the company takes any steps, under the provisions of the policy, for ascertaining the amount in money of the damage to the property insured; and that, if the company unites with the insured in the appointment of appraisers for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of the loss, such appraise[707]*707ment being had, such action must be held to be an election on the part of the company to indemnify the insured by a money payment. The determination of (be question thus presented is dependent upon the construction of the terms of the policy, which forms the contract between the parties, the portions of which, pertinent to the question, are as follows: In the body of the policy it is declared that:

“The company shall not be liable beyond the actual cash value of the property at the lime any loss or damage occurs, and the loss or damage shall be ascertained or estimated according to such actual cash value, with proper deduction for depreciation, however caused, and .shall in no event exceed what it would then cost the insurer to repair or replace the same with material of like kind and quality. Said ascertainment or estimate shall be made by the insured and this company, or, if they differ, then by appraisers, as hereinafter provided; and, the amount of loss or damage having been thus determined, the sum for which this company is liable pursuant to this policy shall be payable sixty days after due notice, ascertainment, estimate, and- satisfactory proof of loss have been received by this company, in accordance with the terms of (his policy. It shall be optional, however, with this company to take ail or any parr of the articles at such ascertained or appraised value, and also to repair, rebuild, or replace ibe property lost or damaged with other of like kind arid quality within a reasonable time, on giving notice within thirty days after receipt of' the proof herein required of its intention so to do; but there can he no' abandonment to this company of the property described.”

In a subsequent clause it is provided that:

“This company shall not be held to have waived any provision or condition of iliis policy, or any forfeiture; thereof, by any act or requirement or proceeding relative to the appraisal, or to any exceptions herein provided for.”

In construing contracts of insurance against fire it must be borne in mind that they are not contracts for the payment of a specific sum of money named, but tire contracts of indemnity, whereby tin* company agrees to make good, to the insured, up to the limit of tii(> amount named in the policy, any loss or damage caused by Are to the property insured, by a payment in money, or by repairing, replacing, or rebuilding the property injured or destroyed. The mode in which the indemnity shall be given is usually left to the option of the company, which in each case, after a right to indemnity has accrued to the insured, must determine, within the time allowed it by the terms of the policy, whether it will repair or rebuild the property injured or pay in money the ascertained amount of the loss. It is not questioned in this case that under the terms of the policy issued by tire company this right of election as to the mode of indemnifying the insured in case of loss by Are is secured'to the defendant, the insurance company, but it is claimed that it must make the election before entering upon an appraisal of the loss caused by the Are; or, in other words, the contention of the plaintiff is that, if the company calls for an ascertainment of the extent of the damage caused by the Are to the insured property, or unites with the property owner in an appraisement of the damages, such action must be deemed in law to be an election on its part to pay the loss in money, and that the company cannot afterwards elect to make good the loss by replacing, «‘pairing, or rebuilding the injured property or premises. The proceedings to be taken in case of a Are injuring or destroying property covered by insurance in the defendant company are clearly pointed [708]*708out in the policy, which forms the contract of the parties. Upon the happening of the fire it is made the duty of the insured to give notice thereof to the company, and to take proper charge of the property injured. Then the amount of the loss or damage is to be ascertained or estimated, it being expressly declared in the policy that “said ascertainment or estimate shall be made by the insured and this company, or, if they differ, tben by appraisers.” Under the former part of this clause in the policy, in order to establish a right to claim indemnity from the company, it is necessary that the insured shall have the amount of the loss or damage ascertained, and then to furnish proof thereof to the company. The ascertainment of the amount of the loss must be had in one of the modes provided for in the policy itself, to wit, either by the parties agreeing on the amount, or by having the same ascertained by appraisers; and by the express terms of the policy this ascertainment of the amount of the loss, either by agreement or by appraisement, forms an essential part ,of the proof which must be furnished to the company as a condition precedent to the right to maintain an action against the company, unless the furnishing thereof is waived by the company. Hamilton v. Insurance Co., 136 U. S. 242, 10 Sup. Ct. 945; George Dee & Sons Co. v. Key City Fire Ins. Co. (Iowa) 73 N. W. 594.

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111 F. 702 (Eighth Circuit, 1901)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
96 F. 705, 1899 U.S. App. LEXIS 3274, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/langan-v-tna-ins-co-circtnia-1899.