Lang v. District of Columbia

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: July 6, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2020-1199
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SHEILA LANG,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 20-cv-1199 (TSC)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

Plaintiff Sheila Lang, a former teacher at the District of Columbia Public Schools

(“DCPS”), filed this lawsuit against the District of Columbia and former DCPS Principal Anna

Krughoff, alleging employment discrimination and First Amendment violations. In March 2023,

the court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Third Amended

Complaint, allowing Plaintiff to proceed with her First Amendment claim against Krughoff and

her hostile work environment claims against the District. See Mem. Op. at 28, ECF No. 25.1 As

the case proceeded to discovery, the court set a June 2023 deadline for amended pleadings. See

Scheduling Order, ECF No. 29.

Approximately two-and-a-half years after that deadline, in January 2026, Plaintiff moved

for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint. See Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 60; see also Proposed

Fourth Am. Compl., ECF No. 60-1 (“FAC”). She seeks to revive her dismissed First

Amendment municipal liability and retaliation claims and add allegations to buttress her non-

dismissed claims. See Pl.’s Mot. at 3–4. Defendants oppose further amendment. See Defs.’

1 For a more detailed overview of this case’s background and procedural history, see Memorandum Opinion, ECF No. 25.

Page 1 of 10 Opp’n, ECF No. 68. Despite receiving two extensions to reply to Defendants’ Opposition, see

Min. Order (Apr. 15, 2026), Min. Order (Apr. 16, 2026), Plaintiff’s counsel was late to file a

Reply, see Pl.’s Reply, ECF No. 73. Although the court will GRANT Plaintiff’s motion to

accept the late filed and overlength Reply, ECF No. 74, the court will DENY Plaintiff’s motion

for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint, ECF No. 60.

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) ordinarily governs a motion for leave to amend a

complaint. Under Rule 15(a)’s “liberal standard for granting leave,” Firestone v. Firestone, 76

F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996), “leave to amend should be freely given unless there is a good

reason, such as futility, to the contrary.” Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 100 F.3d 999,

1003 (D.C. Cir. 1996). But when a plaintiff seeks to amend after the scheduling order deadline

for amendment has passed, “the more stringent good cause standard imposed by” Rule “16(b)

applies.” In re Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG Litig., 762 F. Supp. 2d 56, 59 (D.D.C. 2011);

see also Sacerdote v. NYU, 9 F.4th 95, 115 (2d Cir. 2021) (“The period of ‘liberal’ amendment

ends if the district court issues a scheduling order setting a date after which no amendment will

be permitted.”); Cheeks v. Belmar, 162 F.4th 899, 907 (8th Cir. 2025) (“Rule 16(b)—rather than

Rule 15(a)—governs the amendment of pleadings after the [scheduling order] deadline

expires.”).

“To show good cause under” that “more stringent” standard, “the moving party must

show both diligence and a lack of prejudice to the opposing parties.” In re Papst, 762 F. Supp.

2d at 59 (emphasis added). The primary consideration is diligence; “if the party was not diligent,

the inquiry should end.” United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., 285 F.R.D. 133, 136

(D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir.

Page 2 of 10 1992)). “Only after the movant shows good cause may the court consider whether amendment is

[also] proper under Rule 15(a).” Cheeks, 162 F.4th at 907; see also 6A Charles Alan Wright &

Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1522.2 (3d ed. 2026) (“[T]he Rule 16(b) standard

controls any decisions to alter a scheduling order for purposes of making pleading amendments

and it must be satisfied before determining whether an amendment should be permitted under

Rule 15.”).

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s counsel contends that during discovery he learned of evidence to support ten

sets of new allegations. See Pl.’s Mot. at 2–3. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s counsel had

most of this evidence by early April 2024, and that his one-year-and-nine-month delay in moving

to amend—approximately two-and-a-half years after the amended pleadings deadline—reflects a

lack of diligence. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 10. The court agrees with Defendants.

a. Family Issues and Workload

As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s counsel attributes roughly six months of delay to his

obligations as his father’s “primary caregiver” and his father’s death. Pl.’s Reply at 7, ECF No.

73. Specifically, counsel’s father became “terribly ill” around late April 2024 and passed away

on September 2, 2024. Id. According to Plaintiff’s counsel, that means any delay until mid-

October 2024—“or about one month after [his] father’s funeral”—is categorically justified. Id.

Plaintiff’s counsel also justifies this and other delays by pointing to his responsibilities “working

for other clients.” Id. at 8. But although counsel “regrettably suffered through a period of

personal hardship” and had competing work demands, “‘a lawyer’s duty of diligence transcends

both upheaval at work and personal tragedy.’” Strong-Fischer v. Peters, 554 F. Supp. 2d 19, 25

(D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Davila-Alvarez v. Escuela de Medicina Universidad Cent. del Caribe,

Page 3 of 10 257 F.3d 58, 65 (1st Cir. 2001)). Even if personal tragedy excuses some delay, it cannot justify

six months’ worth. Cf. Davila-Alvarez, 257 F.3d at 65 (reasoning that counsel “was not

relieved” of his “ongoing responsibility to inquire into the status of a case” by “his brother’s

untimely death”); Harrington v. City of Chicago, 433 F.3d 542, 548 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that

counsel’s “abandonment of the case during discovery . . . cannot be excused by the deaths in his

family”). Nor does counsel’s status as “a busy sole-practitioner . . . relieve [him] of [his] duty to

diligently pursue discovery.” Gaines v. United States, 54 F. App’x 797 (5th Cir. 2002). “That

an attorney has other matters in his office which require his attention does not constitute excuse

for neglect of attention to any one matter.” Citizens’ Protective League v. Clark, 178 F.2d 703,

704 (D.C. Cir. 1949); see also Stonkus v. City of Brockton Sch. Dep’t, 322 F.3d 97, 101 (1st Cir.

2003) (“Most attorneys are busy most of the time and they must organize their work so as to be

able to meet the requirements of the matters they are handling or suffer the consequences.”

(cleaned up)).

b. New Allegations

As for the ten sets of new allegations, Plaintiff’s counsel largely does not dispute that the

evidence underlying most of them was turned over in April 2024 or otherwise already available

to him.2 Beginning with the first two sets of new allegations, Plaintiff’s counsel states that

2 The ten sets of new allegations are: “(1) the identity of the defendants’ major coconspirators; (2) relevant emails to and from those coconspirators; (3) the District’s illegal, secret investigations of Lang wherein the District violated the law by never affording Lang with notice of those investigations and by never granting Lang’s right to defend against those investigations; (4) the adverse actions imposed against Lang during those illegal investigations; (5) the District’s elimination of Lang’s salary from its fiscal year 2019 budget; (6) the District’s elimination of the salaries of two black coworkers who opposed racial discrimination against Lang; (7) possible proof that the District’s chancellor retaliated against Lang for her protected speech; (8) a striking example of disparate treatment between the black plaintiff and her white supervisor; (9) coworker and parent complaints about the District’s racially hostile

Page 4 of 10 through discovery he learned of “(1) the identity of the defendants’ major coconspirators and (2)

relevant emails to and from those coconspirators.” Pl.’s Mot. at 2. Defendant responds that the

identity of alleged co-conspirators and each email cited in the proposed Fourth Amended

Complaint was disclosed in April 2024. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 10 & n.7. Plaintiff’s counsel fails

to dispute that assertion in the Reply.

Turning to set 3—the District’s alleged “illegal, secret investigations of Lang wherein the

District violated the law by never affording Lang with notice of those investigations and by

never granting Lang’s right to defend against those investigations,” Pl.’s Mot. at 2—Plaintiff’s

counsel clarified in the Reply that he was referring to “a secret reopening of DCPS’s

investigation of [Plaintiff’s] trip to Europe.” Pl.’s Reply at 11. Specifically, Plaintiff supervised

a school trip for several students and a parent to Europe, but while “Plaintiff was at the departure

gate . . . , the students and parent slipped away from” Plaintiff who “did not realize until the

flight reached London that the rest of the group had missed the flight.” Mem. Op. at 4 (cleaned

up). An initial DCPS investigation found “no wrongdoing on [Plaintiff’s] part with regard to the

field trip.” Id. (cleaned up). Plaintiff’s counsel contends, however, that some of the documents

turned over in April 2024—DC-3599 through DC-3606—contained redactions which covered up

evidence relevant to the claim that DCPS had secretly reopened this investigation. Pl.’s Reply at

11. But counsel concedes that the basis for these new allegations largely comes from DC-680

through DC-682, which counsel does not dispute he received in April 2024. Id. In any event,

Plaintiff asked for unredacted versions of DC-3599 through DC-3606 on May 12, 2025, and

received them about a week later. Id. Notably, it took Plaintiff more than a year to address these

workplace; and (10) the District’s materially false but secret and illegal job performance evaluations that resulted in both the elimination of Lang’s job assignment and her constructive discharge.” Pl.’s Mot. at 2–3.

Page 5 of 10 deficiencies in the April 2024 production, which does not reflect diligence. Moreover, Plaintiff’s

counsel does not explain his eight-month delay in moving to amend after he received the

unredacted versions.

It is unclear what Plaintiff’s counsel is referring to with set 4—“the adverse actions

imposed against [Plaintiff] during those illegal investigations.” Pl.’s Mot. at 2–3. The adverse

actions alleged in the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint appear to be that Plaintiff was placed

on “forced indefinite administrative leave” following her November 2017 PTA speech in which

she complained of race discrimination, FAC ¶ 27(a); investigated without an opportunity to

defend herself, id. ¶ 27(c); had her salary defunded from the FY2019 budget, id. ¶ 38; and had

her position as a reading teacher at Cleveland excessed, id. ¶ 47. Set 4 thus substantially

overlaps with set 5—“the District’s elimination of Lang’s salary from its fiscal year 2019

budget.” Pl.’s Mot. at 3. But the Third Amended Complaint already alleges that Plaintiff’s

position as a reading teacher was excessed in 2018 after Plaintiff was transferred to a different

school, see, e.g., Third Am. Compl. ¶ 34(a), ECF No. 15, so the elimination of that salary in the

FY2019 budget is not new. The same is true for set 6—“the District’s elimination of the salaries

of two black coworkers who opposed racial discrimination against Lang.” Pl.’s Mot. at 3. The

Third Amended Complaint already alleges that those positions were excessed, see Third Am.

Compl. ¶ 26(x), (z), so this too is not new.

Set 7 concerns “possible proof that the District’s chancellor retaliated against Lang for

her protected speech.” Pl.’s Mot. at 3. Specifically, documents DC-3599 through DC-3606

reflect that the DCPS Chancellor was involved in the decision to involuntarily transfer Plaintiff

from Cleveland to Browne. See Pl.’s Reply at 11. Plaintiff’s counsel contends that these

documents contained redactions which “blotted out” the critical information when they were

Page 6 of 10 initially turned over in April 2024. Id. at 11. But as discussed above, it was not diligent for

Plaintiff’s counsel to wait until May 2025 to request unredacted versions to documents he

received in April 2024. Counsel has failed, moreover, to explain his eight-month delay after he

received the unredacted versions to seek leave to amend.

Set 8—“a striking example of disparate treatment between the black plaintiff and her

white supervisor”—concerns how Principal Krughoff was treated after a child was improperly

released under her watch from a Cleveland afterschool program to a stranger in December 2017.

Pl.’s Mot. at 3; see also Pl.’s Reply at 15–16. According to Plaintiff, the leniency Krughoff was

afforded stands in stark contrast to the “racist harassment” Plaintiff received in the aftermath of

the failed Europe trip. Pl.’s Reply at 16. Plaintiff’s counsel contends that he learned of this

incident in November 2025 through online research that was prompted by emails released to him

in April 2024 mentioning media coverage at Cleveland Elementary in December 2017. Id. at 15.

This again shows a lack of diligence. The media stories have been publicly available since

December 2017 and could have been discovered by simple internet searches into Cleveland

Elementary long before November 2025. In any event, Plaintiff’s counsel received the emails

that prompted his simple internet search in April 2024; his more than year-and-a-half delay in

reviewing those emails was not diligent.

Set 9—“coworker and parent complaints about the District’s racially hostile

workplace”—appears to refer to a petition campaign by parents and teachers who sought to

preserve the job of a Black assistant principal at Cleveland, which Plaintiff’s counsel links to a

“closely related petition campaign in April 2018 to preserve [Plaintiff’s] employment as a

Cleveland reading teacher.” Pl.’s Reply at 12; see also FAC ¶ 43 (conceding Plaintiff “agreed

to” a petition drive on her behalf in 2018). To start, it is unclear why Plaintiff’s counsel needed

Page 7 of 10 discovery to plead “closely related” petition campaigns that his client was aware of in 2018. In

any event, the relevant discovery was disclosed in April and October 2024. See Defs.’ Opp’n at

12–13; see also Pl.’s Reply at 13. Although Plaintiff contends some of these documents

contained redactions that were not lifted until July 2025, he does not indicate that those

redactions concealed the existence of the petition campaigns or parent complaints, as opposed to

non-essential details like the names of the parents involved. See Pl.’s Reply at 12–13. Given

these circumstances, Plaintiff’s counsel has again failed to show diligence.

Finally, set 10 concerns “the District’s materially false but secret and illegal job

performance evaluations that resulted in both the elimination of Lang’s job assignment and her

constructive discharge.” Pl.’s Mot. at 3. Defendants produced the performance evaluation and

evaluation rubric in April 2024. Defs.’ Opp’n at 13; Pl.’s Reply at 8, 14. Plaintiff’s counsel

indicates that he “studied” the rubric used to make excessing decisions in August 2024, but did

not “realize[]” until more than a year later, in November 2025 that “the illegal excessing of

[Plaintiff’s] job assignment by way of the ‘rubric’ . . . needed to be alleged in a fourth amended

complaint.” Pl.’s Reply at 8, 14. Having possessed the relevant documents since April 2024,

Plaintiff’s counsel cannot characterize his delayed comprehension of their relevance and his

further delay in moving to amend as the product of diligence. This is emblematic of the larger

problem. Across the new allegations, the pattern is the same: Plaintiff’s counsel had most of the

underlying evidence since the April 2024 production or before, but then took many months, and

in most instances more than a year, to review those documents, grasp their significance, and act

on them. That is not diligent.

Plaintiff’s counsel notes that discovery has been voluminous—Defendants produced

roughly 4,500 pages of documents in response to his requests. Pl.’s Reply at 2. To the extent

Page 8 of 10 Plaintiff’s counsel thereby means to suggest that his delay is justified by the volume of discovery

and the number of discovery disputes he raised, the court is not persuaded. See id. at 2, 12.

Although the challenges associated with discovery in this case may have justified several months

of delay for a diligent lawyer, it does not justify counsel’s delay of one year and nine months in

moving to amend his pleadings after the vast majority of documents were turned over in April

2024, and two and a half years after the amended pleadings deadline had passed. Because

Plaintiff’s counsel has failed to establish diligence, the Rule 16(b) analysis is at its end and the

court need not consider whether amendment would be justified under Rule 15(a). See Kellogg

Brown, 285 F.R.D. at 136; Cheeks, 162 F.4th at 907.

Plaintiff’s counsel also notes that the court granted Defendants’ unopposed motion to stay

the Scheduling Order deadlines in November 2024 to allow the parties time to resolve discovery

disputes. See Pl’s Reply at 10; Min. Order (Nov. 26, 2024). But that order merely stayed expert

discovery deadlines, the end of discovery, and summary judgment briefing; the amended

pleadings deadline had already long passed. Thus, the stay of those discovery and summary

judgment deadlines does not excuse counsel’s considerable delay in moving to amend the

pleadings based on discovery materials he already had after the amended pleadings deadline.

Finally, Plaintiff’s counsel worries that because the “Third Amended Complaint never

referred to [certain] evidence” learned in discovery, the court “will bar” Plaintiff from using “this

newly acquired proof” at trial and summary judgment. Pl.’s Mot. at 2. That concern is largely

misplaced. Although “a plaintiff is not permitted to raise new claims at the summary judgment

stage, where those claims were not pleaded in the complaint,” Taylor v. Mills, 892 F. Supp. 2d

124, 137 (D.D.C. 2012), or make a “fundamental change” to their theories of liability, Trudel v.

SunTrust Bank, 924 F.3d 1281, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2019), a plaintiff is not prohibited from using

Page 9 of 10 evidence obtained in discovery to support existing claims and theories merely because that

evidence was not mentioned in the complaint. As the pleading that merely initiates litigation, a

complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2),

not all the evidence which supports the claim. See Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe, 964 F.3d

1203, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (explaining that a complaint “need not set out all the precise facts

on which the claim is based” (cleaned up)). “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the

court looks beyond the pleadings and may take into consideration affidavits, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file[.]” Mann-Paller Found. v. Econometric Rsch.,

Inc., 644 F. Supp. 92, 93 (D.D.C. 1986) (emphasis added). Thus, this decision does not limit

Plaintiff to the evidence alleged in the Third Amended Complaint when this case moves to

summary judgment, but merely holds that Plaintiff’s counsel was too tardy in seeking to revive

the already dismissed claims.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to accept the late filed and overlength

Reply, ECF No. 74, is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a Fourth Amended

Complaint, ECF No. 60, is DENIED. The parties are ORDERED to meet and confer and file a

Joint Status Report by July 20, 2026, proposing next steps in this long-delayed litigation.

It is SO ORDERED.

Date: July 6, 2026

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge

Page 10 of 10