Lanekia Chante Eckles v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: July 14, 2011
• Docket: 01-10-00634-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued July 14, 2011.

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

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NO. 01-10-00634-CR

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Lanekia Chante Eckles, Appellant

V.

The State of TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 262nd District Court 

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 1185654

MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Lanekia Chante Eckles pleaded no contest to the offense of indecent exposure.  See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.08(a) (West 2011).  Pursuant to Eckles’s plea agreement with the State, the trial court deferred adjudication of her guilt and placed her on community supervision for one year.  The State filed a motion to revoke, alleging that Eckles violated conditions of her community supervision.  The trial court granted the motion, revoked her community supervision, and assessed her punishment at ninety days’ confinement.  On appeal, Eckles maintains that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her community supervision. We affirm. 

Background

          The State indicted Eckles for aggravated sexual assault of a child.  As part of a plea agreement, the State reduced the charged offense to indecent exposure, and Eckles pleaded no contest to that offense.  She signed written admonishments acknowledging that she understood the consequences of her plea and certifying that she was mentally competent.  Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court deferred adjudication of guilt and placed Eckles on community supervision for one year.  The conditions of Eckles’s community supervision included a requirement that she attend sexual offender treatment and be successfully discharged from the treatment.  The relevant condition reads:

Participate in Sex Offender Evaluation and attend treatment and aftercare as recommended or as designated by the Court beginning immediately upon referral.  Attend treatment and aftercare with a State of Texas registered Sex Offender Provider as recommended.  Comply with all program rules, regulations[,] and guidelines until successfully discharged or released by further order of the Court.  

The State filed a motion to revoke community supervision after Eckles was discharged unsuccessfully from sex offender treatment.  The motion to revoke states in part:

The State would further show the said Defendant did then and there, violate terms and conditions of Community Supervision by: Failing to comply with al[l] program rules, regulations and guidelines until successfully discharged or released by further order of the Court.  The defendant was unsuccessfully discharged from sex offender treatment on June 1, 2010.

Eckles pleaded not true to the State’s allegation that she had been discharged because she failed to comply with the rules, regulations, and guidelines of the treatment program. 

Dr. Karen Gallaher was Eckles’s treatment provider.  Dr. Gallaher testified it is important for each sex offender to take responsibility for what she has done so that she can be rehabilitated and avoid recidivism.  During the course of her treatment, Eckles continually denied that she committed any offense.  Dr. Gallaher testified that even if a patient, like Eckles, is unwilling to admit to her conduct, she attempts to work with the patient on other topics.  For example, according to Dr. Gallaher, all people make cognitive distortions or “thinking errors” that lead to inappropriate behavior.  Dr. Gallaher asked Eckles to identify any “thinking errors” she had outside of a sexual context.  Eckles refused to identify any of her “thinking errors.”  Eckles’s refusal indicated to Dr. Gallaher her resistance to treatment.  Dr. Gallaher added that Eckles failed to complete any homework assignments except for one.  Dr. Gallaher asked Eckles to complete a life story, and Eckles completed only one portion of her life story.     

Eckles also failed to actively participate in group therapy.  According to Dr. Gallaher, group therapy is an important aspect of treatment.  Eckles provided little, if any, feedback during the group therapy sessions.  She did not speak up or participate.  At one point, Dr. Gallaher told Eckles that it was necessary for her to increase her participation in the group sessions to be successful.  Dr. Gallaher testified that she did not discharge Eckles because of her denial of the offense.  She discharged Eckles because of her overall lack of participation in the treatment program, particularly her failure to complete assignments and failure to participate in group therapy.  She testified that even if Eckles continued to deny the offense, she would have allowed Eckles to continue in the treatment so long as she actively participated.  Dr. Gallaher admitted that Eckles attended every treatment session and is a shy person.  Two family friends of Eckles also testified at the hearing that she is a shy person.   

Eckles testified that Dr. Gallaher wanted her to admit to guilt to the offense, and she became upset when Eckles refused.  According to Eckles, Dr. Gallaher terminated her treatment because she would not admit that she was guilty of the offense.  Eckles said that she completed all homework assignments.  She admitted that she would not interact during the group therapy sessions.  She said that she understood the conditions of her community supervision, including the requirement to participate in counseling.  After hearing the evidence, the trial court found that the allegation in the State’s motion to revoke was true. The trial court then found Eckles guilty of indecent exposure, revoked her probation, and sentenced her to ninety days’ confinement in jail.  Eckles timely filed notice of appeal, and on appeal argues that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the State’s motion to revoke community supervision.    

Discussion

Standard of Review

We review a trial court's order revoking community supervision under an abuse-of-discretion standard.  Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).  The trial court abuses its discretion in issuing the order to revoke if the State fails to meet its burden of proof.  Greathouse v. State, 33 S.W.3d 455, 458 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet ref’d).  We examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order.  Id.  The trial judge is the sole trier of the facts and determines the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.  Taylor v. State, 604 S.W.2d 175, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Amado v. State, 983 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d).

In a community supervision revocation hearing, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the probationer violated the terms and conditions of community supervision.  Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Smith v. State, 790 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d).  This standard is met when the greater weight of the credible evidence creates a reasonable belief that the defendant violated a condition of his community supervision.  Jenkins v. State, 740 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Akbar v. State, 190 S.W.3d 119, 123 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.).  When several violations are found by the trial court, we will affirm the order revoking community supervision if the State proved any violation by a preponderance of the evidence.  Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 870–71 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Akbar, 190 S.W.3d at 123.

Analysis

Here, as a condition of her community supervision, Eckles had to comply with all rules, regulations, and guidelines of her sex offender treatment and be successfully discharged from the treatment.  Eckles claims that she completed all assignments and that Dr. Gallaher terminated her simply because she would not admit she was guilty of the offense.  She maintains that the order of deferred adjudication is void because to successfully complete sex offender treatment she was required to admit guilt to aggravated sexual assault of a child, an offense with which she was no longer charged.  Similarly, she contends that the trial court violated her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by requiring her to admit that she committed aggravated sexual assault of child.[1]   

Dr. Gallaher testified, however, that she did not discharge Eckles because of her denial of the offense.  She stated that even if Eckles continued to deny the offense, she would have allowed Eckles to continue in the treatment so long as she actively participated.  Eckles was unsuccessfully discharged because she failed to actively participate.  Eckles failed to complete all homework assignments except one and refused to participate in the “thinking errors” exercise.  She also did not participate during group therapy sessions.  She provided little, if any, feedback and did not speak up.  Even after Dr. Gallaher warned her that she needed to increase her participation in the sessions to be successful, Eckles still did not actively participate.  Eckles’s behavior indicated that she was resistant to treatment.[2]  Eckles testified that Dr. Gallaher terminated her because she would not admit guilt.  Since the trial court is the sole trier of the facts and determines the credibility of the witnesses, it was free to resolve any conflicts between Dr. Gallaher’s testimony and Eckles’s testimony.  See Taylor, 604 S.W.2d at 179; Amado, 983 S.W.2d at 332.  The evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the revocation decision, supports the trial court’s finding that Eckles violated a condition of her community service by failing to comply with all rules, regulations, and guidelines of her sex offender treatment, resulting in her unsuccessful discharge from treatment.  See Sanchez, 603 S.W.2d at 870–77; Akbar, 190 S.W.3d at 123.  We, therefore, hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate Eckles’s Fifth Amendment rights in revoking her community supervision.    

Conclusion

          We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                   Jane Bland

                                                                   Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Bland, and Massengale.

Do not publish.   Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

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[1]           In response to Eckles’s argument, the State relies upon Ellerbe v. State.  See 80 S.W.3d 721, 722 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d).  There, Ellerbe pleaded no contest to aggravated sexual assault of a child.  Id.  Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court deferred adjudication of Ellerbe’s guilt and placed him on community supervision.  Id.  The trial court ordered Ellerbe to attend and participate in a sex offender treatment program.  Id.  Ellerbe’s treatment program required him to admit that he committed a sexual assault.  Id.  Ellerbe denied guilt of the offense and was therefore unsuccessfully discharged.  Id.  The trial court then adjudicated him guilty.  Id.  This court held that a plea of no contest does not relieve a defendant from having to admit to the commission of an offense as to fully participate in a treatment program as a condition of community supervision. Id. at 723.  Ellerbe, however, is inapplicable here because Dr. Gallaher asked Eckles to admit to a sexual assault of a child.  Eckles pleaded guilty to indecent exposure, not to sexual assault.   

[2]           In a case similar to Eckles’s situation, the defendant claimed his probation was revoked without reason and the revocation was a violation of his due-process rights.  Pickett v. State, No. 05-98-01174-CR, 1999 WL 793397, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 6, 1999, no pet.) (not designated for publication). The State alleged the defendant was unsuccessfully discharged from two sex-offender-treatment programs, which violated a condition of his probation.  Id.  The defendant stated he attended the program, paid all the fees, and abided by all the rules, but the court noted the defendant refused to take responsibility for his offense and he continued to maintain his innocence.  Id.  In the second program, the defendant did not actively participate in the program by failing to present his sexual history, minimizing his offense, and refusing to present a relapse plan to his group.  Id.  The court concluded the probation conditions not only required the defendant to attend the sessions, but the defendant needed to abide by treatment directives and continue his treatment.  Id. at *2.  Because the defendant failed to complete this condition, the court held the State successfully demonstrated the defendant violated his probation.  Id.