Lane v. Levi

21 App. D.C. 168, 1903 U.S. App. LEXIS 5468
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedJanuary 20, 1903
DocketNo. 1259
StatusPublished

This text of 21 App. D.C. 168 (Lane v. Levi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lane v. Levi, 21 App. D.C. 168, 1903 U.S. App. LEXIS 5468 (D.C. Cir. 1903).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Shepard

delivered the opinion of the Court:

1. The appellant is not in a position to avail himself of his first assignment of error, which is founded on the [174]*174failure of the bill to sufficiently describe the subject-matter of the complainant’s patent of which infringement is charged.

For whilst it would seem that the bill was defective in that respect, the defendant neither demurred nor objected in any form on the preliminary hearing, but admitted the existence of the patent, of the contents of which he was evidently advised, and denied that he was making and vending the composition claimed thereunder by the complainant. Moreover, on that hearing the learned justice who granted the injunction was called upon to consider certified copies of the patent, offered by the complainant, and of the proceedings in the Patent Office, preliminary to its issue, offered on behalf of the defendant. Both of these papers have also been presented for consideration on this-appeal. For these reasons the point will not be considered. Before the final hearing the parties will have ample opportunity to amend if they so desire.

2. Whether the allegations of the bill in respect of the validity of the patent are sufficient to give jurisdiction in equity is likewise an immaterial question on this appeal.

No suggestion of the point was made on the hearing below; nor could it have been made, with any show of reason or consistency, in view of the answer admitting its validity as covering the composition of the complainant, and seeking to avoid its effect by the allegation of substantial differences between the two compositions which relieve that of the defendant of the charge of infringement. 3 Robinson on Patents, Sec. 1189; Walker on Patents, Sec. 673.

3. The only question that is directly involved in this appeal arises under the third and related assignments of error. It is whether, under the facts disclosed by the respective pleadings of the parties, the supporting affidavits, and the proceedings in the Patent Office, the manufacture and sale of the defendant’s composition constitute such an apparent infringement of the complainant’s patent as to warrant the grant of the temporary injunction?

A patentable compound or composition of matter is one [175]*175that is produced by the intermixture of two or more specific ingredients, and possesses properties pertaining to none of those ingredients separately, thereby accomplishing a new and useful result. The patentee who seeks protection for such a composition must describe with clearness and precision the component parts thereof, the process of their intermixture, and the result. Tyler v. Boston, 7 Wall. 327, 330; 1 Robinson Patents, Sec. 192; 2 Idem, Secs. 500 and 532.

The identity of a composition depends, in general, upon the identity of its ingredients and of their co-operative law, as well as upon the identity of the properties and effect of the composition as a whole. 1 Robinson on Patents, Sec. 300.

The addition, however, of substances that do not, by their interaction, change the properties, effect, or usefulness of the composition, does not destroy its identity. The composition is the same if its properties substantially remain. 1 Robinson on Patents, Sec. 195; Klein v. Russell, 19 Wall. 433.

Nor is a patent for a compound any less infringed through the substitution of one of its ingredients by another substance well known in the arts at the date of the patent, as endowed with the same capacity, and which, therefore, does not change its properties and effect. 1 Robinson on Patents, Sec. 247; Fuller v. Yentzer, 94 U. S. 288, 297; Rowell v. Lindsay, 113 U. S. 97, 102; Fay v. Cordesman, 109 U. S. 408, 420; Hubbell v. U. S., 179 U. S. 77, 82.

On the other hand, it is an undoubted principle of the patent law that the omission of one of a combination of old parts distinctly claimed in the patent is not an infringement.

The combination as claimed is an entirety and disappears with the removal of one of its elements. Prouty v. Ruggles, 16 Pet. 336, 341; Vance v. Campbell, 1 Black, 427; Klein v. Russell, 19 Wall. 433, 465; Dunbar v. Myers, 94 U. S. 187, 202; Rowell v. Lindsay, 113 U. S. 97, 102; Wright v. Yuengling, 155 U. S. 47, 52.

Having made such a claim a patentee is not afterward [176]*176at liberty to prove that the described part is not essential or material to the operation of his patented combination or composition. Vance v. Campbell, 1 Black, 427, 429; Fay v. Cordesman, 109 U. S. 408, 420. In the case last cited it was said by Mr. Justice Blatchford in words that have since been repeatedly approved: “ The claims of the patent sued on in this case are claims for combinations. In such a claim if the patentee specifies any element as entering into the combination, either directly by the language of the claim, or by such a reference to the descriptive part of the specification as carries such element into the claim, he makes such element material to the combination, and the court cannot declare it to be immaterial. It is his province to make his own claim and his privilege to restrict it. If it be a claim to a combination, and be restricted to specific elements, all must be regarded as material, leaving open only the question whether an omitted part is supplied by an equivalent device or instrumentality. Water Meter Co. v. Desper, 101 U. S. 332; Gage v. Herring, 107 U. S. 640.” See also Sargent v. Hall Safe and Lode Co., 114 U. S. 63, 86; Electric Signal Co. v. Hall Signal Co., 114 U. S. 87, 98; Yale Lock Co. v. Sargent, 117 U. S. 373, 378; McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U. S. 419, 425; Royer v. Coupe, 146 U. S. 524, 530; Wright v. Yuengling, 155 U. S. 47, 52; Hubhell v. U. S., 179 U. S. 77, 82.

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Related

Prouty and Mears v. RUGGLES
41 U.S. 336 (Supreme Court, 1842)
Vance v. Campbell
66 U.S. 427 (Supreme Court, 1862)
Tyler v. Boston
74 U.S. 327 (Supreme Court, 1869)
Klein v. Russell
86 U.S. 433 (Supreme Court, 1874)
Dunbar v. Myers
94 U.S. 187 (Supreme Court, 1876)
Fuller v. Yentzer
94 U.S. 288 (Supreme Court, 1877)
Water-Meter Co. v. Desper
101 U.S. 332 (Supreme Court, 1880)
Gage v. Herring
107 U.S. 640 (Supreme Court, 1883)
Fay v. Cordesman
109 U.S. 408 (Supreme Court, 1883)
Rowell v. Lindsay
113 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1885)
Sargent v. Hall Safe & Lock Co.
114 U.S. 63 (Supreme Court, 1885)
Yale Lock Manufacturing Co. v. Sargent
117 U.S. 373 (Supreme Court, 1886)
McClain v. Ortmayer
141 U.S. 419 (Supreme Court, 1891)
Royer v. Coupe
146 U.S. 524 (Supreme Court, 1892)
Knapp v. Morss
150 U.S. 221 (Supreme Court, 1893)
Wright v. Yuengling
155 U.S. 47 (Supreme Court, 1894)
Hubbell v. United States
179 U.S. 77 (Supreme Court, 1900)

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21 App. D.C. 168, 1903 U.S. App. LEXIS 5468, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lane-v-levi-cadc-1903.