THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In the Court of Appeals
Margie
Lane, Appellant,
v.
Donald
Lane, Respondent.
Appeal from Clarendon County
R. Wright Turbeville, Family Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2004-UP-009
Submitted December 8, 2003 Filed January
14, 2004
AFFIRMED
Kristi F. Curtis, of Sumter, for Appellant.
Lori D. Hall, of West Columbia
and Cyril B. Rush Jr. of Columbia, for Respondent.
ANDERSON, J.: The family court granted
Margie Lane (Wife) and Donald Lane (Husband) a divorce and apportioned the
marital property. The apportionment allocated thirty-five percent of the marital
property to Wife and sixty-five percent to Husband, including the parties marital
residence. We affirm. [1]
FACTS
Wife commenced an action for divorce by filing a summons
and complaint on March 20, 2000. The complaint prayed for a divorce on grounds
of adultery, an order requiring Husband to maintain health insurance on Wife,
apportionment of the marital property, and possession of the marital home.
Husband answered and counterclaimed, also seeking a divorce on grounds of adultery.
The family court issued a temporary order, based partially on an agreement between
the parties, on August 8, 2000.
The parties were married in 1989. Husband was employed as
a sergeant with the South Carolina Highway Patrol, while Wife worked part-time
for her brothers cabinet making company. At this point, the parties resided
with Wifes mother in Chesterfield County. Upon Husband receiving a promotion,
the parties relocated to York, South Carolina. After the relocation to York,
Wife began working for the South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles (SCDMV).
She stayed at this position until 1995, when Husband received a second promotion
to lieutenant colonel, which required relocation to Columbia. From 1995 until
the end of the marriage, Wife has been unemployed.
The parties stipulated that the value of the marital estate
at the time of the hearing was $165,509.40. Of particular importance, the marital
estate included two pieces of real property: a five-acre tract of land located
in York County and a lakefront property used as the marital residence, located
in Summerton, South Carolina. Wife used non-marital funds to purchase both
pieces of property. Around 1990, Wife used non-marital funds to put a down
payment on a mobile home that became the marital residence on the lakefront
property. It appears Wife made the mortgage payments on the mobile home until
1995, when she left her job at the SCDMV. Husband made the payments from 1995
until 1999, when the mortgage was paid in full.
Both parties contributed to the lakefront property by making
several improvements. Husband purchased an outdoor storage building, helped
build porches on the house and a shed on the property, and contributed to the
purchase price of a dock. In addition to purchasing the property and making
a down payment on the mobile home, Wife contributed half the price of the dock,
installed a septic tank system and arranged for both electricity and water services.
Although the lakefront property was initially used only on
weekends and special occasions, upon Husbands relocation to Columbia in 1995,
the property became Wifes primary residence. Wife resided there until June
of 2000 when the parties separated. During the interim, Husband resided in
an apartment in Columbia and would make the trip to the lakefront property on
the weekends. Husband has been living on the lakefront property since the separation
and has lived there continuously since that time.
In the divorce decree, dated September 25, 2001, the family
court granted the parties a divorce on the ground of one-year continuous separation. [2] The court also held that in
terms of financial contributions, Husband contributed eighty-two percent to
the marital estate and Wife contributed eighteen percent. Accordingly, the
decree awarded sixty-five percent of the estate to Husband and thirty-five percent
to Wife. The marital residence (the lakefront property) was included in Husbands
portion of the estate. The court further denied Wifes request for an order
requiring Husband to maintain health insurance on her and awarded her partial
attorneys fees of $2500.00. It is from these rulings that Wife appeals.
ISSUES
I. Did the family court err in determining the percentage of marital property to
be apportioned among the parties?
II. Did the family court err in awarding the lakefront property to Husband?
III. Did the family court err in refusing to require Husband to continue health insurance
coverage on Wife?
IV. Did the family court err in giving Wife only a partial award of attorneys fees?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In appeals from the family court, this court has the authority
to find facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence.
Rutherford v. Rutherford, 307 S.C. 199, 204, 414 S.E.2d 157, 160 (1992).
This broad scope of review does not, however, require this court to disregard
the factual findings of the family court. Stevenson v. Stevenson, 276
S.C. 475, 477, 279 S.E.2d 616, 617 (1981). Neither are we required to ignore
the fact that the trial judge, who saw and heard the witnesses, was in a better
position to evaluate their credibility and assign comparative weight to their
testimony. Woodall v. Woodall, 322 S.C. 7, 10, 471 S.E.2d 154, 157 (1996).
LAW/ANALYSIS
I.
Equitable Distribution
Wife first contends the family court erred in apportioning
the marital property. Specifically, she argues the family court judge did not
give enough consideration to her early contributions to the marriage, the current
condition of her health, and her lack of any substantial savings or retirement.
We disagree.
The apportionment of marital property is within
the discretion of the family court judge and will not be disturbed on appeal
absent an abuse of discretion. See Morris v. Morris, 295 S.C.
37, 39, 367 S.E.2d 24, 25 (1988). South Carolina Code Ann. section 20-7-472
(Supp. 2002) provides the family court must consider fifteen factors and give
each weight as it determines. On review, this court looks to the fairness of
the overall apportionment, and if the end result is equitable, the fact that
this court might have weighed specific factors differently than the family court
is irrelevant. Johnson v. Johnson, 296 S.C. 289, 300-01, 372 S.E.2d
107, 113 (Ct. App. 1988); Doe v. Doe, 324 S.C. 492, 502, 478 S.E.2d 854,
859 (Ct. App. 1996) (the reviewing court will affirm the family court judges
apportionment of marital property if it can be determined that the judge addressed
the relevant factors under section 20-7-472 with sufficiency for the reviewing
court to conclude the judge was cognizant of statutory factors).
In this case, the overall distribution was sixty-five percent
of the estate to Husband and thirty-five percent to Wife. We find, given the
statutory factors, that this distribution is fair and equitable. Given the
length of the marriage, the value of the marital property, and the incomes of
both parties, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its
distribution of the marital property. In identifying, valuating, and apportioning
the property, the family court relied upon the testimony and discovery obtained
from both parties. After examination of both the parties testimony and the
fifteen statutory factors listed in S.C. Code Ann. section 20-7-472, it is clear
that the family court divided the marital property in a fair manner.
II. Lake-Front Property
Wife next maintains the family court erred by awarding
the lakefront property to Husband. We disagree.
Although Wife purchased the lakefront property
with non-marital funds, the parties stipulated it was marital property and agreed
that whichever party received it, the other party would be awarded the five-acre
parcel of land in York County. Accordingly, the award of the property was governed
by the standards for equitable distribution. Because there is evidence in the
record supporting the family courts decision, we find no abuse of discretion.
III. Health Insurance
Wife argues the family court erred in allowing
Husband to drop her from his health insurance. We disagree.
Both parties agreed at trial to waive any right
either may have to alimony. Because of this, the family court denied Wifes
request, but ordered Husband to execute whatever documentation might be necessary
to allow Wife to convert her coverage to COBRA.
In its order disposing of Wifes motion to alter
or amend the divorce decree, the family court denied Wifes request. The court
correctly noted that to require Husband to maintain health insurance, even at
Wifes expense, would become an ongoing obligation as a form of spousal support.
Because it is undisputed the parties voluntarily waived alimony, and thus support,
we find no error.
IV. Attorneys Fees
Wifes final argument is that the family court
erred in only granting her a partial award of attorneys fees. We disagree.
A court must consider six factors in determining
whether to grant attorneys fees: (1) the nature, extent, and difficulty of
the case; (2) the time necessarily devoted to the case; (3) professional standing
of counsel; (4) contingency of compensation; (5) beneficial results obtained;
[and] (6) customary legal fees for similar services. Glasscock v. Glasscock,
304 S.C. 158, 161, 403 S.E.2d 313, 315 (1991) (citing Donahue v. Donahue,
299 S.C. 353, 384 S.E.2d 741 (1989)). Additionally, an award of attorneys
fees and costs is a discretionary matter not to be overturned absent abuse by
the trial court. Donahue, 299 S.C. at 365, 384 S.E.2d at 748.
From a review of the divorce decree, it is clear
the family court fairly and equitably considered the necessary factors. The
court found that the fees and expenses incurred by the respective attorneys
were reasonable, and that Husband was in a better position to pay the fees.
In awarding Wife fees, the court considered the fact that Wife abandoned her
request for alimony on the day of the trial. We conclude the family court properly
considered the necessary factors. We find no error in its award of partial
fees to Wife.
According, based on the foregoing, the family courts
rulings are
AFFIRMED.
GOOLSBY, J., concurs.
CONNOR, J., dissents in a separate opinion.
CONNOR, J. (dissenting): Although
I agree with the majoritys decision regarding the lakefront property, health
insurance, and attorneys fees, I respectfully disagree with its decision to
affirm the family courts determination of each partys percentage of the marital
estate. In my opinion, Husband and Wife should each receive fifty percent of
the marital estate. Applying the requisite factors outlined in section 20-7-472
[3] to the evidence presented at trial, I believe the family court erred
in awarding Wife only thirty-five percent of the marital estate.
The parties were married for almost eleven
years. Even though the parties were divorced on the ground of one years continuous
separation, there is evidence in the record, by way of Husbands admission and
Wifes testimony, that Husbands marital misconduct precipitated the parties
separation. Wife also significantly contributed to the marital estate. Specifically,
Wife purchased, using her own non-marital funds, a five-acre tract of land in
York and a lakefront lot in Summerton, South Carolina. She also used non-marital
funds as a down payment to purchase a mobile home for the lake property. She
continued to make these payments until 1995 when she stopped working. Additionally,
she paid for the installation and set up of the mobile home using her non-marital
funds. Wifes current health condition weighs in favor of her need for a greater
portion of the marital estate. Because Wife suffers from severe fibromyalgia,
she is unable to maintain full-time employment. In addition to Wifes limited
future earnings, she also has no vested retirement and has minimal savings.
Although Wife did not earn as much income as Husband during the marriage, this
factor alone is not sufficient to supports the family courts apportionment
of the marital estate. Based on the foregoing, I would reverse the family courts
decision and award each party fifty percent of the marital estate.
[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant
to Rule 215, SCACR.
[2] The parties agreed to dismiss their requests for
divorce on grounds of adultery.
[3] Section 20-7-472 of the South Carolina Code of Laws enumerates
fifteen factors applicable to a determination of equitable distribution.
These factors are as follows: (1) duration of the marriage; (2) marital misconduct
or fault and its effect on the break-up of the marriage; (3) the value of
the marital property and the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition
or appreciation in value of the marital property, including the contribution
of the spouse as homemaker; (4) the income and earning potential of each spouse
and opportunity for future acquisition of assets; (5) the health, both physical
and emotional, of each spouse; (6) need of either spouse for additional training
or education; (7) the nonmarital property of each spouse; (8) the existence
or nonexistence of vested retirement benefits for each spouse; (9) whether
alimony has been awarded; (10) desirability of awarding the family home; (11)
the tax consequence to each spouse as a result of the apportionment; (12)
the existence and extent of any support obligations of either party; (13)
liens and encumbrances on marital and separate property and other existing
debts; (14) child custody arrangements and obligations; and (15) any other
relevant factors as the trial court shall expressly enumerate in its order.
S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-472 (Supp. 2002).