Lane v. Chen

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: October 1, 2025
• Docket: 25-362
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA25-362

Filed 1 October 2025

Durham County, No. 23CVD003264-310

KELLEY LANE, ZOE LANE, BRYAN RAMIREZ, Plaintiffs,

v.

A-HUA CHEN, JAW-SY CHEN, and ACORN AND OAK PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, LLC, Defendants.

Appeal by plaintiffs from judgment entered 6 December 2024 by Judge

Amanda L. Maris in Durham County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals

8 September 2025.

Kelley Lane and Bryan Ramirez, pro se.

Brownlee, Whitlow & Praet, PLLC, by Daria A. Harrington, for defendant- appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiffs Bryan Ramirez, Kelley Lane, and Lane’s daughter Zoe Lane, appeal

from the trial court’s judgment denying their motion for a jury trial. Upon careful

review, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

I. Factual and Procedural Background LANE V. CHEN

Opinion of the Court

In 2020, Plaintiffs entered into a rental property lease with Defendants A-Hua

Chen, Jaw-Sy Chen, and Acorn & Oak Property Management, LLC. Plaintiffs

renewed their lease in 2021. In 2021, after issues with pests and an unsatisfactory

handling of the matter by Defendants, Plaintiffs, by and through previous counsel,

filed a complaint against Defendants, alleging a breach of lease and warranty of

habitability, as well as a claim of unfair and deceptive trade practices. Following

arbitration, Plaintiffs appealed the award.

A trial was set for 5 August 2024; however, the matter was continued for

various reasons until 1 October 2024. On 23 September 2024—eight days before

trial—Plaintiffs filed a handwritten document with the Durham County Clerk of

Court requesting a jury trial. No certificate of service was attached.

On 1 October 2024, the trial court and Defendants became aware of Plaintiffs’

request for a jury trial. That same day, the trial court heard arguments on the matter

and subsequently entered an order on 6 December 2024 denying Plaintiffs’ request

for a jury trial after finding that “such request was untimely pursuant to N.C.R. Civ.

P. § 38(b) and would prejudice [] Defendants who objected strenuously.” Plaintiffs

timely appealed the trial court’s order. Defendants subsequently filed a motion with

this Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ appeal for Plaintiffs’ failure to “timely file written

documentation of a transcript contract[.]” We first address Plaintiffs’ appeal.

II. Analysis

Plaintiffs argue the trial court’s denial of their motion for a jury trial is “a

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violation of the Plaintiff[s’] rights as afforded in the Constitution of the State of North

Carolina in Article 1, Section 25, page 3.”

“An interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an action, which

does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order

to settle and determine the entire controversy.” Hamilton v. Mortg. Info. Servs., Inc.,

212 N.C. App. 73, 76 (2011) (citation omitted). While “a party is permitted to appeal

from an interlocutory order when the order deprives the appellant of a substantial

right which would be jeopardized absent a review prior to a final determination on

the merits[,]” it is the “appellant’s burden to present appropriate grounds for this

Court’s acceptance of an interlocutory appeal and our Court’s responsibility to review

those grounds.” Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture, 115 N.C. App. 377, 379 (1994)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(4)

(“When an appeal is interlocutory, the statement must contain sufficient facts and

argument to support appellate review on the ground that the challenged order affects

a substantial right.”).

“If a party attempts to appeal from an interlocutory order without showing

that the order in question is immediately appealable, we are required to dismiss that

party’s appeal on jurisdictional grounds.” Hamilton, 212 N.C. App. at 77.

Here, an order denying a jury trial is an interlocutory order. Dick Parker Ford,

Inc. v. Bradshaw, 102 N.C. App. 529, 531 (1991). This Court dismisses

an interlocutory appeal “as fragmentary and premature unless the order affects

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some substantial right[.]” Hanesbrands Inc. v. Fowler, 369 N.C. 216, 218 (2016)

(citation omitted). “It is the appellant’s burden to present appropriate grounds for . .

. acceptance of an interlocutory appeal, . . . and not the duty of this Court to construct

arguments for or find support for appellant’s right to appeal.” Id. at 218 (citation

omitted). Plaintiffs have failed to articulate in their brief why the order is

immediately appealable. See N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(4). Accordingly, we dismiss this

appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Hamilton, 212 N.C. App. at 77. Because we dismiss

Plaintiffs’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction, we deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss for

Plaintiffs’ failure to “timely file written documentation of a transcript contract[.]”

DISMISSED.

Panel consisting of Judges GORE, FLOOD, and STADING.

Report per Rule 30(e).

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