Lane Devon Wootan v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: January 29, 2025
• Docket: 04-23-00111-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-23-00111-CR

Lane WOOTAN, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 226th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2021-CR-1694 Honorable Velia J. Meza, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Lori Massey Brissette, Justice

Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Lori Massey Brissette, Justice

Delivered and Filed: January 29, 2025

AFFIRMED

This case involves two questions. First, we must determine whether the evidence presented

at trial is legally sufficient to support the jury’s verdict finding Appellant Lane Wootan criminally

responsible for the actions of his stepfather, which resulted in the murder of Josh Fowler. Second,

we must decide whether the trial court committed reversible error by not conducting an ability-to-

pay inquiry as required by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 42.15(a-1). We answer both

questions in the negative and affirm the trial court’s judgment. 04-23-00111-CR

BACKGROUND

Procedural Facts Wootan was indicted for murder for an offense that occurred on December 8, 2020. He was

tried alongside a co-defendant, his stepfather, Williams Blankenship. After a multi-day trial, a jury

found him guilty of murder and assessed punishment at twenty-two years confinement in the Texas

Department of Criminal Justice – Institutional Division. He was also fined $10,000 and ordered to

pay $440 in court costs.

Wootan appealed. He was initially represented by a court-appointed attorney who filed an

Anders brief and a motion to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); Kelly

v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). As required, we conducted an

independent review of the record and concluded there was an arguable ground of appeal. See

Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); see also Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.

Specifically, this court had not yet decided whether the trial court’s failure to inquire on the record

about a defendant’s ability to pay a fine and costs was reversible error. We granted the original

appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw, abated this appeal, remanded the cause for the trial court

to appoint new appellate counsel, and ordered new briefing. Wootan then retained new counsel

who now present, on his behalf, the issues on appeal.

Background Facts

It is undisputed that, on December 8, 2020, Williams Blankenship shot Josh Fowler outside

the home of Dylan Tuten, a mutual friend of both Fowler and Wootan. Earlier that day, Fowler had

run Wootan off the road, allegedly angry that his father had given Wootan his dirt bike in exchange

for a debt Fowler had owed Wootan. When Blankenship showed up at Tuten’s home, Fowler fled.

Instead of calling the police, Wootan returned home and became more and more agitated as he

discussed the situation with his family. Eventually, upon finding out Fowler was at Tuten’s house,

-2- 04-23-00111-CR

Wootan decided to go and confront him. He left home with a gun, specifically an AR-15, and a

wooden club in his car. His mother and Blankenship soon followed, also armed with at least one

gun.

This is where the testimony of the two main witnesses, Lance Stovall and Blankenship,

diverge. Lance Stovall, who was in a relationship with Fowler’s mother, testified he was with

Fowler earlier in the day when Fowler ran Wootan off the road. He was also with Fowler, smoking

weed at Tuten’s house, when the incident in question occurred. Stovall testified Fowler heard a

noise and went outside to check it out. He further testified he stayed back because he “was still

hitting the bowl” (smoking), before eventually following Fowler to see what was going on. Stovall

testified that when he got outside, he saw Wootan’s mother bust out the back window of Fowler’s

Mustang. Then she approached Stovall on the back porch, brandishing the bat and saying, “So

what now? You think you’re all big and bad?” He testified she held him at gunpoint as Wootan and

Fowler began fighting in the yard.

Stovall further testified he saw Wootan walk toward Fowler pointing an AR-15 at him,

causing Fowler to back away. Wootan, at some point, turned the AR-15 around and, holding the

barrel, swung it like a bat at Fowler who was able to catch it and throw it away from them.

According to Stovall, Blankenship then picked up the AR-15 and handed it back to Wootan.

Blankenship had another gun in a leg holster and two clubs in his hand. Stovall testified he heard

Blankenship say “I got him” as he was pointing the pistol he had taken out of his leg holster at

Fowler, but then Wootan hit Fowler with the club, Fowler got the club and hit Wootan in the ear,

and then Wootan was able to regain the club and hit Fowler in the head twice. While Fowler was

getting up from the ground after being hit, Stovall said he heard two shots fired and he saw Fowler

was wounded. Stovall got his phone and told Wootan he was going to call the cops. Stovall testified

-3- 04-23-00111-CR

Wootan replied, “You do that, and I’ll kill you.” Wootan, his mother, and Blankenship then fled

the scene in one of their cars, leaving Wootan’s car behind. Fowler was pronounced dead at the

hospital.

Blankenship testified in his own defense and contradicted Stovall’s testimony. He testified

he tried to calm Wootan down at home after the incident on the roadway. He said he only followed

Wootan because he wanted to stop the two of them, who had grown up together, from becoming

violent. Blankenship said he took his gun because he was worried about his life, Wootan’s life and

his wife’s life. He testified he tried to calm them down and eventually got the AR-15 away from

Wootan and locked it in Wootan’s car. 1 As he was returning from the car, he said he heard what 0F

sounded like a bat hitting a ball and saw Wootan collapse to the ground, unconscious, with Fowler

squatting over him with knife in hand. He testified that his instincts took over, and he shot Fowler

without even thinking.

Blankenship testified Wootan, him, and his wife fled the scene in one car because Wootan

was hurt and could not drive. But, even though Wootan had been rendered unconscious according

to Blankenship, they did not take him to the emergency room. Instead, they returned home and

spent the next day trying to figure out what to do. Blankenship testified he had intended to turn

himself in but was picked up before he could do so. The gun he used that he had placed in his truck

was gone the next day, but Blankenship stated he did not ask Wootan what happened to it.

Police were able to recover two guns—an AR-15 and a .40 Smith & Wesson—from a man

named Keith Carter who they tracked down based on information gleaned from Wootan’s jail calls

with his fiancée. Police were also able to locate an empty holster with a magazine attached to it in

an area of Cibolo Creek, which they also searched based on information from Wootan’s fiancée.

1 Police did not find the AR-15 in Wootan’s car upon inspection at the scene.

-4- 04-23-00111-CR

FAILURE TO INQUIRE ON THE RECORD

Wootan argues the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a fine and court costs in

the judgment against him without conducting an ability-to-pay inquiry mandated by Article 42.15

of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. We disagree.

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

Article 42.15(a-1) requires the trial court, at the time of sentencing, to hold a hearing on

the record regarding the defendant’s ability to pay any fine and costs:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, during or immediately after imposing a sentence in a case in which the defendant entered a plea in open court as provided by Article 27.13, 27.14(a), or 27.16(a), a court shall inquire on the record whether the defendant has sufficient resources or income to immediately pay all or part of the fine and costs.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.15(a-1) (emphasis added).

No Record of an Inquiry or Waiver

There is nothing in the record to show the trial court conducted such an inquiry on the

record and, in fact, the State admits it did not. But the State asserts Wootan waived his complaint

by not timely objecting to the absence of an ability-to-pay inquiry on the record. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 33.1(a)(error preservation). The Court of Criminal Appeals recently held that an ability-to-pay

inquiry is a forfeitable right. Cruz v. State, 698 S.W.3d 265, 269 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024). Cruz

reasoned that “because the [Article 42.15(a-1)] inquiry is not fundamental to the functioning of

our adjudicatory system,” if the trial court does not conduct an ability-to-pay inquiry on the record,

the defendant must timely object to preserve a complaint for appellate review. Id.; see TEX. R. APP.

P. 33.1(a)(1); Proenza v. State, 541 S.W.3d 786, 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (noting “responsibility

of asserting forfeitable rights belongs to the litigants . . . not the trial judge [and] such rights will

be unavailable on appeal if not urged at trial”). Because Wootan’s right to an ability-to-pay inquiry

on the record is forfeitable, and he failed to timely object, he did not preserve his complaint for

-5- 04-23-00111-CR

appellate review. See Cruz, 698 S.W.3d at 269; Proenza, 541 S.W.3d at 797. Accordingly, we

overrule Wootan’s first issue.

LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

Wootan contends the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s verdict on the charge of

murder. He specifically asserts that there is insufficient evidence to hold him criminally responsible

for Blankenship shooting Fowler.

When reviewing a jury’s verdict in the context of a sufficiency challenge, the question is

whether, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Nisbett v.

State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319 (1979)). While Wootan requests this Court consider the conflicting testimony that contradicts

and fails to support the verdict, that is not our role. It is the jury, not this court sitting as a thirteenth

juror, that is charged with resolving conflicts within the testimony, determining the credibility of

witnesses, as well as weighing the evidence. See Nisbett, 552 S.W.3d at 262. Our role is simply to

guard against the “rare occurrence when the factfinder does not act rationally.” Id.

Further, it is not necessary the evidence directly prove each element, as circumstantial

evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. See id. Each fact does not need to “point directly

and independently to guilt if the cumulative force of all incriminating circumstances is sufficient

to support the conviction.” Id. (citing Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).

The jury can draw reasonable inferences from the evidence “as long as each inference is supported

by the evidence presented at trial.” Carter v. State, 620 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021)

(quoting Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)) (internal quotation marks

-6- 04-23-00111-CR

omitted). But, “juries are not permitted to come to conclusions based on mere speculation or

factually unsupported inferences or presumptions.” Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 15. An inference by a

factfinder “is a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence

from them.” Id. at 16. By contrast, “[s]peculation is mere theorizing or guessing about the possible

meaning of facts and evidence presented.” Hooper, 214 S.W.2d at 16.

The sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the elements of the offense as defined

by a “hypothetically correct jury charge.” Byrd v. State, 336 S.W.3d 242, 246 (Tex. Crim. App.

2011); TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(c). A hypothetically correct jury charge correctly “sets out the

law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof

or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular

offense.” Baltimore v. State, 689 S.W.3d 331, 341–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024). The law authorized

by the indictment “includes the statutory elements of the offense and those elements as modified

by the indictment.” Lang v. State, 664 S.W.3d 155, 168–69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (quoting

Zuniga, 551 S.W.3d at 733) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 19.02(b) of the Texas Penal Code provides a person commits murder if the person,

among other things, “intentionally or knowingly causes” an individual’s death or “intends to cause

serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life” causing an individual’s

death. TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(1)–(2); see, e.g., Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 862 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2011). Section 7.01(a) of the Texas Penal Code provides “[a] person is criminally

responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct

of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.01(a); see,

e.g., Adames, 353 S.W.3d at 862. A person is criminally responsible for the conduct of another if

the person, among other things, “act[ed] with intent to promote or assist the commission of the

-7- 04-23-00111-CR

offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the

offense.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.02(a); Adames, 353 S.W.3d at 862. The indictment tracks the

language of 19.02(b)(1) and (2). 2 Applying the law of the parties to the murder statute to measure 1F

sufficiency against the hypothetically correct jury charge, Wootan is criminally responsible as a

party to the offense if (1) Wootan committed the murder himself or (2) Blankenship committed the

murder and Wootan acted with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, by

soliciting, encouraging, directing, aiding, or attempting to aid Blankenship to commit murder. See

TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 7.01(a); § 19.02(b)(1)–(2); Adames, 353 S.W.3d at 862.

Furthermore, in determining their verdict, the jury is entitled to consider the events that

took place “before, during, and after the commission of the crime.” See Gross v. State, 380 S.W.3d

181, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The evidence must also be sufficient as to “an understanding and

common design to commit the offense,” reflecting Wootan acted with intent to promote or assist

the murder, by soliciting, encouraging, directing, aiding, or attempting to aid Blankenship to

commit the murder. Gross v. State, 380 S.W.3d 181, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); see TEX. PENAL

CODE §§ 7.01(a). In other words, “mere presence” at a crime scene “or even flight from the scene,”

is insufficient. Id. A “jury may infer the requisite mental state from (1) the acts, words, and conduct

of the defendant, (2) the extent of the injuries to the victim, (3) the method used to produce the

injuries, and (4) the relative size and strength of the parties.” Rhymes v. State, 536 S.W.3d 85, 95

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, pet. ref’d) (citing Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1995)). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we must therefore

2 Although “the parties theory was not plead in the indictment, both state and federal law specify that due process does not require a defendant’s culpability as a party to the offense to be plead in the charging instrument.” Adames, 353 S.W.3d at 861; accord TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.01 (b)–(c) (providing “[e]ach party to an offense may be charged with commission of the offense” and “each party to an offense may be charged and convicted without alleging that he acted as a principal or accomplice”).

-8- 04-23-00111-CR

determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found Wootan guilty on this charge beyond

a reasonable doubt. 3 2F

The Evidence

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict and assuming the jury (solely responsible

for the determination of the credibility of witnesses) resolved the conflicts in the testimony

between Stovall and Blankenship in favor of its verdict, the record demonstrates the following:

- Wootan was upset with Fowler for running him off the road earlier in the day;

- Blankenship was present and aware of the events earlier in the day;

- Blankenship was home when Wootan discussed the incident with his fiancée and mother;

- Neither Blankenship nor Wootan called the police to report the incident on the roadway;

- Wootan left home, armed with an AR-15 and a wooden club in his car, with the intent to

confront Fowler; 4 3F

- Wootan’s mother and Blankenship, both also armed, followed Wootan to Tuten’s house;

- Neither Blankenship nor Wootan’s mother called the police to warn them of the impending

confrontation between Wootan and Fowler, even though Blankenship felt the need to be

armed to protect his family;

- Wootan and/or his mother busted both the front and back windows of Fowler’s car;

- Wootan’s mother held Stovall back with a gun pointed in his direction and a club in her

other hand while Wootan confronted Fowler with an AR-15;

- Blankenship retrieved and handed the AR-15 back to Wootan after he’d lost control of it;

3 The trial court charged the jury as to murder, the law of parties, and criminal responsibility for the conduct of another. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 7.01(a); § 19.02(b)(1)–(2). 4 In addition to the AR-15 that Wootan brandished during the fight with Fowler, the police found in Wootan’s car another wooden bat, a live round, a spent shell casing, and a Glock 9 mm 50 round magazine drum box.

-9- 04-23-00111-CR

- Blankenship also handed Wootan a wooden club;

- Blankenship kept a club in his own hand and had a pistol in a leg holster;

- As Wootan and Fowler were fighting, Blankenship yelled, “I got him” and then after

Wootan and Fowler traded blows with a club, Blankenship shot Fowler;

- Wootan, his mother, and Blankenship fled the scene together; and

- Wootan took action after the incident to dispose of the later-recovered guns in question.

By these facts, there is no doubt the record supports the inference that Wootan went to

Tuten’s house to confront Fowler and to, at the very least, inflict serious bodily injury. His

stepfather took action to support him in that endeavor. Certainly, if the jury believed Blankenship,

many of these facts would be in question. But, we have to assume the jury resolved the conflicts

in testimony in favor of their own verdict. See Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 262 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2018). And the fact that Blankenship is the one that shot Fowler does not make the evidence

insufficient. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 7.01(a); § 19.02(b)(1)–(2); Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d

854, 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

Applying our standard of review and measuring the evidence against the elements of the

offense, as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge, shows a rational trier of fact could have

found beyond a reasonable doubt the State proved Wootan was criminally responsible as a party

to Blankenship’s murder of Fowler because Wootan acted with intent to promote or assist the

commission of the offense, when he solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid

Blankenship to murder Fowler. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 7.01(a); § 19.02(b)(1)–(2); Adames, 353

S.W.3d at 862. The evidence is therefore sufficient to uphold Wootan’s murder conviction. See

Tex. Penal Code § 31.03(a); Lang v. State, 664 S.W.3d 155, 174–75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022).

Accordingly, Wootan’s contention is overruled.

- 10 - 04-23-00111-CR

CONCLUSION

Because Wootan did not preserve his complaint regarding the trial court’s failure to hold

an ability-to-pay inquiry on the record and the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s

verdict, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Lori Massey Brissette, Justice DO NOT PUBLISH

- 11 -