Landon v. Court of Industrial Relations of Kansas

D. Kansas

Landon v. Court of Industrial Relations of Kansas

269 F. 411, 1920 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 829, 1920 WL 47630

CourtDistrict Court, D. Kansas

DecidedAugust 7, 1920

DocketNo. 136-N

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 269 F. 411 (Landon v. Court of Industrial Relations of Kansas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Landon v. Court of Industrial Relations of Kansas, 269 F. 411, 1920 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 829, 1920 WL 47630 (D. Kan. 1920).

Pincite

Opinion

BOOTH, District Judge.

Following the decision of the Supreme Court in said above-entitled cause (249 U. S. 236, 591, 39 Sup. Ct. 268, 389, 63 L. Ed. 791, 577), and the filing of mandates, June 6, 1919, and pursuant thereto, the court allowed amended and supplemental pleadings to be filed, with the view of framing more clearly from the standpoint of the distributing companies the issue whether the 28-cent rate order made by the Public Utilities Commission of Kansas, December 10, 1915, was confiscatory of the property of the distributing companies, as well as noncompensatory to the receiver. The issues in the cause as to the old.supply contracts, their validity, present status and effect as to the receiver, and as to the Kansas Natural Gas Company, remain in the case.

Amended and supplemental pleadings have been filed by the receiver, the Kansas Natural Gas Company, Fidelity Title & Trust Company, the Public Utilities Commission of Kansas (now the Court of Industrial Relations, which latter name will be used henceforth), the Public Service Commission of Missouri, upwards of 20 distributing companies, and several cities, all having been parties to the cause at the time of the former trial. At the request of counsel, and for the greater convenience in handling the case, the issues as to the supply contracts and related matters have been segregated and reserved for future hearing; the present hearing being confined to the issues in reference to the 28-cent rate order of December 10, 1915, and related issues.

[414]*414Before taking up the pleadings and evidence on these latter issues, it is proper to notice and dispose of certain preliminary applications and motions:

[1] 1. Motion by the Kansas City Gas Company and the receivers of the Kansas Natural Gas Company to bring in as additional parties defendant certain parties who have brought suits in their own individual behalf against the Kansas City Gas Company, claiming that that company has at certain specified times charged more- than a legal and more than a reasonable price for gas, and, praying for the fixing of legal and reasonable rates, for an accounting in reference to excessive charges, and for an injunction against charging excessive rates: These various plaintiffs do not ask leave to intervene in the present suit, and in my judgment they are not necessary parties to the present suit, 136-N. Furthermore, their interest as consumers of gas is in my judgment represented either by the city of Kansas City or by the Public Service Commission of Missouri. Accordingly the motion to make them parties defendant is denied.

2. Motion on behalf of the city of Kansas City to dismiss this suit as to it: This motion is based upon several alleged grounds: (a) That the plaintiff’s complaint in making Kansas City a party defendant proceeded upon the theory that the business of the receiver was interstate commerce, and that the interstate movement of gas continued up to the consumer’s burners; that inasmuch as the Supreme Court has negatived this theory there is no longer any reason for retaining Kansas City as a party defendant, (b) That the'original preliminary injunction, though still in force, was not operative against Kansas City, and it therefore furnishes no basis for retaining Kansas City as a party defendant, ('c) That the cross-bills and answers on which the case is to be retried do not involve Kansas City, and that there are no issues in the case in which it is concerned. This motion to dismiss was interposed prior to the completion of the amended and supplemental pleadings, and consideration of the motion has been postponéd until said pleadings were completed.

Without discussing in detail the several grounds of the motion, it is sufficient to say that an examination of the pleadings as now made up has led me to the conclusion that there are certain questions involved in the issues, and especially in connection with the rights of Kansas City under the original ordinance and supply contract of November-December, 1906, which render Kansas City a proper, if not an indispensable, party to the present suit. The motion to dismiss is therefore denied.

3. The question whether the distributing companies can properly maintain in the present suit the inquiry whether the 28-cent rate order was confiscatory is raised by the Court of Industrial Relations. It is contended that the issues raised by' answers and cross-bills of the distributing companies are new controversies between them and their codefendant, the Court of Industrial Relations, and that such new controversies are not of such character as can properly be tried and determined in tire present suit. It is further claimed that said distributing companies cannot maintain such inquiries in the present suit, because no affirmative action was taken by them to question the order of [415]*415December 10, 1915, within 30 days thereafter, as provided by section 21, chapter 238, Session Laws of Kansas 1911. Dismissal of the several cross-bills is prayed.

[2] In my judgment this question of proper procedure is no longer open for discussion. The Supreme Court, by its decree in this cause on April 28, 1919, ordered as follows:

'‘The decrees below are reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court, to hear it anew and determine all the issues involved, including those arising on the several bills, cross-bills, and answers in the nature of cross-bills, in conformity with the views expressed in the opinion of this court, and to take such further proceedings as may be appropriate and consistent with such opinion. All temporary injunctions in force at the time of the entry of the decrees from which appeals were taken shall be continued in force until otherwise ordered.”

These directions were not a mere routine formula; they were specially framed to meet the situation after the original opinion had been handed down. Formal petitions were presented to the Supreme Court, wherein the facts of the situation were fully and clearly set forth, among them that the distributing companies were all in court in the present suit; that they were vitally interested in the 28-cent schedule; that their contentions were, and had been on the trial, that said schedule was confiscatory as to their property; that at least one of the distributing companies had upon the trial filed its answer in the nature of a cross-bill against the Public Utilities Commission of Kansas, alleging the invalidity and confiscatory character of the 28-cent rate order, and demanding relief against the Public Utilities Commission; that inasmuch as the Supreme Court had now held that the receivers of the Kansas Natural Gas Company were not in position to complain of the 28-cent schedule, the other distributing companies desired to interpose similar pleadings, and to try out the issue of the confiscatory character of the 28-cent rate order on their own behalf.

Any doubts which may have been entertained at one time by this court as to its power to allow a hearing to the distributing companies touching the confiscatory character of the 28-cent rate order, without express permission of the Supreme Court, have been effectually removed by the directions of that court above quoted. Not merely permission has been granted, but explicit directions given to proceed to such hearing. Those directions have become the law of the case.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI