Cite as 2020 Ark. App. 571 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS Digitally signed by Susan P. Williams Reason: I attest to the accuracy DIVISION I and integrity of this document No. CR-20-184 Date: 2021.02.25 11:44:49 -06'00'
Opinion Delivered: December 9, 2020 LANDIS HESTER APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE CRAWFORD COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 17CR-19-449] V. HONORABLE GARY COTTRELL, JUDGE STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE AFFIRMED
WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge
Appellant Landis Hester was convicted by a Crawford County Circuit Court jury of
robbery and theft of property. He was ordered to pay a $1,500 fine for the robbery
conviction and was sentenced to serve a one-year term in the county jail for the theft-of-
property conviction. Appellant now appeals, arguing that there is insufficient evidence to
support the convictions. We affirm.
This case arises from events that occurred on May 23, 2019, while appellant and a
female companion were shopping at the Price Cutter grocery store in Van Buren. Chris
Arnold, a loss-prevention officer employed by Price Cutter, who is also an off-duty Van
Buren canine patrol officer, noticed appellant “acting really strange.” As he watched
appellant throughout the store, he observed him pick up a phone charger and hold it in his
hand behind his cell phone instead of placing it with the other grocery items the two
selected. Arnold testified that as appellant and his companion proceeded through the checkout line, appellant placed the phone charger in his companion’s purse. The couple
then paid for the other items but did not pay for the phone charger that appellant concealed
in the purse. At that time, Arnold and another loss-prevention officer, Paul Dunn,
approached appellant and instructed him to return the item. Appellant retrieved the ten-
foot USB phone charger from the companion’s purse and handed it to Dunn and then
immediately “took off running towards the door” and ran into Arnold as he fled toward the
exit. Appellant continued to fight Arnold and Dunn as they tried to detain him; in the
struggle, Arnold and appellant fell through the plate-glass window near the store’s exit.
Dunn testified that appellant then tried to punch him twice in his attempt to escape.
However, Dunn and Arnold were able to detain appellant until police arrived.
At the close of the State’s evidence, appellant moved for a directed verdict arguing
that, with regard to the robbery charge, the State failed to prove that he used physical force
or the threat of physical force. As to the theft-of-property charge, appellant asserted that the
State failed to establish that he intended to deprive the owner of the property. The circuit
court denied the motions. Upon renewal of the motions at the conclusion of all evidence,
the directed-verdict motions were again denied.
Following the trial in which the jury heard the above testimony and viewed Price
Cutter’s surveillance video of the incident, appellant was found guilty of robbery and theft
of property. He now timely appeals both convictions.
A motion for directed verdict is treated as a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence.1 In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence
1 Halliburton v. State, 2020 Ark. 101, 594 S.W.3d 856. 2 in the light most favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the
verdict.2 We will affirm a conviction if substantial evidence exists to support it.3 Substantial
evidence is that which is of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable
certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other, without resorting to speculation or
conjecture.4 We do not weigh the evidence presented at trial or assess the credibility of the
witnesses because those are matters for the finder of fact, which is free to believe all or part
of any witness’s testimony and may resolve questions of conflicting testimony and
inconsistent evidence.5 Further, circumstantial evidence may provide a basis to support a
conviction, but it must be consistent with the defendant’s guilt and inconsistent with any
other reasonable conclusion.6 Whether the evidence excludes every other hypothesis is left
to the jury to decide.7
A person commits robbery if, with the purpose of committing a felony or
misdemeanor theft or resisting apprehension immediately after committing a felony or
misdemeanor theft, the person employs or threatens to immediately employ physical force
2 Id. 3 Id. 4 Id. 5 Id. 6 Id. 7 Id.
3 upon another person.8 Physical force is defined as bodily impact, restraint, or confinement,
or the threat of bodily impact, restraint, or confinement.9
On appeal, appellant first argues that the circuit court erred in denying his directed-
verdict motion because there was insufficient evidence to support his robbery conviction.
Specifically, appellant asserts that he did not employ the requisite physical force or threat of
physical force. He contends that he did not shove or push Arnold; he only attempted to get
away, “which would be consistent with fleeing, not a threat of physical force as required for
robbery.” Appellant additionally maintains that he had no duty to stop for a loss-prevention
officer.
We disagree. In Payne v. State,10 in affirming Payne’s conviction for robbery, this
court explained that the struggle that occurred between Payne and the store employees
implied that appellant used some type of physical force, even if the store employee used
physical force first. Here, as appellant attempted to resist apprehension, there was a clear
struggle that occurred between appellant and store employees Arnold and Dunn. Appellant
threw his shoulder into Arnold as he tried to run past him to get away. During the struggle,
appellant and Arnold fell through a glass store window. There was testimony that appellant
tried to punch one of the employees in an attempt to flee. Video footage of the incident
was played during the trial. There is ample evidence of appellant’s use of physical force
during the incident.
8 Ark. Code Ann. § 5-12-102 (Repl. 2019). 9 Ark. Code Ann. § 5-12-101. 10 86 Ark. App. 59, 159 S.W.3d 804. 4 Furthermore, appellant acknowledges that viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, as we must do, there is both testimonial evidence and video evidence
that he attempted to punch Dunn. Appellant, however, asserts that this does not constitute
physical force sufficient to sustain the robbery conviction because Dunn is not a law
enforcement officer and had no authority to restrain him. Appellant’s argument is
unpersuasive. The statute provides that a person commits robbery if, with the purpose of
committing a felony or misdemeanor theft or resisting apprehension immediately after
committing a felony or misdemeanor theft, the person employs or threatens to immediately
employ physical force upon another person.11 The statute does not require that the person
upon which the physical force or the threat of physical force is employed be a law
enforcement officer. Therefore, we affirm on this point.
A person commits theft of property if the person knowingly exercises unauthorized
control over the property of another with the purpose of depriving the owner of the
property.12 The purpose to deprive requires the specific intent to deprive the owner of the
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Cite as 2020 Ark. App. 571 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS Digitally signed by Susan P. Williams Reason: I attest to the accuracy DIVISION I and integrity of this document No. CR-20-184 Date: 2021.02.25 11:44:49 -06'00'
Opinion Delivered: December 9, 2020 LANDIS HESTER APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE CRAWFORD COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 17CR-19-449] V. HONORABLE GARY COTTRELL, JUDGE STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE AFFIRMED
WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge
Appellant Landis Hester was convicted by a Crawford County Circuit Court jury of
robbery and theft of property. He was ordered to pay a $1,500 fine for the robbery
conviction and was sentenced to serve a one-year term in the county jail for the theft-of-
property conviction. Appellant now appeals, arguing that there is insufficient evidence to
support the convictions. We affirm.
This case arises from events that occurred on May 23, 2019, while appellant and a
female companion were shopping at the Price Cutter grocery store in Van Buren. Chris
Arnold, a loss-prevention officer employed by Price Cutter, who is also an off-duty Van
Buren canine patrol officer, noticed appellant “acting really strange.” As he watched
appellant throughout the store, he observed him pick up a phone charger and hold it in his
hand behind his cell phone instead of placing it with the other grocery items the two
selected. Arnold testified that as appellant and his companion proceeded through the checkout line, appellant placed the phone charger in his companion’s purse. The couple
then paid for the other items but did not pay for the phone charger that appellant concealed
in the purse. At that time, Arnold and another loss-prevention officer, Paul Dunn,
approached appellant and instructed him to return the item. Appellant retrieved the ten-
foot USB phone charger from the companion’s purse and handed it to Dunn and then
immediately “took off running towards the door” and ran into Arnold as he fled toward the
exit. Appellant continued to fight Arnold and Dunn as they tried to detain him; in the
struggle, Arnold and appellant fell through the plate-glass window near the store’s exit.
Dunn testified that appellant then tried to punch him twice in his attempt to escape.
However, Dunn and Arnold were able to detain appellant until police arrived.
At the close of the State’s evidence, appellant moved for a directed verdict arguing
that, with regard to the robbery charge, the State failed to prove that he used physical force
or the threat of physical force. As to the theft-of-property charge, appellant asserted that the
State failed to establish that he intended to deprive the owner of the property. The circuit
court denied the motions. Upon renewal of the motions at the conclusion of all evidence,
the directed-verdict motions were again denied.
Following the trial in which the jury heard the above testimony and viewed Price
Cutter’s surveillance video of the incident, appellant was found guilty of robbery and theft
of property. He now timely appeals both convictions.
A motion for directed verdict is treated as a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence.1 In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence
1 Halliburton v. State, 2020 Ark. 101, 594 S.W.3d 856. 2 in the light most favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the
verdict.2 We will affirm a conviction if substantial evidence exists to support it.3 Substantial
evidence is that which is of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable
certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other, without resorting to speculation or
conjecture.4 We do not weigh the evidence presented at trial or assess the credibility of the
witnesses because those are matters for the finder of fact, which is free to believe all or part
of any witness’s testimony and may resolve questions of conflicting testimony and
inconsistent evidence.5 Further, circumstantial evidence may provide a basis to support a
conviction, but it must be consistent with the defendant’s guilt and inconsistent with any
other reasonable conclusion.6 Whether the evidence excludes every other hypothesis is left
to the jury to decide.7
A person commits robbery if, with the purpose of committing a felony or
misdemeanor theft or resisting apprehension immediately after committing a felony or
misdemeanor theft, the person employs or threatens to immediately employ physical force
2 Id. 3 Id. 4 Id. 5 Id. 6 Id. 7 Id.
3 upon another person.8 Physical force is defined as bodily impact, restraint, or confinement,
or the threat of bodily impact, restraint, or confinement.9
On appeal, appellant first argues that the circuit court erred in denying his directed-
verdict motion because there was insufficient evidence to support his robbery conviction.
Specifically, appellant asserts that he did not employ the requisite physical force or threat of
physical force. He contends that he did not shove or push Arnold; he only attempted to get
away, “which would be consistent with fleeing, not a threat of physical force as required for
robbery.” Appellant additionally maintains that he had no duty to stop for a loss-prevention
officer.
We disagree. In Payne v. State,10 in affirming Payne’s conviction for robbery, this
court explained that the struggle that occurred between Payne and the store employees
implied that appellant used some type of physical force, even if the store employee used
physical force first. Here, as appellant attempted to resist apprehension, there was a clear
struggle that occurred between appellant and store employees Arnold and Dunn. Appellant
threw his shoulder into Arnold as he tried to run past him to get away. During the struggle,
appellant and Arnold fell through a glass store window. There was testimony that appellant
tried to punch one of the employees in an attempt to flee. Video footage of the incident
was played during the trial. There is ample evidence of appellant’s use of physical force
during the incident.
8 Ark. Code Ann. § 5-12-102 (Repl. 2019). 9 Ark. Code Ann. § 5-12-101. 10 86 Ark. App. 59, 159 S.W.3d 804. 4 Furthermore, appellant acknowledges that viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, as we must do, there is both testimonial evidence and video evidence
that he attempted to punch Dunn. Appellant, however, asserts that this does not constitute
physical force sufficient to sustain the robbery conviction because Dunn is not a law
enforcement officer and had no authority to restrain him. Appellant’s argument is
unpersuasive. The statute provides that a person commits robbery if, with the purpose of
committing a felony or misdemeanor theft or resisting apprehension immediately after
committing a felony or misdemeanor theft, the person employs or threatens to immediately
employ physical force upon another person.11 The statute does not require that the person
upon which the physical force or the threat of physical force is employed be a law
enforcement officer. Therefore, we affirm on this point.
A person commits theft of property if the person knowingly exercises unauthorized
control over the property of another with the purpose of depriving the owner of the
property.12 The purpose to deprive requires the specific intent to deprive the owner of the
property.13 A criminal defendant’s intent or state of mind is seldom capable of proof by direct
evidence, but may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the crime. 14 Further, flight
to avoid arrest can be evidence of criminal intent.15
11 Ark. Code Ann. § 5-12-102 (Repl. 2019). 12 Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-103(a)(1) (Repl. 2013). 13 Horton v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 481, 530 S.W.3d 880. 14 Campbell v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 297, 577 S.W.3d 729. 15 Horton, supra.
5 Appellant argues that there was testimony that he was under the influence at the time
of the incident. Upon being confronted, he immediately handed over the phone charger,
and there were no questions asked regarding his state of mind or why the charger was in the
purse. Appellant contends that because no explanation was sought, the State failed to prove
that it was his intent to deprive Price Cutter of the phone charger; consequently, his
conviction for theft of property must be reversed.
Despite appellant’s contention to the contrary, no explanation was required in order
to ascertain appellant’s intent, as intent may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of
the crime.16 Here, appellant picked up a phone charger and concealed it behind his cell
phone as he continued to shop throughout the store. At the checkout line, while paying for
other items, appellant put the charger in his female companion’s purse without first paying
for it. Once confronted by the store’s loss-prevention officer, appellant handed over the
charger and attempted to flee, resulting in a struggle between appellant and two of the store’s
loss-prevention officers. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,
sufficient evidence supports appellant’s theft-of-property conviction.
Affirmed.
GLADWIN and HARRISON, JJ., agree.
Dusti Standridge, for appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Brooke Jackson Gasaway, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
16 See Campbell, supra. 6