LANDIS, DANIEL B. v. GIACINTO, RICHARD

86 A.D.3d 945, 926 N.Y.2d 339
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedJuly 8, 2011
DocketCA 10-02401
StatusPublished

This text of 86 A.D.3d 945 (LANDIS, DANIEL B. v. GIACINTO, RICHARD) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
LANDIS, DANIEL B. v. GIACINTO, RICHARD, 86 A.D.3d 945, 926 N.Y.2d 339 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2011).

Opinion

*946 Memorandum:

Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking, inter alia, to recover the down payment held in escrow that was paid by defendant Richard Giacinto when he entered into a contract to purchase real estate from plaintiffs. We agree with plaintiffs that Supreme Court erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and we therefore modify the order accordingly. A seller in a real estate transaction may be entitled to keep a down payment where a buyer willfully defaults on the contract (see Lawrence v Miller, 86 NY 131, 139-140 [1881]; see also Maxton Bldrs. v Lo Galbo, 68 NY2d 373, 378 [1986]). Here, the contract contained a mortgage contingency clause, and we conclude that there is a triable issue of fact whether Giacinto engaged in good faith efforts to obtain a mortgage (see Balkhiyev v Sanders, 71 AD3d 611, 612-613 [2010]; Katz v Simon, 216 AD2d 270, 271-272 [1995]; Zwirn v Goodman, 206 AD2d 360, 361-362 [1994]).

We further conclude, however, that the court properly denied plaintiffs’ cross motion for, inter alia, summary judgment on the third cause of action, alleging that plaintiffs are entitled to retain the down payment held in escrow, inasmuch as there are triable issues of fact with respect to Giacinto’s breach of the real estate contract (see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). We reject plaintiffs’ contention that the evidence submitted regarding an alleged mortgage commitment from IndyMac Bank establishes that Giacinto breached the contract as a matter of law. We reject plaintiffs’ further contention that Giacinto breached the contract by providing late notice of his inability to secure financing. The contract did not specify a date by which Giacinto was required to provide such notice, and he therefore was afforded a reasonable time to do so (see Big Apple Meat Mkt. v Frankel, 276 AD2d 657, 658 [2000]). Present — Centra, J.P, Fahey, Garni, Sconiers and Green, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Maxton Builders, Inc. v. Lo Galbo
502 N.E.2d 184 (New York Court of Appeals, 1986)
Lawrence v. . Miller
86 N.Y. 131 (New York Court of Appeals, 1881)
Zuckerman v. City of New York
404 N.E.2d 718 (New York Court of Appeals, 1980)
Balkhiyev v. Sanders
71 A.D.3d 611 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2010)
Zwirn v. Goodman
206 A.D.2d 360 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1994)
Katz v. Simon
216 A.D.2d 270 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1995)
Big Apple Meat Market, Inc. v. Frankel
276 A.D.2d 657 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2000)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
86 A.D.3d 945, 926 N.Y.2d 339, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/landis-daniel-b-v-giacinto-richard-nyappdiv-2011.