Landi v. United States

316 B.R. 363, 94 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6071, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19800, 2004 WL 2367237
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedSeptember 9, 2004
Docket2:02-cv-00593
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 316 B.R. 363 (Landi v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Landi v. United States, 316 B.R. 363, 94 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6071, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19800, 2004 WL 2367237 (M.D. Fla. 2004).

Opinion

*365 OPINION AND ORDER

STEELE, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on an appeal of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Memorandum Opinion (Doc. # 73) 1 and the resulting Judgment (Doc. # 74) determining that appellants’ federal income tax liabilities for certain years were excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C). Appellants John P. Landi and Phyllis Landi (collectively the Landis or appellants) filed a Brief (Dist.Doc. # 21), and the appellee the United States of America (the United States or appellee) filed a Brief (Dist.Doc. #27).

I.

The United States District Court functions as an appellate court in reviewing decisions of the United States Bankruptcy Court. In re Miller, 39 F.3d 301, 305 (11th Cir.1994). The legal conclusions of the bankruptcy court are reviewed de novo, In re JLJ, Inc., 988 F.2d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir.1993), while findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Fed. R. Bankr.P. 8013; In re Thomas, 883 F.2d 991, 994 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1007, 110 S.Ct. 3245, 111 L.Ed.2d 756 (1990). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when, “although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire record is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Crawford v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 745 F.2d 1373, 1378 (11th Cir.1984)(eiting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)). See also In re Cox, 338 F.3d 1238, 1241 (11th Cir.2003).

il.

The Landis filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on January 11, 2001. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) filed a $1,126,693.47 claim on behalf of the United States for income taxes, interest and penalties for the years 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996. The Landis then filed a Complaint in an adversary proceeding seeking, among other things, a determination that the federal income tax liabilities were dis-chargeable. The United States contended that the Landis purposefully evaded tax liabilities for certain tax years, and therefore discharge of that tax debt should not be granted. A trial was conducted before the bankruptcy judge over the course of three days. On September 24, 2002, the Honorable Alexander L. Paskay entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Memorandum Opinion (Doc. # 73) determining that the Landis’ federal income tax liabilities for the years at issue were excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C). Judgment (Doc. # 74) was entered accordingly, and this appeal followed.

III.

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727, a debtor under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code is generally granted a discharge from all debts that arise prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. An exception to the general rule is that a discharge under § 727 “does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt (1) for a tax ... with respect to which the debtor ... willfully attempted in any manner to evade or defeat such tax; ...” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C). Three cases frame the *366 Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of this statutory exception: In re Fretz, 244 F.3d 1823 (11th Cir.2001); In re Griffith, 206 F.3d 1389 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 826, 121 S.Ct. 73, 148 L.Ed.2d 37 (2000); and In re Haas, 48 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir.1995), abrogated in part by In re Griffith.

Exceptions to the general rule of discharge are to be strictly construed in favor of the debtor. In re Fretz, 244 F.3d at 1327. The government has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the claim is nondischargeable under § 523(a). Id. As relevant to this case, the statute contains a “conduct” element and a “mental state” element. Id. The conduct required is that the debtor attempted in any manner to evade or defeat a tax, which can include either affirmative conduct or acts of culpable omission. Id. at 1327-30. The mental state required is willfulness; this means the attempt to avoid tax liability was done voluntarily, consciously or knowingly, and intentionally. While fraudulent intent is not required, inadvertent mistakes are not sufficient. Id. at 1330-31. Thus, to establish the exception, the government must prove that the debtor (1) had a duty to file income tax returns and pay taxes; (2) knew he had such a duty; and (3) voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty. Id. at 1330.

It is not contended that the Bankruptcy Court applied incorrect legal principles, and it is clear that the correct law was articulated and applied. (Doc. # 73, pp. 15-18). The Bankruptcy Court found that “the Government has sustained its burden of proving that the Debtors purposefully evaded the payment of taxes.” (Doc. # 73, p. 15). There is also no dispute that the facts presented were sufficient to establish that the Landis had a duty to file income tax returns and pay taxes and that the Landis knew of that duty. Appellants contend, however, that the Bankruptcy Court’s determination that they voluntarily and intentionally violated that known duty was clearly erroneous, and therefore the tax debt should have been discharged in bankruptcy.

IV.

A.

John P. Landi began a medical practice as a vascular surgeon in 1980 upon completion of a fellowship following medical school. Dr. Landi operated his medical practice through a professional corporation, and opened and operated an office in New York until 1996, when he relocated to Naples, Florida. Phyllis Landi, Dr. Landi’s wife, served as his office manager from the inception, essentially handling the financial end of the practice while Dr. Landi performed the surgeries. Until 1990, Mrs. Landi was paid a salary from the professional corporation; since 1990 she received no income from the professional corporation, although she continued to work there five days a week.

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Bluebook (online)
316 B.R. 363, 94 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6071, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19800, 2004 WL 2367237, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/landi-v-united-states-flmd-2004.