Lance Deshawn Moore v. State of Florida

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: March 25, 2026
• Docket: 3D2023-1465
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed March 25, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D23-1465 Lower Tribunal No. F16-4003 ________________

Lance Deshawn Moore, Appellant,

vs.

State of Florida, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Ramiro C. Areces, Judge.

Rier Jordan, P.A., and Jonathan E. Jordan, for appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Ryan Schelwat, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before SCALES, C.J., and LOGUE and GORDO, JJ.

PER CURIAM. Lance Deshawn Moore appeals the post-conviction court’s June 30,

2023 order, entered after an evidentiary hearing, that denied Moore’s Florida

Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 postconviction motion alleging ineffective

assistance of trial counsel. Moore challenges only that aspect of the June

30, 2023 order denying relief on Moore’s claim that he rejected the State’s

favorable plea offer based on trial counsel’s alleged failure to provide Moore

the information necessary to make an informed decision on whether to

accept the offer.1

We affirm because the trial court’s determinations that (i) Moore’s

counsel’s performance was not deficient, and (ii) Moore was not prejudiced

by any deficiency, are both amply supported by competent, substantial

evidence. Annicchiarico v. State, 300 So. 3d 805, 807 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020)

(“The lower court determined that trial counsel was more credible than

Annicchiarico and concluded that Annicchiarico was properly advised

regarding the multiple plea offers. That determination was supported by

competent substantial evidence, as the letters between Annicchiarico and

trial counsel, in addition to the testimony, demonstrated that Annicchiarico

was well informed of the State’s plea offers and the conditions that

1 Moore’s other claim alleged that trial counsel was ineffective in advising Moore not to testify at trial.

2 accompanied them.”); see also Alcorn v. State, 121 So. 3d 419, 422 (Fla.

2013) (“[T]o show prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable

probability, defined as a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome, that (1) he or she would have accepted the offer had counsel

advised the defendant correctly, (2) the prosecutor would not have

withdrawn the offer, (3) the court would have accepted the offer, and (4) the

conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have been less

severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed.”).

Affirmed.