Lancaster v. Industrial Accident Commission

California Court of Appeal

Lancaster v. Industrial Accident Commission

42 P.2d 333, 5 Cal. App. 2d 304, 1935 Cal. App. LEXIS 1063

CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal

DecidedMarch 18, 1935

DocketCiv. 10147

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 42 P.2d 333 (Lancaster v. Industrial Accident Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Lancaster v. Industrial Accident Commission, 42 P.2d 333, 5 Cal. App. 2d 304, 1935 Cal. App. LEXIS 1063 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935).

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Opinion

SCOTT, J., pro tem.

Certiorari to review order of respondent Commission denying compensation to petitioner. The latter, a thick-set, vigorous ex-prizefighter, was employed as gardener for respondents Dabney. While planting a heavy tree he experienced pain, and later reported to a physician, who determined that he suffered from coronary *305 occlusion, a condition of the heart. The Commission concluded that the evidence did not establish that petitioner sustained injury arising out of and occurring in the course of said employment. There was competent medical evidence that “the work that the applicant was doing was not an exciting factor in precipitating or aggravating the coronary occlusion”, and one physician declared: “I believe that this man had been slowly developing the pathology of coronary sclerosis for a number of years. The resulting coronary occlusion might as readily have occurred at any other time.”

Where there is substantial conflict in the evidence in such a case as this the determination of the Commission is final. (Murray v. Industrial Acc. Com., 216 Cal. 340 [14 Pac. (2d) 301].) We cannot substitute our own opinion, whether or not it is in accord with the Commission’s finding. The evidence would warrant a conclusion that petitioner had chronic heart trouble which had reached a stage where disability might ensue at any time from any exertion, and the disabling condition arose while he was doing work of his employment which, although it was heavy and a strain, would not of necessity be characterized as extraordinary or unusual. Under such circumstances compensation is properly denied. (McNamara v. Industrial Acc. Com., 130 Cal. App. 284 [20 Pac. (2d) 53].)

Order affirmed.

Stephens, P. J., and Crail, J., concurred.

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SCOTT, J., pro tem.

Certiorari to review order of respondent Commission denying compensation to petitioner. The latter, a thick-set, vigorous ex-prizefighter, was employed as gardener for respondents Dabney. While planting a heavy tree he experienced pain, and later reported to a physician, who determined that he suffered from coronary *305 occlusion, a condition of the heart. The Commission concluded that the evidence did not establish that petitioner sustained injury arising out of and occurring in the course of said employment. There was competent medical evidence that “the work that the applicant was doing was not an exciting factor in precipitating or aggravating the coronary occlusion”, and one physician declared: “I believe that this man had been slowly developing the pathology of coronary sclerosis for a number of years. The resulting coronary occlusion might as readily have occurred at any other time.”

Where there is substantial conflict in the evidence in such a case as this the determination of the Commission is final. (Murray v. Industrial Acc. Com., 216 Cal. 340 [14 Pac. (2d) 301].) We cannot substitute our own opinion, whether or not it is in accord with the Commission’s finding. The evidence would warrant a conclusion that petitioner had chronic heart trouble which had reached a stage where disability might ensue at any time from any exertion, and the disabling condition arose while he was doing work of his employment which, although it was heavy and a strain, would not of necessity be characterized as extraordinary or unusual. Under such circumstances compensation is properly denied. (McNamara v. Industrial Acc. Com., 130 Cal. App. 284 [20 Pac. (2d) 53].)

Order affirmed.

Stephens, P. J., and Crail, J., concurred.

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42 P.2d 333, 5 Cal. App. 2d 304, 1935 Cal. App. LEXIS 1063, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lancaster-v-industrial-accident-commission-calctapp-1935.

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