Lampkin v. Spangner

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: August 11, 2022
• Docket: 2:20-cv-01204
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 TRISHKA LAMPKIN AND ROBERT No. 2:20-cv-01204-JAM-JDP CORTEZ, 9 Plaintiffs, 10 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S v. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 11 COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, M. SPANGER 12 in his official capacity, and MATTHEW CORTEZ, 13 Defendants. 14 15 This matter is before the Court on Defendant County of 16 Sacramento’s motion for summary judgment. See Def.’s Motion for 17 Summary Judgement (“MSJ”), ECF No. 17. Plaintiffs filed an 18 untimely opposition. See Opp’n, ECF No. 18. Under the 19 discretion provided by the Court’s local rules, the Court shall 20 construe Plaintiffs’ “failure to file a timely opposition [...] 21 as a non-opposition to the motion.” E.D. Cal. Local R. 230(c). 22 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s 23 motion for summary judgment.1 24 /// 25 /// 26 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 27 oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled for July 26, 2022. Despite the lack of an opposition, 28 the Court still considered the motion on its merits. 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 This case involves the unwitting disclosure of a victim’s 3 mailing address to her previous partner and abuser. Having 4 reviewed the declaration and exhibits submitted in support of 5 Defendant’s motion, the Court finds that the undisputed facts are 6 as follows. 7 Plaintiffs Trishka Lampkin and her son Robert Cortez sued 8 Defendants County of Sacramento and Martha Spagner2 for 9 disclosing Plaintiff Lampkin’s address to Defendant Matthew 10 Cortez. See Compl., ECF No. 1. As deputy clerk for the Superior 11 Court of California, County of Sacramento, Defendant Spagner 12 mailed a “Certificate of Mailing/Distribution” to Trishka 13 Lampkin, Robert Cortez, and Matthew Cortez to distribute copies 14 of a minute order issued by the Superior Court. Exh. A, ECF 15 No. 17-5. The Certificate of Mailing/Distribution contained the 16 mailing addresses of all recipients, thus alerting Defendant 17 Cortez to Plaintiff Lampkin’s location. Id. 18 At all relevant times, Defendant Spagner was an employee of 19 the Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento. 20 Defendant Spagner was not an employee of the County of 21 Sacramento. See Decl. of Alice Kruegar, ECF No. 17-5. The 22 Superior Court is a State of California entity, separate from the 23 County of Sacramento. Id. 24 Plaintiffs filed suit in June, 2020 alleging three causes of 25 action: (1) Violation of Substantive Due Process under 42 U.S.C. 26 § 1983; (2) Monell Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and 27

28 2 Erroneously named as “Martha Spangner” in the Complaint. 1 (3) Declaratory Relief. Defendant County of Sacramento moves for 2 summary judgment on all claims. 3 4 II. OPINION 5 A. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment 6 Summary judgment is proper if “the movant shows that there 7 is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 8 entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 9 Summary judgment should be granted cautiously, with due respect 10 for a party’s right to have its factually grounded claims and 11 defenses tried to a jury. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 12 317, 327, (1986). The Court must view the facts and draw 13 inferences in the manner most favorable to the non-moving party. 14 United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, (1992); Chevron 15 Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1992). The 16 moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the 17 absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial, but it 18 need not disprove the other party’s case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 19 323. 20 B. Discussion 21 For the purpose of the present motion, Plaintiffs do not 22 oppose summary judgment, having failed to submit a timely 23 opposition. In the absence of an opposition, the Court 24 nevertheless decides a motion for summary judgment on its merits. 25 See Cristobal v. Siegel, 26 F.3d 1488, 1494-95 (9th Cir. 1994) 26 (holding that an unopposed motion may be granted only after the 27 court determines there are no material issues of fact). 28 Defendant, therefore, must still meet its burden of showing the 1 absence of a genuine issue of material fact. If the undisputed 2 facts as found by the Court in the preceding section support an 3 entry of judgment as a matter of law, then Defendant is entitled 4 to judgment. 5 1. Claim One: Substantive Due Process 6 The substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment Due 7 Process Clause “forbids the government from depriving a person of 8 life, liberty, or property in such a way that . . . interferes 9 with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” no 10 matter how many procedural safeguards are in place. Engquist v. 11 Oregon Dept. of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 996 (9th Cir 2007). To 12 state a claim for a substantive due process violation, Plaintiffs 13 must show that a challenged state action either “shocks the 14 conscience” or arbitrarily deprives him of a fundamental right. 15 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987). A county 16 cannot be held vicariously liable for the civil rights violations 17 of its employees, much less non-employees. Monell v. Dept of 18 Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Because Defendant County 19 of Sacramento does not employ Defendant Spagner and because 20 Plaintiffs have not alleged any state action on the part of 21 Defendant County, the Court finds as a matter of law that 22 Defendant County is entitled to summary judgment as to the first 23 claim. 24 2. Claim Two: Monell Liability 25 Under Monell, municipalities can be sued directly under 42 26 U.S.C. § 1983 for an unconstitutional custom, policy, or 27 practice. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 28 (1978). To establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must 1 establish: “(1) that he possessed a constitutional right of which 2 he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that 3 this policy amounts to ‘deliberate indifference’ to the 4 plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the 5 ‘moving force behind the constitutional violation.’” Oviatt ex 6 rel. Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992) 7 (internal citation omitted). 8 The Court finds as a matter of law that Plaintiffs cannot 9 establish the first or fourth element of a Monell claim. As 10 explained, Plaintiffs have not established an underlying 11 constitutional violation attributable to Defendant County of 12 Sacramento. Further, even if Plaintiffs were to establish an 13 underlying violation, because Defendant County has no say in the 14 machinations of the Superior Court, none of the County’s policies 15 could be the “moving force” behind Defendant Spagner’s actions. 16 The fourth element is therefore not satisfied. For these 17 reasons, the Defendant County is entitled to summary judgment on 18 this claim. 19 3. Claim Three: Declaratory Relief 20 Because summary judgment in favor of Defendant County is 21 appropriate on the forgoing claims, there are no claims left to 22 support Plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory relief. Defendant 23 County is therefore entitled to summary judgment on this third 24 claim. 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// nee enn meee ne nn nnn nn nen nn rE NE IESE III EEE

1 Til. ORDER 2 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendant 3 County of Sacramento’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 Dated: August 10, 2022 6 APs JOHN A. MENDEZ 8 SENIOR UNITED*STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28