Lamore v. United States

136 F.2d 766, 78 U.S. App. D.C. 12, 1943 U.S. App. LEXIS 3127
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedMay 29, 1943
DocketNo. 8452
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 136 F.2d 766 (Lamore v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lamore v. United States, 136 F.2d 766, 78 U.S. App. D.C. 12, 1943 U.S. App. LEXIS 3127 (D.C. Cir. 1943).

Opinion

MILLER, Associate Justice.

Only one question is presented on this appeal, namely, whether, upon an indictment charging robbery, appellant could properly be convicted of larceny. Counsel for appellant and for the government agree that no case in this jurisdiction has declared the law expressly upon the point; although, in several cases, the general proposition has been recognized that such a conviction is proper for a lesser constituent offense.1 Section 1035 of the Revised Statutes2 provides that: “In all criminal causes the defendant may be found guilty of any offense the commission of which is necessarily included in that with which he is charged in the indictment, or may be found guilty of an attempt to commit the offense so charged, if such attempt be itself a separate offense.”

Robbery was defined by the common-law writers as a species of aggravated larceny.3 The two offenses were described as “intimately connected, the one being included in the other.” 4 The language of the early cases indicates general acceptance of this proposition. Thus, in Merriman v. The Hundred of Chippenham:5 “It was objected to be no robbery; there being no force used; but only larceny.” [Italics supplied.] Conviction of larceny upon indictment for robbery was common practice.6 The question of the present case may be considered as well settled, therefore, both at common law and in the uniform practice of the courts throughout the United States.7 We see no reason for reopening the question or giving serious consideration to another possibility. No reason, persuasive or plausible, is urged for doing so in the present case.

Affirmed.

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663 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Circuit, 1980)
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George Younger, Jr. v. United States
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159 F.2d 463 (D.C. Circuit, 1947)
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149 F.2d 481 (Sixth Circuit, 1945)
Edwards v. United States
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Bluebook (online)
136 F.2d 766, 78 U.S. App. D.C. 12, 1943 U.S. App. LEXIS 3127, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lamore-v-united-states-cadc-1943.