Lambeth v. Joffrion

41 La. Ann. 749
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedJuly 15, 1889
DocketNo. 1,343
StatusPublished

This text of 41 La. Ann. 749 (Lambeth v. Joffrion) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lambeth v. Joffrion, 41 La. Ann. 749 (La. 1889).

Opinion

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Watkins, J.

Claim is made against defendant sheriff for the sum of $8954 87 — the items of which alleged indebtedness appearing in detail in an account which is annexed to the plaintiff’s petition — under the following circumstances:

Under a final judgment rendered in a suit entitled Geo. W. Sentell & Co. vs. Mrs. Dora Lambeth, wife, the defendant was directed and required to make a seizure of the property of tho defendant in execution — the present plaintiff — and he did, thereunder, make a seizure of her Dora plantation, and, ponding sale thereof, same was in his care, and nnder his administration. It is charged that this seizure was effected on the 17th of August, 1875, at a time when the place was in process of cultivation in cotton and cane— one-sixth by tho owners, and five-sixths by tenants who worked on shares, for money, or for labor; that the defendant (plaintiff here) resided at a distance of four miles from the place, and had placed it under the management and superintendence of an overseer, who was displaced by the sheriff’s keeper. That the said sheriff continued in charge of said plantation, crops and other property, from the date of seizure until it was leased for the subsequent year, 1886, under an order of court, which was [751]*751granted on the 8th of December, 1885, an injunction against a sale thereof having been,'in the meanwhile, obtained by the plaintiff.

It is for a general settlement of the sheriff’s agency and management of this property that this litigation was undertaken.

It appears that the property was ultimately sent to sale — the injunction having been finally disposed of — on the 6th of November, 1886, and sold for $16,500, on a credit of twelve months, the purchaser executing his bond therefor.

Soon afterwards the defendant in execution — plaintiff herein — obtained a rule on the defendant sheriff, to show cause on the 9th of December, 1886, why lie should not file his return of the writ of seizure and sale; and on the 11th of that month he made a return of the writ and accompanied the same with a full and elaborate statement in detail, of all of his proceedings and doings thereunder, and particularly of his cultivation and management of Dora plantation, and of the crops of cotton and sugar-cane produced thereon, and all of the items and amounts of his expenditures and receipts therefrom, including the lease thereof — the whole covering twenty-two pages of this transcript.

According to his report, the total proceeds of the crops of 1885 and 1886, including the lease price, aggregated $6324 38, the whole of which was expended, except the sum of $1402 65, paid to plaintiff’s ’attorney, and a balance of $335 14, remaining in sheriff’s hand, subject to her order.

In opposition to this return and statement of account, the plaintiff has taken the present proceeding, whereby she seeks to recover judgment for the sum stated swpra.

To the petition of plaintiff, defendant, sheriff, tendered the following exceptions, viz:

1. No cause of action.

2. Because the suit wherein his account is filed, and against which this proceeding is directed had been ended by final judgment, disposition of proceeds, and return of fi. fa., before the same was filed.

3. Because third opposition is not the proper fo,rm in which to attack same.

4. Because said proceeding- discloses a misjoinder of actions.

On the trial the judge a guo found that plaintiff’s petition contained an improper cumulation of demands, and she was ordered to elect whether she would pursue her opposition to the account of distribution of the proceeds of sale, or her action against the sheriff for damages, resulting from his alleged maladministration of plaintiff’s property [752]*752while under seizure — or in default of so doing, that her proceeding-should be dismissed.

Thereupon, x>laintiff elected to pursue her opposition to the sheriff’s account, as evidenced by the account annexed to her petition, reserving her rights of action against him for an account of his management of the property seized, and for and on account of all of his acts of maladministration thereof.

Defendant objected to this election as not being sufficiently explicit, or responsive to the judge’s order, but same having been overruled, his counsel reserved a bill of exceptions.

In this state of the pleadings — as nearly as we can understand them .— for they are exceedingly prolix and elaborate — the parties went to trial, and judgment was thereon pronounced, and the defendant’s account was amended by placing to his debit, the following additional items, viz :

Thirty-seven barrels of molasses............................. $505 54

Sixteen hogsheads of sugar.................................. 708 00

Sale of cotton seed and ginning.............................. 08 23

Six molasses barrels......................................... 10 80

Balance of rent by Jones..................................... 43 00

For pioux and posts......................................... 58 75

Total...............................................$1,394 32

This account was, in all other respects, approved and homologated.

From this judgment the accountant has appealed, and in this court the complainant has filed an elaborate assignment of errors, and, in this wise, the entire case is before us for review.

It is made an important question in this case whether the plaintiff’s petition is in the nature of an opposition to an account of administration, and, therefore, in effect, an answer, or is it a direct action. The judge a quo at first entertained, and treated it as a suit, but subsequently as an opposition, and of this the sheriff’s counsel complain.

To our thinking the whole proceeding is somewhat anomalous and sui generis-, one for which wo know of no exact precedent. But the definition of it will serve no useful purpose, as mere names are not at all efficacious in controversies touching- the adjustment of matters of account; and the question of the onus of proof, is of scarcely greater importance. So we will leave it just where we find it, and treat it as, in some sort, an opposition to a sheriff’s account of administration of a plantation under seizure.

[753]*753Tlie substantial facts, as above recited, are proved by the record — the differences between the x>arties being as to the details, only.

It appears that on the 14th of December, 1886, prior to the inauguration of these proceedings on the 2nd of April afterwards, plaintiff’s attorney received, and receipted for $300 of the balance in the sheriff’s hands, as stated previously, and this is made the foundation of defendant’s jilea of estoppel by conduct and of record which was, over their objection, overruled by tlie judge a quo, and, we think, correctly. The simple acceptance of this sum, on account,” to all appearances, cannot be treated as having such serious consequences, when it was evidently not contemplated, or so considered.

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Bluebook (online)
41 La. Ann. 749, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lambeth-v-joffrion-la-1889.