Conley Byrd, Justice.
Appellant, Mrs. Joel Lambert, d/b/a Lambert Seed Company, used a two-ton Dodge truck equipped with a “cheater” axle
The complaint alleged, and evidence was submitted to the jury upon, the issues of res ipsa loquitur and the specific negligence allegations that appellant failed to maintain her vehicle in a safe operating condition and failed to attach the dual wheels to the truck in such manner to keep the hub and wheels from separating from the truck. There was a dispute in the evidence with reference to the presence or absence óf a lock washer required to keep the wheels attached to the truck. However, the trial court submitted the issues to the jury only upon A.M.I. 305, duty to use ordinary care, and A.M.I. 610, res ipsa loquitur. For reversal of a verdict and judgment in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Markley, appellant raises the issues hereinafter discussed.
POINT I. In contending that the trial court erred in giving the res ipsa loquitur instruction, appellant principally relies upon Ford Motor Company v. Fish, 232 Ark. 270, 335 S.W. 2d 713 (1960). In that case Fish, a game warden, was driving a new Ford pickup which allegedly left the highway and caused personal injuries because a defective brake grabbed the right front wheel. Upon proof that the brake mechanism was bolted together at Ford’s factory and that it had not been tampered with, the trial court there submitted the issues to the jury on a res ipsa loquitur instruction. We there held the instruction erroneous, but in doing so we neither added to nor qualified the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
When we remember that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant either knows the cause of the accident or has the better opportunity of ascertaining it, it can be readily seen that the case of Ford Motor Company v. Fish, supra, does not support appellant’s position. We there pointed out not only that Fish had not made the necessary showing that he was not also negligent, since he was operating and in possession of the automobile at the time of the injury, but that since the average auto repairman could determine the exact nature of the malfunction of the brake mechanism by merely removing some bolts, the cause of the malfunction could be as easily determined by Fish as by Ford Motor Company. That decision was in accord with the authorities generally which state that if the plaintiff has equal or superior means of information, the doctrine will not apply. See Annotation 46 A.L.R. 2d 110.
In the case before us, Mr. Markley is not in a position to have equal or superior means of information as to the cause of the wheel becoming detached. Even if we assume that the proof shows that the lock washer had been left off the wheel and that caused the wheel to become detached from the truck, that in itself would not establish negligence on the part of appellant. Still the appellant had the better opportunity to have access to all the information as to why her driver did not discover the loosened wheel before it became detached; who placed the wheel on the truck in the first place; whether she had caused proper inspection to be made to see if the wheel was properly secured for operation on the highways; and who could have assembled the wheels without the lock washer being in place. Of course the appellant here furnished proof to the effect that the lock washer was not missing, and, under these circumstances, what we said in Moon Distributors v. White, 245 Ark. 627, 434 S.W. 2d 56 (1968), in quoting from Cassady v. Old Colony Street R. Co., 184 Mass. 156, 68 N.E. 10, 63 L.R.A. 285 (1903), is most appropriate, to-wit:
“It is true that, where the evidence shows the precise cause of the accident . . . there is, of course no room for the application of the doctrine of presumption. The real cause being shown, there is no occasion to inquire as to what the presumption would have been as to it if it had not been shown. But if, at the close of the evidence, the cause does not clearly appear, or if there is a dispute as to what it is, then it is open to the plaintiff to argue upon the whole evidence, and the jury are justified in relying upon presumptions, unless they are satisfied that the cause has been shown to be inconsistent with it. An unsuccessful attempt to prove by direct evidence the precise cause does not estop the plaintiff from relying upon the presumption applicable to it.”
When the facts are here analyzed, we must conclude that the trial court did not err in giving the res ipsa lo-quitur instruction. The annotator in 46 A.L.R. 2d 110 points out that a great majority of the courts from other jurisdictions hold that res ipsa loquitur is proper in the case of a detached wheel.
POINT II. Having determined that the case was properly submitted upon the res ipsa loquitur issue, it follows, without further discussion, that the trial court did not err in refusing a directed verdict.
POINT III. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in allowing appellees on direct to read from the deposition of J. C. McDaniel on the theory he was a “managing agent.” Different authorities are cited both by appellant and appellees to support .heir respective contentions that McDaniel was or was not a managing agent within the provisions of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 28-348(d)(2) (Repl. 1962). We need not here determine whether Mr. McDaniel was a “managing agent” for he later took the witness stand and testified to the same facts developed in the deposition. Consequently, the record demonstrates that reading of the deposition was not prejudicial.
POINT IV. Appellant asked the court, in accordance with A.M.I. 603, to instruct the jury that “the fact that an injury occurred is not, of itself, evidence of negligence on the part of anyone.” The court declined to give the instruction apparently on the basis that it to some extent conflicted with the res ipsa loquitur instruction which permitted the jury to draw an inference of negligence “from the manner in which the alleged injury occurred.”
The drafters of the Arkansas Model Jury Instructions recognized that A.M.I. 603 is inappropriate when Ark. Stat. Ann. § 75-623(c) is applicable. That statute provides: “. . . that if such driver is involved in a collision with a pedestrian in a crosswalk or a vehicle in the intersection after driving past a yield sign without stopping, such collision shall be deemed prima facie evidence of his failure to yield the right-of-way.” We can see little difference between the prima facie case raised by the statute and that involved in the detachment of a wheel from a moving vehicle upon a highway.
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Conley Byrd, Justice.
Appellant, Mrs. Joel Lambert, d/b/a Lambert Seed Company, used a two-ton Dodge truck equipped with a “cheater” axle
The complaint alleged, and evidence was submitted to the jury upon, the issues of res ipsa loquitur and the specific negligence allegations that appellant failed to maintain her vehicle in a safe operating condition and failed to attach the dual wheels to the truck in such manner to keep the hub and wheels from separating from the truck. There was a dispute in the evidence with reference to the presence or absence óf a lock washer required to keep the wheels attached to the truck. However, the trial court submitted the issues to the jury only upon A.M.I. 305, duty to use ordinary care, and A.M.I. 610, res ipsa loquitur. For reversal of a verdict and judgment in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Markley, appellant raises the issues hereinafter discussed.
POINT I. In contending that the trial court erred in giving the res ipsa loquitur instruction, appellant principally relies upon Ford Motor Company v. Fish, 232 Ark. 270, 335 S.W. 2d 713 (1960). In that case Fish, a game warden, was driving a new Ford pickup which allegedly left the highway and caused personal injuries because a defective brake grabbed the right front wheel. Upon proof that the brake mechanism was bolted together at Ford’s factory and that it had not been tampered with, the trial court there submitted the issues to the jury on a res ipsa loquitur instruction. We there held the instruction erroneous, but in doing so we neither added to nor qualified the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
When we remember that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant either knows the cause of the accident or has the better opportunity of ascertaining it, it can be readily seen that the case of Ford Motor Company v. Fish, supra, does not support appellant’s position. We there pointed out not only that Fish had not made the necessary showing that he was not also negligent, since he was operating and in possession of the automobile at the time of the injury, but that since the average auto repairman could determine the exact nature of the malfunction of the brake mechanism by merely removing some bolts, the cause of the malfunction could be as easily determined by Fish as by Ford Motor Company. That decision was in accord with the authorities generally which state that if the plaintiff has equal or superior means of information, the doctrine will not apply. See Annotation 46 A.L.R. 2d 110.
In the case before us, Mr. Markley is not in a position to have equal or superior means of information as to the cause of the wheel becoming detached. Even if we assume that the proof shows that the lock washer had been left off the wheel and that caused the wheel to become detached from the truck, that in itself would not establish negligence on the part of appellant. Still the appellant had the better opportunity to have access to all the information as to why her driver did not discover the loosened wheel before it became detached; who placed the wheel on the truck in the first place; whether she had caused proper inspection to be made to see if the wheel was properly secured for operation on the highways; and who could have assembled the wheels without the lock washer being in place. Of course the appellant here furnished proof to the effect that the lock washer was not missing, and, under these circumstances, what we said in Moon Distributors v. White, 245 Ark. 627, 434 S.W. 2d 56 (1968), in quoting from Cassady v. Old Colony Street R. Co., 184 Mass. 156, 68 N.E. 10, 63 L.R.A. 285 (1903), is most appropriate, to-wit:
“It is true that, where the evidence shows the precise cause of the accident . . . there is, of course no room for the application of the doctrine of presumption. The real cause being shown, there is no occasion to inquire as to what the presumption would have been as to it if it had not been shown. But if, at the close of the evidence, the cause does not clearly appear, or if there is a dispute as to what it is, then it is open to the plaintiff to argue upon the whole evidence, and the jury are justified in relying upon presumptions, unless they are satisfied that the cause has been shown to be inconsistent with it. An unsuccessful attempt to prove by direct evidence the precise cause does not estop the plaintiff from relying upon the presumption applicable to it.”
When the facts are here analyzed, we must conclude that the trial court did not err in giving the res ipsa lo-quitur instruction. The annotator in 46 A.L.R. 2d 110 points out that a great majority of the courts from other jurisdictions hold that res ipsa loquitur is proper in the case of a detached wheel.
POINT II. Having determined that the case was properly submitted upon the res ipsa loquitur issue, it follows, without further discussion, that the trial court did not err in refusing a directed verdict.
POINT III. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in allowing appellees on direct to read from the deposition of J. C. McDaniel on the theory he was a “managing agent.” Different authorities are cited both by appellant and appellees to support .heir respective contentions that McDaniel was or was not a managing agent within the provisions of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 28-348(d)(2) (Repl. 1962). We need not here determine whether Mr. McDaniel was a “managing agent” for he later took the witness stand and testified to the same facts developed in the deposition. Consequently, the record demonstrates that reading of the deposition was not prejudicial.
POINT IV. Appellant asked the court, in accordance with A.M.I. 603, to instruct the jury that “the fact that an injury occurred is not, of itself, evidence of negligence on the part of anyone.” The court declined to give the instruction apparently on the basis that it to some extent conflicted with the res ipsa loquitur instruction which permitted the jury to draw an inference of negligence “from the manner in which the alleged injury occurred.”
The drafters of the Arkansas Model Jury Instructions recognized that A.M.I. 603 is inappropriate when Ark. Stat. Ann. § 75-623(c) is applicable. That statute provides: “. . . that if such driver is involved in a collision with a pedestrian in a crosswalk or a vehicle in the intersection after driving past a yield sign without stopping, such collision shall be deemed prima facie evidence of his failure to yield the right-of-way.” We can see little difference between the prima facie case raised by the statute and that involved in the detachment of a wheel from a moving vehicle upon a highway. Consequently, where, as here, the case is submitted to the jury only upon the issues of res ipsa loquitur and ordinary care (as distinguished from specific grounds of negligence such as speed and control), we cannot say that in view of the other instructions, the trial court committed prejudicial error in declining to give the instruction.
POINT V. Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give her requested instructions Nos. 1 and 2 which stated:
“1. In connection with the alleged negligence of Lambert Seed Company, Lambert Seed Company is not liable for hidden or latent defects in their trucking equipment which were not or could not have been discovered by ordinary care and ordinary maintenance. If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defect which caused the wheel to become dislodged from the Lambert truck was a latent defect, or one which could not have been discovered by ordinary care and ordinary maintenance, then you are instructed the Lambert Seed Company is not guilty of negligence which was proximate cause of the accident.
2. Lambert Seed Company, as the owner of a motor vehicle, is not liable for injuries resulting from the defective condition of their motor vehicle in the absence of negligence on their part. Lambert Seed Company was required to exercise reasonable care to see that their vehicle was in proper operating condition and must have exercised reasonable care in the inspection of their vehicle to discover any defects that might have prevented proper operation. If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Lambert Seed Company and its agents or employees could not have discovered the defect which was to cause the wheel from becoming detached by reasonable care and inspection of the vehicle, then Lambert Seed Company is not guilty of any negligence which was a proximate cause of the occurrence.”
The Committee in its introduction to the Arkansas Model Jury Instructions points out the guides that it used in drafting the instructions therein contained. One of those guides is that an instruction must be unslanted. In the per curiam order of April 19, 1965, we pointed out that:
“. . . Whenever A.M.I. does not contain an instruction on a subject upon which the trial judge determines that the jury should be instructed, or when an A.M.I. instruction cannot be modified to submit the issue, the instruction on that subject should be simple, brief, impartial, and free from argument.”
In commenting on what is impartial and unslanted the Committee said:
“To be unslanted the instructions must be an objective statement of the law. They are to be the court’s instructions and not partisian instructions sounding first like the plaintiff’s counsel and then like defense counsel. ...”
Even a casual reading of the two instructions offered by appellant demonstrates that they are slanted toward the defendant. For this reason the trial court properly refused the instructions.
Affirmed.
Harris, C.J., not participating. Fogleman, J., dissents. This axle sometimes referred to as a tandem axle permits the truck to haul a greater weight under the State’s truck licensing laws.