Present: Goodwyn, Mims, Powell, Kelsey, McCullough, and Chafin, JJ., and Russell, S.J.
CLINARD GARY LAMBERT OPINION BY v. Record No. 190439 SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL APRIL 9, 2020 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
This appeal arises from convictions for aggravated involuntary manslaughter in violation
of Code § 18.2-36.1 and driving while intoxicated in violation of Code § 18.2-266. It presents
questions whether the Commonwealth presented evidence sufficient to support jury verdicts
finding that the defendant had self-administered intoxicants that impaired his ability to drive
safely. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the evidence before the jury, and the
inferences reasonably deducible therefrom, was sufficient to support a finding beyond a
reasonable doubt that Lambert had, prior to the accident, self-administered drugs that impaired
his ability to drive safely. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial. On March 1, 2015,
Donna Turner was driving her Chevrolet Cavalier eastbound, crossing “Big A” Mountain in
Russell County. She was accompanied, in the front passenger seat, by Forrest Ramey. At the
same time, the defendant, Clinard Gary Lambert, was driving a pickup truck westbound,
approaching her on the same road. The defendant crossed the centerline, entered the eastbound
lane and continued until he collided with the guardrail to his left. He scraped along the guardrail
for about forty feet before coming to a stop.
Donna Turner, coming around a curve, saw the truck ahead, swerved to her left to avoid
it, but was unable to avert a collision. She suffered injuries but the main force of the impact was to the passenger side of her car. Forrest Ramey, her passenger, later died as a result of the blunt
force injuries he sustained.
Several witnesses soon appeared at the scene. Claude Musick was driving eastbound
ahead of the Turner Chevrolet. He heard the crash behind him. In his rear-view mirror, he saw
Lambert’s truck against the guardrail, headed in the wrong direction. He turned around, returned
to the scene and called 911.
Next, an eastbound car driven by Tammy Brown, with Andrew Duncan as her passenger,
arrived at the scene. They had been too far behind to see the accident but stopped to give
assistance. Duncan assisted Lambert in climbing out of his truck on its passenger side. Donna
Turner remained in her car, trying unsuccessfully to revive Ramey. Lambert stood beside the
truck and appeared to be “dazed” and “wobbly on his feet.” His face was bleeding profusely.
He was not seen to eat, drink, or take any medication.
Greta Morrison, an Emergency Medical Technician and a nursing supervisor at the
Russell County Medical Center, responded to the scene. Treating Lambert for his facial injuries,
she noted that his speech was slurred but that he was oriented and could answer questions. She
suspected that “there was more to” the slurred speech than just this apparent facial trauma.
When she asked him whether he had taken any drugs or alcohol, he denied that he had. She
suggested to a police officer who had arrived at the scene that a blood sample should be taken
from Lambert. No medications were given to Lambert at the scene or during his subsequent
transportation to the hospital by emergency personnel.
Two Virginia State Troopers responded to the scene. Lambert told Trooper Osborne that
he had been driving his truck but did not know what had happened. He appeared sleepy and was
leaning on the guardrail for support but denied consuming any drugs or alcohol. Upon being
2 asked a second time, however, Lambert admitted that he had just come back from the local
methadone treatment center where he received a “treatment of methadone.”
Lambert was transported to the Holston Valley Hospital in Kingsport, Tennessee. The
police obtained a search warrant for a sample of his blood for analysis. The resulting certificate
of analysis confirmed the presence of methadone and drugs commonly known as Valium and
Xanax in Lambert’s blood.
Lambert was indicted in the Circuit Court of Russell County for aggravated involuntary
manslaughter and driving while intoxicated. The case proceeded to a jury trial. The
Commonwealth presented evidence to support the facts outlined above. In addition, Dr. James
Kuhlman, Jr., a forensic toxicologist, testified that the levels of methadone and Xanax in
Lambert’s blood were “significant,” had depressant effects that could be “additive” and “very
dangerous” in combination, causing drowsiness, dizziness, lethargy, slowed hand-eye
coordination, slurred speech and altered balance. He concluded that the drug levels in Lambert’s
blood were sufficient to have impaired his ability to drive safely.
At the close of the Commonwealth’s evidence, Lambert moved to strike it on the ground,
among others, that the Commonwealth had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
drugs in Lambert’s blood were self-administered. The trial court denied the motion then and
again when it was renewed at the conclusion of the trial. The jury found Lambert guilty on both
charges and sentenced him to seven years’ incarceration on the charge of aggravated involuntary
manslaughter and a fine of $1,500 on the charge of driving while intoxicated. The court entered
final judgment in accordance with the jury verdicts.
Lambert appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals, which granted and considered
his assignments of error. In a published opinion, Lambert v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 54
(2019), the Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions. We awarded Lambert an appeal limited 3 to three assignments of error relating solely to the question whether the drugs found in Lambert’s
blood had been self-administered.
ANALYSIS
The statutes under which Lambert was charged provide, in pertinent part, as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate any motor vehicle . . . (iii) while such person is under the influence of any narcotic drug or any other self- administered intoxicant or drug of whatsoever nature, or any combination of such drugs, to a degree which impairs his ability to drive or operate any motor vehicle . . . safely.
Code § 18.2-266.
Any person who, as a result of driving under the influence in violation of clause (ii), (iii), or (iv) of § 18.2-266 . . . unintentionally causes the death of another person, shall be guilty of involuntary manslaughter.
Code § 18.2-36.1(A).
Lambert contended in the Court of Appeals that our decision in Jackson v.
Commonwealth, 274 Va. 630 (2007), precludes a finding that the drugs found in his blood were
“self-administered.” The Court of Appeals determined that Jackson was inapposite, and we
agree. Jackson was a case devoted entirely to statutory construction. There, we construed Code
§ 18.3-266 to require the Commonwealth to prove self-administration as an element of the crime,
regardless of the intoxicating substance involved. Jackson, 274 Va. at 634. There, the
Commonwealth contended that the phrase “any narcotic drug” in Code § 18.2-266 made proof of
self-administration unnecessary. Id. at 633-34. We disagreed and reversed the conviction. Id. at
634-35.
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Present: Goodwyn, Mims, Powell, Kelsey, McCullough, and Chafin, JJ., and Russell, S.J.
CLINARD GARY LAMBERT OPINION BY v. Record No. 190439 SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL APRIL 9, 2020 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
This appeal arises from convictions for aggravated involuntary manslaughter in violation
of Code § 18.2-36.1 and driving while intoxicated in violation of Code § 18.2-266. It presents
questions whether the Commonwealth presented evidence sufficient to support jury verdicts
finding that the defendant had self-administered intoxicants that impaired his ability to drive
safely. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the evidence before the jury, and the
inferences reasonably deducible therefrom, was sufficient to support a finding beyond a
reasonable doubt that Lambert had, prior to the accident, self-administered drugs that impaired
his ability to drive safely. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial. On March 1, 2015,
Donna Turner was driving her Chevrolet Cavalier eastbound, crossing “Big A” Mountain in
Russell County. She was accompanied, in the front passenger seat, by Forrest Ramey. At the
same time, the defendant, Clinard Gary Lambert, was driving a pickup truck westbound,
approaching her on the same road. The defendant crossed the centerline, entered the eastbound
lane and continued until he collided with the guardrail to his left. He scraped along the guardrail
for about forty feet before coming to a stop.
Donna Turner, coming around a curve, saw the truck ahead, swerved to her left to avoid
it, but was unable to avert a collision. She suffered injuries but the main force of the impact was to the passenger side of her car. Forrest Ramey, her passenger, later died as a result of the blunt
force injuries he sustained.
Several witnesses soon appeared at the scene. Claude Musick was driving eastbound
ahead of the Turner Chevrolet. He heard the crash behind him. In his rear-view mirror, he saw
Lambert’s truck against the guardrail, headed in the wrong direction. He turned around, returned
to the scene and called 911.
Next, an eastbound car driven by Tammy Brown, with Andrew Duncan as her passenger,
arrived at the scene. They had been too far behind to see the accident but stopped to give
assistance. Duncan assisted Lambert in climbing out of his truck on its passenger side. Donna
Turner remained in her car, trying unsuccessfully to revive Ramey. Lambert stood beside the
truck and appeared to be “dazed” and “wobbly on his feet.” His face was bleeding profusely.
He was not seen to eat, drink, or take any medication.
Greta Morrison, an Emergency Medical Technician and a nursing supervisor at the
Russell County Medical Center, responded to the scene. Treating Lambert for his facial injuries,
she noted that his speech was slurred but that he was oriented and could answer questions. She
suspected that “there was more to” the slurred speech than just this apparent facial trauma.
When she asked him whether he had taken any drugs or alcohol, he denied that he had. She
suggested to a police officer who had arrived at the scene that a blood sample should be taken
from Lambert. No medications were given to Lambert at the scene or during his subsequent
transportation to the hospital by emergency personnel.
Two Virginia State Troopers responded to the scene. Lambert told Trooper Osborne that
he had been driving his truck but did not know what had happened. He appeared sleepy and was
leaning on the guardrail for support but denied consuming any drugs or alcohol. Upon being
2 asked a second time, however, Lambert admitted that he had just come back from the local
methadone treatment center where he received a “treatment of methadone.”
Lambert was transported to the Holston Valley Hospital in Kingsport, Tennessee. The
police obtained a search warrant for a sample of his blood for analysis. The resulting certificate
of analysis confirmed the presence of methadone and drugs commonly known as Valium and
Xanax in Lambert’s blood.
Lambert was indicted in the Circuit Court of Russell County for aggravated involuntary
manslaughter and driving while intoxicated. The case proceeded to a jury trial. The
Commonwealth presented evidence to support the facts outlined above. In addition, Dr. James
Kuhlman, Jr., a forensic toxicologist, testified that the levels of methadone and Xanax in
Lambert’s blood were “significant,” had depressant effects that could be “additive” and “very
dangerous” in combination, causing drowsiness, dizziness, lethargy, slowed hand-eye
coordination, slurred speech and altered balance. He concluded that the drug levels in Lambert’s
blood were sufficient to have impaired his ability to drive safely.
At the close of the Commonwealth’s evidence, Lambert moved to strike it on the ground,
among others, that the Commonwealth had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
drugs in Lambert’s blood were self-administered. The trial court denied the motion then and
again when it was renewed at the conclusion of the trial. The jury found Lambert guilty on both
charges and sentenced him to seven years’ incarceration on the charge of aggravated involuntary
manslaughter and a fine of $1,500 on the charge of driving while intoxicated. The court entered
final judgment in accordance with the jury verdicts.
Lambert appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals, which granted and considered
his assignments of error. In a published opinion, Lambert v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 54
(2019), the Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions. We awarded Lambert an appeal limited 3 to three assignments of error relating solely to the question whether the drugs found in Lambert’s
blood had been self-administered.
ANALYSIS
The statutes under which Lambert was charged provide, in pertinent part, as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate any motor vehicle . . . (iii) while such person is under the influence of any narcotic drug or any other self- administered intoxicant or drug of whatsoever nature, or any combination of such drugs, to a degree which impairs his ability to drive or operate any motor vehicle . . . safely.
Code § 18.2-266.
Any person who, as a result of driving under the influence in violation of clause (ii), (iii), or (iv) of § 18.2-266 . . . unintentionally causes the death of another person, shall be guilty of involuntary manslaughter.
Code § 18.2-36.1(A).
Lambert contended in the Court of Appeals that our decision in Jackson v.
Commonwealth, 274 Va. 630 (2007), precludes a finding that the drugs found in his blood were
“self-administered.” The Court of Appeals determined that Jackson was inapposite, and we
agree. Jackson was a case devoted entirely to statutory construction. There, we construed Code
§ 18.3-266 to require the Commonwealth to prove self-administration as an element of the crime,
regardless of the intoxicating substance involved. Jackson, 274 Va. at 634. There, the
Commonwealth contended that the phrase “any narcotic drug” in Code § 18.2-266 made proof of
self-administration unnecessary. Id. at 633-34. We disagreed and reversed the conviction. Id. at
634-35. The present case, by contrast, presents only a question of the sufficiency of the evidence
to prove self-administration.
On appeal, an appellate court is required to consider the evidence and all inferences fairly
deducible from it in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.
Perry v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 572, 578 (2010). The relevant issue on appeal is, “upon
4 review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, whether any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pijor v.
Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The evidence concerning the presence of intoxicants in Lambert’s blood, sufficient to
impair his ability to drive safely, was undisputed. When separately asked by Nurse Morrison
and Trooper Osborne whether he had taken any drugs or alcohol, he initially denied that he had
done so. Later, he admitted to the trooper that he had just received methadone at a methadone
treatment clinic. The trial court held, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the methadone
treatment clinic was a part of a voluntary program and that Lambert had agreed to ingest
methadone by his voluntary participation in the program. There was no evidence as to how the
other drugs had found their way into Lambert’s blood, but the jury was entitled to draw the
inference that he had initially lied about consuming any drugs out of his consciousness of guilt
and a desire to conceal it. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 52, 57-58 (2010).
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the evidence before the jury, and the inferences reasonably deducible
therefrom, was sufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Lambert had, prior
to the accident, self-administered drugs that impaired his ability to drive safely. Accordingly, we
will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Affirmed.