Lamb v. United States

264 F. 660, 1920 U.S. App. LEXIS 1302
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedApril 7, 1920
DocketNo. 3400
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 264 F. 660 (Lamb v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lamb v. United States, 264 F. 660, 1920 U.S. App. LEXIS 1302 (5th Cir. 1920).

Opinion

CALL, District Judge.

The plaintiffs in error, defendants below, were jointly indicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern Division of the Southern District of Georgia. The indictment contains four counts. The first count, the only one on which the jury returned a verdict of guilty, charges the defendants with unlawfully having in their possession and custody, and under their control, a still, or distilling apparatus, for the production of spirituous liquors, set up without having the same registered as required by law. Upon the trial the jury returned a verdict of guilty against both of the defendants on this count, upon which verdict the court sentenced the defendants to pay a fine and be confined in the Chatham county jail for a certain period. The writ of error sued out seeks a reversal of this judgment.

There are eight assignments of error. The first is that there was no evidence upon which Dave Lamb could have been convicted.

The second assigns as error a charge given by the court, because it authorized a conviction on the fourth count, on which count the defendants were acquitted. If error had been committed in this charge, which we do not think, it is harmless to the defendants, as they were each acquitted by the jury of this charge.

The third assigns error to the court in overruling the motion in arrest of judgment. This assignment is discussed, and decided adversely to the plaintiffs in error in the case of Anthony Phillips v. United States, 264 Fed. 657,- C. C. A. -, at the present term.

The fourth assignment is upon the court’s refusal to give the following charge requested:

“I charge you that, under the first count of the indictment, the defendants are charged with having in their possession, custody, and control a still and distilling apparatus for the production of spirituous liquors, set up without-having the same registered as required by law. I charge you that there is no evidence to show that either of the defendants were in possession of the still in question, and there is no evidence to show that either of the defendants had such still in their custody. It is for yon to determine from the evidence in this case, if they liad said still and distilling apparatus under their control. By control the statute means management or direction.”

The fifth assignment is upon the refusal of the court to give the following requested charge:

“I charge you that the defendant Dave Lamb contends that he knew nothing about this still, knew nothing of its operation, had nothing whatever to do with its management or control, and was not in possession of it; that he does admit that he had in his possession, two miles away from the place [662]*662where the still was found, and at his own place, certain fermenting syrup which he claims he intended to use in his own household, and not for the purpose of manufacturing any spirituous liquors. If you find his contention supported by the evidence, you would find him not guilty.”

The sixth assignment is abandoned in argument. The seventh assignment is based upon the refusal to give this charge:

“I charge you that suspicious circumstances are never 'sufficient alone to convict one of crime. Those circumstances in any given case may be of more or less importance viewed in the light of the entire evidence in the ease; but if they amount to merely circumstantial evidence, then such evidence alone would not be sufficient to convict unless the same was consistent with the guilt of the accused as charged, and must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.”

The eighth assignment is based upon the refusal to charge as follows :

“If you find from the evidence in this case that the still in question at the time it was discovered by the officers of the law was in actual operation, and that Kobert Lamb was at Stillmore at that time, seven miles away, and had been away from his own place since 8 or 9 o’clock that morning, and that this still had a fire going at that time, and in actual operation, that the circumstance that Robert Lamb was so far away from where the still was located may be considered by you in determining whether he was in control of said still; and if you find that the evidence fails to show that he or any one acting under his direction commenced the operation of the still that day, and that it was physically impossible for him to have commenced the operation of such still before leaving and the same be in the condition in which it was found by the officers of the law when they did find it, then you would be authorized to find that he was not connected with the management or control of said still, and you would be authorized to find him not guilty.”

The second and third assignments need not be noticed, further than what has been said about them above.

[ 1 ] The first assignment raises the question whether there was any evidence before the jury upon which Dave Lamb could be convicted of the first count of the-indictment. If there was any evidence upon which, and the deductions properly flowing therefrom, the jury would be justified in arriving at a verdict of guilty, the court should have refused the charge; by giving it the court would have instructed the jury to acquit that particular defendant on the first count. The testimony contained in the bill of exceptions shows this state of facts:

On the 24th of May, 1918, there was a still found on property not owned by the Lambs near a branch of running water. The still was in operation when found; fire under it and spirits dripping from the pipe. This still was within a short distance of Robert Lamb’s house; some of the witnesses say 300 yards; some say 500 or 600 yards. From the still Robert Lamb’s house was in plain view. Some 10 gallons of whisky distilled from syrup beer, one empty barrel which had contained beer, and a barrel and a half of beer in condition to be distilled, were found at or near the still. A well-defined wagon track led from the still to Robert Lamb’s house, with indications that a wagon that morning had come from the house to the still, been unloaded there, and then returned to the house. A wagon was found in the yard of Robert Lamb; also two barrels buried in the ground and covered up, [663]*663containing syrup beer, not quite ready for distillation. Dave Ramb was a brother of Robert, and lived between a half and three-quarters of a mile from the place where the still was found, although one had to travel further in going to or from the house to the still, depending on whether one went through the field or by the road. The house of the father was between Robert’s and Dave’s houses. At Dave’s house was found barrels of syrup beer not ready for distillation, two full barrels by the well in the yard, and one of the witnesses testified one empty, from which beer had been taken; two barrels buried in his smokehouse, one of which contained a small quantity of beer and several Coca-Cola kegs, one of the witnesses testifying that one of the kegs contained a small quantity of whisky made from syrup beer, and all the others smelling of such whisky. Dave Ramb’s house was not in sight from the still.

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Related

Kendall v. United States
131 F.2d 431 (Fifth Circuit, 1942)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
264 F. 660, 1920 U.S. App. LEXIS 1302, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lamb-v-united-states-ca5-1920.