Lamb v. Social Security Administration

E.D. Arkansas

Lamb v. Social Security Administration

DecidedAugust 29, 2025

Docket3:22-cv-00210

StatusUnknown

This text of Lamb v. Social Security Administration (Lamb v. Social Security Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Lamb v. Social Security Administration, (E.D. Ark. 2025).

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Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS NORTHERN DIVISION

CONSEULO LAMB PLAINTIFF

Vv. No. 3:22-cv-210-DPM

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Commissioner DEFENDANT

ORDER After the Social Security Administration denied Consuelo Lamb’s application for disability benefits, she turned to Nicholas Coleman, alawyer. They made a contingent-fee agreement: 25% of any past-due benefits owed to Lamb. With Coleman’s help, Lamb sought review in this Court and secured a remand to the ALJ. On remand, the ALJ issued Lamb a fully favorable decision, which included an award of $70,620 in past-due disability benefits. Coleman now seeks an attorney’s fee of $17,655 (25% of $70,620) under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). The question is whether that fee is reasonable for the services rendered. Kertz v. Colvin, 125 F.4th 1218, 1220-21 (8th Cir. 2025). Under § 406(b), the Court must anchor its reasonableness analysis in the fee yielded by the contingency agreement. Ibid. A reduction may be warranted if Coleman’s representation was substandard, if he was responsible for delay, or if the fee award would be a windfall to him. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808 (2002).

Coleman has zealously represented Lamb, and the Court sees no delay on his part. But an award of $17,655 is simply too large in comparison to the amount of time he spent on this case — 24.2 hours. Doc. 23-1 at 5. That award would boil down to an hourly rate of $729.55, which is more than double his $350/hour rate for noncontingent-fee cases. Doc. 23-1 at 2. Plus, the scope of Coleman's representation was “strictly limited to federal court review.” Doc. 23-2 at 1. After the case was remanded, Lamb retained a different lawyer, Jerrold Scholtens, to represent her before the ALJ. Doc. 23-3 at 3. Coleman’s efforts here played a big part, but not the only part, in the outcome of Lamb’s case. All material things considered, a 25% reduction is necessary to arrive at a reasonable § 406(b) attorney’s fee of $13,241.25. That fee, as requested, is offset by the $5,591.20 that Coleman has already received in EAJA fees. Doc. 24 at 10. The net § 406(b) attorney’s fee is therefore $7,650.05.

Motion for § 406(b) attorney’s fees, Doc. 23, partly granted and partly denied, as specified. The Commissioner must pay Coleman a net § 406(b) attorney’s fee of $7,650.05 out of Lamb’s past-due benefits in accordance with agency policy.

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So Ordered. Teypnr fp. D.P. Marshall Jr. United States District Judge aq Avenis £2025,

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS NORTHERN DIVISION

CONSEULO LAMB PLAINTIFF

Vv. No. 3:22-cv-210-DPM

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Commissioner DEFENDANT

ORDER After the Social Security Administration denied Consuelo Lamb’s application for disability benefits, she turned to Nicholas Coleman, alawyer. They made a contingent-fee agreement: 25% of any past-due benefits owed to Lamb. With Coleman’s help, Lamb sought review in this Court and secured a remand to the ALJ. On remand, the ALJ issued Lamb a fully favorable decision, which included an award of $70,620 in past-due disability benefits. Coleman now seeks an attorney’s fee of $17,655 (25% of $70,620) under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). The question is whether that fee is reasonable for the services rendered. Kertz v. Colvin, 125 F.4th 1218, 1220-21 (8th Cir. 2025). Under § 406(b), the Court must anchor its reasonableness analysis in the fee yielded by the contingency agreement. Ibid. A reduction may be warranted if Coleman’s representation was substandard, if he was responsible for delay, or if the fee award would be a windfall to him. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808 (2002).

Coleman has zealously represented Lamb, and the Court sees no delay on his part. But an award of $17,655 is simply too large in comparison to the amount of time he spent on this case — 24.2 hours. Doc. 23-1 at 5. That award would boil down to an hourly rate of $729.55, which is more than double his $350/hour rate for noncontingent-fee cases. Doc. 23-1 at 2. Plus, the scope of Coleman's representation was “strictly limited to federal court review.” Doc. 23-2 at 1. After the case was remanded, Lamb retained a different lawyer, Jerrold Scholtens, to represent her before the ALJ. Doc. 23-3 at 3. Coleman’s efforts here played a big part, but not the only part, in the outcome of Lamb’s case. All material things considered, a 25% reduction is necessary to arrive at a reasonable § 406(b) attorney’s fee of $13,241.25. That fee, as requested, is offset by the $5,591.20 that Coleman has already received in EAJA fees. Doc. 24 at 10. The net § 406(b) attorney’s fee is therefore $7,650.05.

Motion for § 406(b) attorney’s fees, Doc. 23, partly granted and partly denied, as specified. The Commissioner must pay Coleman a net § 406(b) attorney’s fee of $7,650.05 out of Lamb’s past-due benefits in accordance with agency policy.

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So Ordered. Teypnr fp. D.P. Marshall Jr. United States District Judge aq Avenis £2025,

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