Lamb v. Saguaro Trails Community Association

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: September 24, 2025
• Docket: 4:25-cv-00159
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Mikkel-Stanley Lamb, No. CV-25-00159-TUC-EJM 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION1

12 Saguaro Trails Comm. Assoc, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 On April 7, 2025, Plaintiff Mikkel-Stanley Lamb filed a pro se Complaint (Doc. 1) 15 alleging claims pursuant to Section 1983, Title 42, United States Code. See Compl. (Doc. 16 1). Plaintiff paid the $405.00 civil action filing fee upon initiating this cause of action. 17 USDC Ariz. Receipt (Doc. 4). On July 22, 2025, this Court issued an Order to Show Cause 18 why this case should not be dismissed due to Plaintiff’s failure to serve the Complaint. 19 Order 7/22/2025 (Doc. 9). On July 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed a response indicating he “is the 20 Authorized Representative for the family estate in question” and that he was “a bit confused 21 about the [show cause] request.” Response (Doc. 10) at 1. Plaintiff further directs that if 22 the Magistrate Judge would “view all of the fraudulent documents filed into the court 23 system, . . . [he would] clearly see the family estate has been violated.” Id. Nothing in 24 Plaintiff’s response indicated why he has not served his Complaint. Based on Plaintiff’s 25 response to the Court’s show cause order, as well as its review of Plaintiff’s Complaint 26 27 1 A Magistrate Judge shall prepare a Report and Recommendation to the appropriate designee in either Tucson or Phoenix/Prescott for cases where the status of election by parties is 28 incomplete. General Order No. 21-25. Accordingly, this Report and Recommendation is directed to the Honorable Raner C. Collins. 1 (Doc. 1), it will dismiss the Complaint for failing to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal 2 Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff shall have the opportunity to file an amended complaint 3 in compliance with this Order. 4 5 I. AUTHORITY TO SCREEN A COMPLAINT 6 A district court has the inherent power to control its own docket, which includes 7 “the disposition of the causes . . . with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, 8 and for litigants.” Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936); Ferdick v. 9 Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992). This power includes the “authority to 10 dismiss frivolous or transparently defective suits spontaneously, . . . sav[ing] everyone time 11 and legal expense.” Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Wong 12 v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361–62 (9th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted) (“[a] trial court may act 13 on its own initiative to note the inadequacy of a complaint and dismiss it for failure to state 14 a claim[.]”). “[A] complaint . . . is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law 15 or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Furthermore, “courts . . . have 16 an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in 17 the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 18 (2006) (citations omitted). 19 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. 20 Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A district court has original jurisdiction “of all 21 civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 22 U.S.C. § 1331. This is known as federal question jurisdiction. District courts also have 23 original jurisdiction “of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum 24 or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between (1) citizens of different 25 States; (2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state; (3) citizens of 26 different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; 27 and (4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title as plaintiff and citizens of a 28 State or of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332. This is referred to as diversity jurisdiction. 1 2 II. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE 8 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 3 4 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 5 pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Rule 8(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. While Rule 8 does not demand 6 detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant- 7 unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 8 “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 9 statements, do not suffice.” Id. Thus, a complaint must state “enough facts to state a claim 10 for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 11 (2007). Where the pleader is pro se, however, the pleading should be liberally construed 12 in the interests of justice. Johnson v. Reagan, 524 F.2d 1123, 1124 (9th Cir. 1975); see 13 also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, a complaint must set 14 forth a set of facts that serves to put defendants on notice as to the nature and basis of the 15 claim(s). See Brazil v. U.S. Dept. of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995). “Rule 8(a)’s 16 simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited exceptions.” 17 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). And a plaintiff’s failure to comply 18 with Rule 8 is grounds for dismissal of the complaint. Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. General 19 Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th Cir. 2011); see also McHenry v. 20 Renne, 84 F3d. 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 1996). 21 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that Rule 8 can be violated in 22 multiple ways. Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013). On one end of the 23 spectrum, a violation occurs “when a pleading says too little[,] the baseline threshold of 24 factual and legal allegations required” is not met. Knapp, 738 F.3d at 1109 (citations 25 omitted). On the other end, “[t]he Rule is . . . violated . . . when a pleading says too much.” 26 Id. (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has observed that “[p]rolix, confusing complaints 27 . . . impose unfair burdens on litigants and judges[.]” Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1059 (quoting 28 McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1179). If the Court is required to “waste[] half a day . . . preparing 1 the ‘short and plain statement’ which Rule 8 obligated plaintiffs to submit[,] [it] then must 2 manage the litigation without knowing what claims are made against whom.” McHenry, 3 84 F.3d at 1180. This would be a waste of judicial resources. 4 Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) begins on a form stating it is a Complaint for 5 Violation of Civil Rights (Non-Prisoner Complaint). On the form, the Complaint (Doc. 1) 6 names four (4) defendants—all of whom are private citizens or entities; indicates that 7 Plaintiff is bringing suit against state or local officials pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and 8 claims a violation for two (2) criminal statutes and a section of the Code of Federal 9 Regulations. Under the statement of claim and relief sections, however, it states “see 10 attached.” What follows is a list of eighteen (18) additional defendants; random legal terms 11 and amounts; a document addressed to the Clerk of Court in Phoenix, Arizona which 12 alludes to the Hague Convention, as well as additional random citations to inter alia more 13 criminal statutes; a rambling narrative that does not delineate individual counts setting forth 14 Plaintiff’s specific claims for relief with specific facts regarding who and what actions are 15 linked to those claims; and additional documents, some of which are from the Arizona 16 Superior Court and some of which claim to be “legal” documents but are unintelligible. It 17 is impossible to tell how these extraneous attachments relate to the Complaint. 18 The Court will not comb through the documents in an attempt to determine which 19 allegations support each claim. See Ferrell v. Durbin, 311 F. App'x 253, 259 (11th Cir. 20 2009) (“Neither this Court nor the district court is required to parse the complaint searching 21 for allegations . . . that could conceivably form the basis of each of Appellants’ claims.”); 22 cf. Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 23 United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955 (7th Cir. 1991)) (“[J]udges are not like pigs, hunting 24 for truffles buried in briefs.”). Plaintiff’s Complaint is neither short nor plain. The Court 25 finds that the Complaint (Doc. 1) fails to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil 26 Procedure and will dismiss it with leave to amend. Plaintiff’s amended Complaint shall 27 comply with the requirements of Rule 8, as well as the instructions set forth in this Order. 28 . . . 1 III. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR ANY AMENDED COMPLAINT 2 Because the Court is dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with leave to amend, the legal 3 standards, which appear to relate to the claims Plaintiff seeks to bring in this case, are 4 provided below. 5 A. Section 1983 6 Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) appears to allege claims pursuant to the Civil Rights 7 Act. Section 1983, 42 U.S.C., provides in relevant part: 8 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 9 causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within 10 the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 11 injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 12 redress[.] 13 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that 14 ‘(1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; 15 and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right.’” 16 Murguia v. Langdon, 61 F.4th 1096, 1106 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 17 648 F.3d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 2011)). It is well-established that Section 1983 “is not itself a 18 source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method of vindicating federal rights 19 elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (quotations and 20 citations omitted). 21 “The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit, therefore, is whether the plaintiff has been 22 deprived of a right ‘secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States].’” Baker 23 v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979). “[T]he deprivation must be caused by the exercise 24 of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state 25 or by a person for whom the State is responsible.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 26 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). “[T]he fact that a federal statute has been violated and some person 27 harmed does not automatically give rise to a private cause of action in favor of that person.” 28 In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litig., 549 F.3d 1223, 1229–30 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 1 Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979)). 2 As an initial matter, Title 18 of the United States Code is the federal criminal code. 3 18 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (“Crimes and Criminal Procedure”). “[C]riminal statutes . . . do not 4 give rise to private rights of action.” Robertson v. Catholic Cmty. Servs. of Western Wash., 5 No. 22-35965, 2023 WL 3597383, at *1 (9th Cir. May 23, 2023) (citing Cent. Bank of 6 Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 190 (1994)); see also 7 Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (recognizing 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 8 242 as “criminal provisions, . . . [which] provide no basis for civil liability.”). Accordingly, 9 they cannot form the basis of a Section 1983 claim or otherwise be an independent basis 10 for liability. 11 Along the same lines, “[t]he Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) . . . is the 12 codification of the general and permanent rules published in the Federal Register by the 13 departments and agencies of the Federal Government.” About the Code of Federal 14 Regulations, Code of Federal Regulations, https://www.govinfo.gov/help/cfr (last visited 15 September 17, 2025). A regulation does not create a private right of action, such a right 16 must be based on the text of a statute enacted by Congress. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 17 U.S. 275, 285–86 (2001). Therefore, a regulation from the CFR cannot form the basis of 18 a Section 1983 claim or any other claim for liability. 19 Finally, “private parties are not generally acting under color of state law.” Price v. 20 Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707–08 (9th Cir. 1991). “[A] person acts under color of state law 21 only when exercising power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only 22 because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’” Polk County v. Dodson, 23 454 U.S. 312, 317–18 (1981) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). 24 “Like the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the under-color-of-state- 25 law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach ‘merely private conduct, no matter how 26 discriminatory or wrongful.’” American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) 27 (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982)). “[S]tate action may be found if, 28 though only if, there is such a ‘close nexus between the State and the challenged action’ 1 that seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.’” 2 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Assoc., 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (quoting 3 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)); see also George v. 4 Edholm, 752 F.3d 1206, 1215 (9th Cir. 2014). A party may be a state actor “because he is 5 a state official, because he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state 6 officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State.” Lugar, 457 U.S. at 7 936; see also Price, 939 F.2d at 708–09. Additionally a private person may act under color 8 of law when he is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents. Lugar, 9 457 U.S. at 941 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970)); see also 10 Price, 939 F.2d at 708–09. 11 A lawyer in private practice cannot be sued under Section 1983, because 12 representing a client is not under color of state law. Summons v. Sacramento Cnty. Super. 13 Ct., 318 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2003). Furthermore, although “[i]t is often said that lawyers 14 are ‘officers of the court[,]’ . . . a lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of being an 15 officer of the court, a state actor ‘under color of state law’ within the meaning of § 1983.” 16 Polk County, 454 U.S. at 318. 17 The burden is on Plaintiff to “allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an 18 individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v. 19 Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). Thus, to state a valid constitutional 20 claim, Plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a 21 particular defendant; and he must allege an affirmative link between the injury and the 22 conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371–72 (1976). 23 B. Sovereign Immunity 24 “Section 1983 provides a federal forum to remedy many deprivations of civil 25 liberties, but it does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a 26 State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties.” Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 27 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). “The Eleventh Amendment bars such suits unless the State has 28 waived its immunity.” Id. (citing Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 1 483 U.S. 468, 472–73 (1987)). An Eleventh Amendment barrier to suit may also be 2 avoided where “Congress has abrogated state sovereign immunity under its power to 3 enforce the Fourteenth Amendment[.]” Holley v. California Dept. of Corrections, 599 F.3d 4 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 5 Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999)). In other words, the State must have either 6 consented to suit or Congress must have unequivocally expressed its intention to overturn 7 a State’s sovereign immunity. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 8 99 (1984) (quotations and citations omitted). 9 Furthermore, “States or governmental entities that are considered ‘arms of the State’ 10 for Eleventh Amendment purposes are not ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Cornel v. Hawaii, 37 11 F.4th 527, 531 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab’y, 131 F.3d 12 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997)). The Arizona superior courts are ‘arms of the State’ for Eleventh 13 Amendment purposes and therefore immune from suit pursuant to Section 1983. See Krug 14 v. Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct., 674 F.App’x. 652, 653 (9th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted) 15 (recognizing that Arizona superior courts are an “arm of the state” for Eleventh 16 Amendment purposes and not liable under § 1983); see also Simmons v. Sacramento Cnty. 17 Super. Ct., 318 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 18 U.S. 58, 70 (1989)) (recognizing Section 1983 claims are barred against state courts and 19 their employees by the Eleventh Amendment). Additionally, governmental entities, such 20 as sheriff’s departments, are not proper defendants in Arizona because they are non-jural 21 entities under state law. Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing 22 Braillard v. Maricopa Cnty., 232 P.3d 1263, 1269 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010)). “[T]hat is, [they] 23 lack[] separate legal status from the County and therefore [are] incapable of suing or being 24 sued in [their] own name.” Id. 25 “The Eleventh Amendment [also] bars a suit against state officials when the state is 26 the real, substantial party in interest.” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101 (quotations and citations 27 omitted). “The general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact 28 against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.” Hawaii v. Gordon, 1 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) (per curiam). “[A]s when the State itself is named as the defendant, 2 a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit against a State is barred regardless of 3 whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief.” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101–02 (citations 4 omitted). 5 If Plaintiff cannot point to “any federal statute that abrogated the state’s sovereign 6 immunity, [or otherwise demonstrate] . . . that Arizona waived its immunity or consented 7 to suit in federal court[,]” he is barred from naming the State of Arizona, the Arizona courts, 8 or state officials where the State is the real-party-in-interest in his amended complaint. 9 Lucas v. Arizona Sup. Ct. Fiduciary Certification Program, 457 F.App’x 689, 690 (9th Cir. 10 2011). 11 C. Jurisdiction to Review State Court Decisions 12 The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine precludes a district court from reviewing state court 13 judgments. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923); District of Columbia 14 Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 450 U.S. 462, 483 (1983); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic 15 Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291–92 (2005). The Supreme Court of the United States 16 has held that this doctrine “is confined to cases . . . brought by state-court losers 17 complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court 18 proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those 19 judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284. In other words, “a United States District 20 Court has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings.” 21 District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983). “If a plaintiff 22 brings a de facto appeal from a state court judgment, Rooker-Feldman requires that the 23 district court dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Kougasian v. TMSL, 24 Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court has further instructed “even 25 though a ‘state-court decision is not reviewable by lower federal courts,’ a ‘statute or rule 26 governing the decision may be challenged in a federal action.’” Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 27 230, 235 (2023) (quoting Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 532 (2011)). 28 “Stated plainly, Rooker-Feldman bars any suit that seeks to disrupt or ‘undo’ a 1 prior state-court judgment, regardless of whether the state-court proceeding afforded the 2 federal-court plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to litigate [his] claims.” Bianchi v. 3 Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotations and citations omitted). 4 Accordingly, to the extent that any of Plaintiff’s claims are seeking to undo a prior state 5 court judgment or otherwise seek to remedy injuries allegedly caused by a state court 6 judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction over such claims. As such, Plaintiff must omit any 7 such claims from his amended complaint. 8 D. Judicial Immunity 9 It is well-established law that a judicial officer “exercising the authority vested in 10 him” is immune from suit. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355 (1978); see also Crooks 11 v. Maynard, 913 F.2d 699, 700 (9th Cir. 1990). Such judicial immunity extends to civil 12 rights actions alleging constitutional deprivations under Section 1983, Title 42, United 13 States Code. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 356. Furthermore, “[a] judge will not be deprived of 14 immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess 15 of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear 16 absence of all jurisdiction.’” Id. at 356–57 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 351 17 (1872)); see also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). 18 “Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, 19 not just from ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) 20 (citations omitted). Judicial immunity “protect[s] the finality of judgments [and] 21 discourage[es] inappropriate collateral attacks,” as well as “protect[s] judicial 22 independence by insulating judges from vexatious actions prosecuted by disgruntled 23 litigants.” Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988) (citations omitted). Therefore, 24 Plaintiff cannot sue any judicial officer for any actions taken in their judicial capacity. Id. 25 at 227–28. 26 27 IV. LEAVE TO AMEND 28 Within 30 days, Plaintiff may submit an amended complaint. Plaintiff’s amended 1 complaint should clearly set out each claim Plaintiff is making, the jurisdictional basis for 2 each claim, and name all appropriate parties. Any amended complaint submitted by 3 Plaintiff should be clearly designated as such on the face of the document. An amended 4 complaint supersedes the original Complaint. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th 5 Cir. 1992); Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th 6 Cir. 1990). After amendment, the original Complaint is treated as nonexistent. Ferdik, 7 963 F.2d at 1262. Plaintiff must also abide by the strictures discussed in Sections I., II., 8 and III., supra. 9 10 V. WARNINGS 11 A. Address Changes 12 Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule 13 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other 14 relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this 15 action. 16 B. Rules of Court 17 Plaintiff shall familiarize himself with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 18 Local Rules for the District of Arizona, both of which can be found on the Court’s web site 19 at www.azd.uscourts.gov. Plaintiff shall also review the Notice to Self-Represented 20 Litigant (Doc. 3) information that was provided to him. 21 C. Possible Dismissal 22 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these 23 warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 24 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure 25 to comply with any order of the Court). 26 27 VI. RECOMMENDATION 28 As noted, supra, General Order 21-25 directs this Court to prepare a Report and Recommendation to the appropriate designee in either Tucson or Phoenix/Prescott. || Accordingly, the Court directs this Report and Recommendation to the Honorable Raner 3 || C. Collins. 4 For the reasons delineated above, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the 5 || District Judge enter an order: 6 (1) DISMISSING Plaintiffs Complaint (Doc. 1) for failure to comply with Rule 7\|| 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days from the 8 || date of the District Judge’s Order resolving this Report and Recommendation to file a first || amended complaint in compliance with this R & R; and 10 (2) If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days from the 11 || District Judge’s order, the Clerk must, without further notice, enter a judgment of dismissal of this action without prejudice and deny any pending unrelated motions as moot. 13 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after 15 || being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to || another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed. || R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). No replies shall be filed unless leave is granted from Judge Collins. 18 Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the 19 || Magistrate Judge may result in waiver of the right of review. 20 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall refer this matter to the □□ Honorable Raner C. Collins for the limited purpose of resolving this Report and 22 || Recommendation. 23 Dated this 24th day of September, 2025. Lf pleb 25 Jou — 6 Enric J. M#kovich United States Magistrate Judge 27 28

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