Lamb v. Board of Auditors

209 N.W. 195, 235 Mich. 95, 1926 Mich. LEXIS 655
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 10, 1925
DocketCalendar 32,206
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 209 N.W. 195 (Lamb v. Board of Auditors) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lamb v. Board of Auditors, 209 N.W. 195, 235 Mich. 95, 1926 Mich. LEXIS 655 (Mich. 1925).

Opinions

*97 Clark, J.

This friendly suit is brought to determine the compensation of nonresident circuit judges, sitting in Wayne county on assignment of the presiding circuit judge. The question is on section 12, art. 7, State Constitution of 1908:

“Each of the judges of the circuit courts shall receive a salary payable monthly. In addition to the salary paid from the State treasury, each circuit judge may receive from any county in which he regularly holds court such additional salary as may be determined from time to time by the board of supervisors of the county. In any county where such additional salary is granted it shall be paid at the same rate to all circuit judges regularly holding court therein, * * *”

and particularly on the meaning of the word “regularly” as used in the section. The annual salary of a circuit judge, paid by the State, is $5,000. Act No. 143, Pub. Acts 1919 (Comp. Laws Supp. 1922, § 12141). Plaintiff is the circuit judge of the 28th circuit composed of the counties of Kalkaska, Missaukee, Wexford, and Benzie (3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 12110). The third circuit is composed of the county of Wayne (3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 12085). The board of supervisors of the county of Wayne, at the time in question, had granted to the circuit judges of that county an additional annual salary of $8,500.

The legislature in 1915 passed the presiding circuit judge act, effective August 24, 1915 (Act No. 213, Pub. Acts 1915 [3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 14546 et seq.]). This act, after providing for the election'by the circuit judges of the State of a presiding circuit judge, defined his power and duty:

“(14547) Sec. 2. The presiding circuit judge shall have full directory power over the matter of apportioning the work of the several circuits among the circuit judges of the State.”

Plaintiff, by direction of the presiding circuit judge, *98 held court in Wayne county. He requested of defendants that he 'be paid per diem for the time the additional salary so granted by the supervisors. They refused. We are asked in mandamus to compel payment.

Where does the plaintiff regularly hold court within the meaning of the section of the Constitution above-quoted? Clearly it must be the counties of his own circuit.

We quote section 8, art. 7, of the Constitution:

“The State shall be divided into judicial circuits in each of which there shall be elected one circuit judge. The legislature may provide by law for the election of more than one circuit judge in any judicial circuit. A circuit court shall be held at least four times in each year in every county organized for judicial purposes. Each circuit judge shall hold court in the county or counties, within the circuit in which he is elected, and in other circuits as may be provided by law. The legislature may by law arrange the various circuits into judicial districts, and provide for the manner of holding courts therein. Circuits and districts may be created, altered or discontinued by law, but no such alteration or discontinuance shall have the effect to remove a judge from office.”

This section requires that a circuit judge shall hold court in the county or counties within the circuit in which he is elected, and there must be at least four sittings or terms in each county in each year. By this section we are committed to the principle that the people are entitled to the service of the judge whom they elect.

But what is the meaning of the second sentence of said section 12:

“In any county where such additional salary is granted it shall be paid at the same rate to all circuit judges regularly holding court therein.”

Its meaning, in the present state of the law, is that in those circuits in which the legislature has provided *99 for the election of more than one circuit judge (art. 7, § 8), all such circuit judges of the circuit shall be paid such additional salary, if granted, at the same rate. It has perhaps a further meaning, now potential merely. Said section 8 provides that the legislature may arrange the circuits into judicial districts. If the legislature should create of two or more circuits a judicial district and provide for rotation of the circuit judges therein throughout the district and, perhaps, for the election of such judges at large in. the district, and that such judges should hold court, regularly in all the counties of the district, then all such circuit judges might be entitled to additional, salary at the same rate if granted by any county of the district.

But the legislature has not created such judicial districts. It passed the presiding circuit judge act, which, we take notice, has given general satisfaction. As administered, it has done much toward expediting the business of the courts. Its chief feature (apart from aid in emergencies or exigencies) is in affording relief, in a- prompt and orderly manner, to circuits where business is congested, as it quite constantly is in the great and growing industrial center within Wayne county. It is well that a circuit judge in a circuit where business happens to be light may relieve in another circuit where business is heavy.

It is well to note, too, the statute (3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 12144) provided that in certain cases the governor may designate a circuit judge to hold court temporarily in a circuit other than his own, and the statute (3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 12307) providing among other things that circuit judges may hold court for each other. But it cannot be said that a circuit judge, sitting in a county outside the circuit in which he was elected, by occasional exchange and agreement with another circuit judge, or by direction of the pre *100 siding circuit judge to relieve against congestion, emergency, exigency, or otherwise, is “regularly holding court” in such county. It is urged that “regularly” has various shades of meaning, defendants, in effect, contending that “regularly holding court” means to hold it at fixed and certain intervals, regular in point of time, and plaintiff stating that it means “following the rule; according to rule or law; observing the prescribed course,” and that such possible difference in meaning presents an ambiguity in the quoted language of the Constitution permitting resort to the Constitutional Debates that we may be enlightened.

If that be granted, the Debates confirm what we have said. The delegates, in building the section in question (art. 7, § 12), had in mind the possible and then probable arranging by the legislature of the various circuits into judicial districts (art. 7, § 8), and sought to provide for equal distribution to the judges regularly holding court in such district of any additional salary so granted by any board of supervisors in the district. Beecher’s Ann. Const. of 1908, p. 92. That the presiding circuit judge act was to follow a few years later, no one seems to have anticipated.

We quote from the Debates:

“Mr. Flannigan:

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Bluebook (online)
209 N.W. 195, 235 Mich. 95, 1926 Mich. LEXIS 655, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lamb-v-board-of-auditors-mich-1925.