Lamar v. City of New York
Opinion
While the City’s generalized assertion of law office failure as the excuse for its delay is not particularly compelling, it constitutes “good cause” for the delay (see Spira v New York City Tr. Auth., 49 AD3d 478 [2008]). No prejudice to plaintiff has been shown (see Cirillo v Macy’s, Inc., 61 AD3d 538, 540 [2009]), and New York’s public policy strongly favors litigating matters on the merits (see Silverio v City of New York, 266 AD2d 129 [1999]). An affidavit of merit is not required where no default order or judgment has been entered (see Cirillo, supra). Concur — Saxe, J.P., Friedman, Acosta, Renwick and AbdusSalaam, JJ.
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68 A.D.3d 449 (Lamar v. City of New York) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.