Lamar Cantrail Austin v. the State of Texas
This text of Lamar Cantrail Austin v. the State of Texas (Lamar Cantrail Austin v. the State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________
No. 02-23-00194-CR ___________________________
LAMAR CANTRAIL AUSTIN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from County Criminal Court No. 1 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1695647
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell MEMORANDUM OPINION
By information, Appellant Lamar Cantrail Austin was charged with failure to
identify by intentionally giving a false name and that at the time of the offense, he was
a fugitive from justice, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.02(b),
(d)(2). The information also included a repeat offender notice consisting of a 2019
Class A misdemeanor conviction for the same offense.1 A jury convicted Austin of
the offense and assessed his punishment at a $4,000 fine and one year in jail. The trial
court sentenced Austin accordingly, and Austin appealed.2 Austin subsequently failed
to prosecute his appeal and, further, failed to keep this court and the trial court
informed of his whereabouts, so we submitted his case without briefs. We hold that
the record shows no fundamental error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Background
Before trial, the trial court appointed an attorney to represent Austin, but
Austin insisted on representing himself pro se notwithstanding the trial court’s
warnings about the inadvisability of proceeding without counsel. At trial, Austin
reaffirmed that he did not want an attorney and that he wanted to represent himself
1 The enhancement changed Austin’s range of punishment from a fine not to exceed $4,000, confinement in jail for a term not to exceed a year, or both, id. § 12.21, to a fine not to exceed $4,000, confinement in jail for a term of not more than one year or less than 90 days, or both, id. § 12.43(a). 2 The jury convicted Austin of two offenses and assessed punishment on both. Austin’s notice of appeal, however, identified only one of the two. We review only the conviction for which he filed a notice of appeal.
2 pro se despite the trial court’s admonitions to the contrary. After hearing the
evidence, a jury found Austin guilty and assessed his punishment at a $4,000 fine and
one year in jail.
After trial, Austin indicated that he wanted to appeal. The trial court urged him
to accept an appointed appellate attorney, but he declined the offer. Austin further
declined to sign a document that the trial court had handed him. Contextually, the
document appeared to have been a notice of appeal. The record does not contain the
form notice of appeal typically signed by a defendant. Austin was taken immediately
into custody.
Twenty-eight days later, in a “Certificate of Proceedings,” the trial court set
Austin’s appeal bond amount at $500. Another document with the same date
identified the conditions of any appeal bond that Austin might file, and one of those
conditions was that Austin had to provide the Tarrant County Community
Supervision and Corrections Department a “current, accurate residential address . . .
throughout the period of supervision and notify the . . . supervision officer of any
address change within five days from the date of the change.” Also on that same
date, Austin filed a handwritten pro se notice of appeal.
Thereafter, the court reporter filed a fourteen-volume reporter’s record, and
the clerk filed a one-volume clerk’s record. Austin’s brief was due originally on
November 27, 2023. When Austin did not file an appellate brief, we reset his briefing
3 deadline to December 27, 2023. But by January 8, 2024, Austin still had not filed an
appellate brief.
Complicating the matter, our correspondence to Austin was returned by the
post office. Austin was not in the Tarrant County jail. 3 Although not entirely clear,
Austin appeared to have filed an appeal bond. We abated the appeal and remanded
the case to the trial court to determine, among other things, if it had any information
regarding Austin’s address or location. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(b)(2). As noted, one
of the conditions of any appeal bond was that Austin had to keep the probation
department apprised of his address. The trial court, however, responded that it had
no information regarding Austin’s whereabouts.
In a criminal case, when an appellant does not file a brief, we cannot dismiss
the appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(b)(1). We can, however, submit the case without
briefs. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(b)(4); McHenry v. State, No. 04-20-00015-CR, 2021 WL
260248, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 27, 2021, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem.
op., not designated for publication). We have done so in Austin’s case.
II. Standard
When considering a case without briefs, we review the entire appellate record
to determine if fundamental error exists. See Williams v. State, 654 S.W.3d 222, 223
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2022, no pet.). Fundamental errors include (1) the denial of
The record contained Austin’s CID number. Tarrant County has a website on 3
which inmates in the county jail can be located. See Tarrant County, Texas, Inmate Search, https://inmatesearch.tarrantcounty.com (last visited Apr. 22, 2024).
4 the right to counsel, (2) the denial of the right to a jury trial, (3) the denial of ten days’
preparation before trial for appointed counsel, (4) the absence of jurisdiction over the
defendant, (5) the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, (6) prosecution under a
penal statute that does not comply with the Separation of Powers section of the state
constitution, (7) jury charge errors resulting in egregious harm, (8) holding trials at a
location other than the county seat, (9) prosecution under an ex post facto law, and
(10) comments by a trial judge that taint the presumption of innocence. Savage v. State,
No. 02-21-00064-CR, 2022 WL 557488, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 24, 2022,
no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
III. Discussion
At trial, Austin challenged the trial court’s jurisdiction. He maintained that he
was a Moorish National. Consistent with that assertion, Austin possessed an “Allodial
American National Identification Card” that identified his nationality as “Moor
American.” 4 Despite this evidence, the trial court asserted jurisdiction over both
Austin and his case.
And the trial court did so correctly. The trial court, as a county court, had
jurisdiction to hear misdemeanor cases. Tex. Const. art. V, § 16; Tex. Gov’t Code
4 An “alodium” or “allodium” is defined as (1) “a form of estate among 11th century Anglo-Saxons in which absolute possession and control were vested in the holder—opposed to feodum” and (2) “land that is the absolute property of the owner: real estate held in absolute independence without being subject to any rent, service, or acknowledgment to a superior.” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/alodium (last visited Apr. 22, 2024). The identification card purportedly makes its possessor tax exempt.
5 Ann. § 25.2223(a). The trial court thus had subject-matter jurisdiction. Turning to
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