Lam v. Peller

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Lam v. Peller

276 A.D.2d 596, 714 N.Y.S.2d 903, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10410

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 16, 2000

StatusPublished

This text of 276 A.D.2d 596 (Lam v. Peller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Lam v. Peller, 276 A.D.2d 596, 714 N.Y.S.2d 903, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10410 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2000).

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Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Cozzens, J.), dated October 7, 1999, which denied his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

The defendant made a prima facie showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). Thus, it was incumbent on the plaintiff to come forward with evidence in admissible form to raise an issue of fact (see, Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957). The plaintiff failed to do so (see, Soto v Fogg, 255 AD2d 502; Reeves v Scopaz, 227 AD2d 606; Stallone v County of Suffolk, 209 AD2d 403; Philpotts v Petrovic, 160 AD2d 856; Lebreton v New York City Tr. Auth., 267 AD2d 211, 212-213). Mangano, P. J., S. Miller, McGinity, Luciano and Smith, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Cozzens, J.), dated October 7, 1999, which denied his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

The defendant made a prima facie showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). Thus, it was incumbent on the plaintiff to come forward with evidence in admissible form to raise an issue of fact (see, Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957). The plaintiff failed to do so (see, Soto v Fogg, 255 AD2d 502; Reeves v Scopaz, 227 AD2d 606; Stallone v County of Suffolk, 209 AD2d 403; Philpotts v Petrovic, 160 AD2d 856; Lebreton v New York City Tr. Auth., 267 AD2d 211, 212-213). Mangano, P. J., S. Miller, McGinity, Luciano and Smith, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

276 A.D.2d 596, 714 N.Y.S.2d 903, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10410, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lam-v-peller-nyappdiv-2000.

Opinion

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