Lakhumna v. Uintah County

CourtDistrict Court, D. Utah
DecidedJune 13, 2025
Docket2:23-cv-00387
StatusUnknown

This text of Lakhumna v. Uintah County (Lakhumna v. Uintah County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lakhumna v. Uintah County, (D. Utah 2025).

Opinion

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF UTAH

VIVEK LAKHUMNA,

MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER Plaintiff, REGARDING SERVICE OF PROCESS

v. Case No. 2:23-cv-00387 DBB UINTAH COUNTY et al, District Judge David Barlow

Defendants.

Plaintiff, self-represented Utah state inmate Vivek Lakhumna, filed this civil-rights action, see 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (2025), proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 id. § 1915. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (AC) names as defendants--in their official capacities only-- Uintah County (UC) employees Irene Brown (jail commander), Officer Cox, and John/Jane Doe. (ECF No. 11.) He asserts these defendants violated his “First Amendment right to receive information,” by “enacting jail policy and procedure that prohibited all newspaper subscriptions,” based on a rationale that “paper products constitute an extreme fire hazard in the housing unit.” (Id. at 3-4.) The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit explains, “The Supreme Court has instructed that ‘official-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Coates v. Reigenborn, Nos. 22-1339 & 22-1434, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 27456, at *9–10 (10th Cir. Oct. 16, 2023) (unpublished) (quoting Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (cleaned up)); see also Mocek v. City of Albuquerque, 813 F.3d 912, 932 (10th Cir. 2015) (“A suit against a government agent in his official capacity is treated as a suit against the government.”). Thus, “there is no . . . need to bring official-capacity actions against local government officials, for under Monell, local government units can be sued directly for damages and injunctive or declaratory relief.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658) (1978)).

Based on these principles, the Court construes the AC to have been brought solely against UC. (ECF No. 11.) And upon further review of the AC, the Court concludes that official service of process is warranted for Defendant UC. See 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915(d) (2025) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in such cases.”). Thus, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(1), waiver of service is requested from Defendant UC. IT IS ORDERED as follows: (1) Based on the fact that the Uintah County personnel were named as defendants, in their official capacities only, the Court construes the Amended Complaint as bringing its claim against Uintah County. (ECF No. 11.) (2) Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(1), the Court requests waiver of service

from sole defendant Uintah County, which shall answer the Amended Complaint. (Id.) (3) The Clerk of Court shall mail Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons, AO form 398; copies of Waiver of the Service of Summons, AO form 399; and copies of the Amended Complaint, (ECF No. 11), and this Order to Defendant Uintah County, addressed as follows: Uintah County Office Building Attention: Loren Anderson 147 E Main Street Vernal, UT 84078

(4) Defendants are cautioned that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 requires Defendant to cooperate in saving unnecessary costs of service of summons and complaint. Under Rule 4, if Defendant does not waive summons service, after being asked by the Court to do so on Plaintiff’s behalf, Defendant must bear service costs unless good cause be shown for not signing and returning the waiver form. If service is waived, this action will proceed as if Defendant had been served on the day the waiver is filed, except that Defendant need not file an answer until 60

days from the date when the waiver request was sent. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3). (This allows more days to respond than would be required if formal summons service is necessary.) Defendant must read the statement at the waiver form’s end that more completely describes the party’s duties about waiver. If service is waived after the deadline given in the Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons but before Defendant has been personally served, the Answer shall be due 60 days from the date on which the request for waiver was sent or 20 days from the date the waiver form is filed, whichever is later. (5) If Defendant does not execute a waiver, attorney(s) for Defendant must file a notice with reasons for not giving a waiver. A notice is due 30 days from the date a request was sent. (6) Defendant shall answer the Amended Complaint, observing Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and the following litigation schedule: (a) If Defendant asserts the affirmative defense of Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies in a grievance process, Defendant must, (i) within 60 days of date of waiver request, file an answer; (ii) within 90 days of filing an answer, prepare and file a Martinez report1 limited to the exhaustion issue; and,

1 See Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978) (approving district court’s practice of ordering prison administration to prepare report to be included in pleadings in cases when prisoner has filed suit alleging constitutional violation against institution officials). In Gee v. Estes, 829 F.2d 1005 (10th Cir. 1987), the Tenth Circuit explained the nature and function of a Martinez report, saying: Under the Martinez procedure, the district judge or a United States magistrate [judge] to whom the matter has been referred will direct prison officials to (iii) within 120 days of filing an answer, file a separate summary judgment motion, with supporting memorandum. (b) If Defendant challenges the complaint’s bare allegations, Defendant shall, within 60 days of date of waiver request, file a motion to dismiss based on

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (c) If Defendant chooses not to rely on an exhaustion defense and wants to pierce the complaint’s allegations, Defendant must, (i) within 60 days of date of waiver request, file an answer; (ii) within 90 days of filing an answer, prepare and file a Martinez report addressing the complaint’s substance; and, (iii) within 120 days of filing an answer, file a separate summary judgment motion, with supporting memorandum. (d) If Defendant wants to seek relief otherwise contemplated under procedural rules, Defendant must file an appropriate motion within 90 days of filing an

answer. (7) Plaintiff must, within 30 days of its filing, respond to the Martinez report. Plaintiff must expect that Martinez reports may “be used for their truth against a plaintiff if the plaintiff has been warned that failing to respond to the Martinez report could lead to that result.” Ortiz v. Torgensen, 857 F. App'x 419, 426-27 (10th Cir. 2021) (unpublished). This is the warning.

respond in writing to the various allegations, supporting their response by affidavits and copies of internal disciplinary rules and reports.

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Related

Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
436 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Kentucky v. Graham
473 U.S. 159 (Supreme Court, 1985)
Hafer v. Melo
502 U.S. 21 (Supreme Court, 1991)
Martinez v. Aaron
570 F.2d 317 (Tenth Circuit, 1978)
Mocek v. City of Albuquerque
813 F.3d 912 (Tenth Circuit, 2015)

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Lakhumna v. Uintah County, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lakhumna-v-uintah-county-utd-2025.