Lakhan Jha and Minakshi Kumari v. Michael William Piepkorn, Rodney T. Harmon and Suzzane Harmon, husband and wife

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: April 6, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-02044
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 3

4 LAKHAN JHA and MINAKSHI KUMARI, Case No. C25-2044RSM 5 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL 6 v. 7

8 MICHAEL WILLIAM PIEPKORN, and RODNEY T. HARMON and SUZZANE 9 HARMON, husband and wife, 10 Defendants. 11

12 Plaintiffs Lakhan Jha and Minakshi Kumari, represented by counsel, filed this case on 13 October 20, 2025, against Defendants Michael Piepkorn, Rodney T. Harmon, and Suzzane 14 Harmon. Dkt. #1. The Complaint was later amended. Dkt. #5. Ten days later, Defendants 15 16 moved for summary judgment and, later, sanctions. Dkts. #8 and #10. Plaintiffs moved to 17 strike, essentially arguing that the Motion for Summary Judgment was premature because it 18 occurred before the Rule 26(f) conference. Dkt. #11. Plaintiffs never filed a response to the 19 Motion for Summary Judgment. See Dkt. #17. 20 On March 30, 2026, the Court reviewed all of these filings and ordered the parties to 21 22 “show cause why the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims and why 23 Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claim should not be dismissed and the remainder of the claims remanded to 24 state court for the reasons presented in Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.” Dkt. #18. 25 Responses from the parties were due on April 2, 2026. Plaintiffs did not file a timely 26 27 Response; Defendants stated that a response was not necessary and that the Court could rely on 28 the arguments in their Motion for Summary Judgment. See Dkts. #19 and #20. The Amended Complaint alleges Defendants wrongfully collected a debt based on “a 1 2 dispute in King County Superior Court that resulted in two judgments issued against Plaintiff.” 3 Dkt. #5 at 1. Plaintiffs state that “even though [they] had posted a cash deposit for an appeal of 4 the judgments, Piepkorn still continued to pursue collections efforts even though he was 5 prohibited from doing so under Washington law.” Id. Plaintiffs assert causes of action for 6 declaratory relief, violation of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 7 8 violations of the Washington State Collections Agency Act and Consumer Protection Act, and 9 for unjust enrichment under state law. Id. 10 Defendants argue on summary judgment that “the FDCPA does not apply to collection 11 of these judgments” and that “the other claims are state law claims for which they assert [the 12 13 Court has] supplemental jurisdiction.” Dkt. #8 at 1–2. Defendants assert that the underlying 14 state court action was a “quiet title case” based on Plaintiffs unsuccessfully seeking to establish 15 title by adverse possession of a disputed area of Defendant Piepkorn’s property.” Id. at 2 16 (citing exhibits). Defendants argue that the FDCPA cannot apply to this kind of debt, citing, 17 inter alia, Leadbetter v. Comcast Cable Communications, Inc., No. C05-0892RSM, 2005 U.S. 18 19 Dist. LEXIS 45365, 2005 WL 2030799 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 22, 2005) and Turner v. Cook, 362 20 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 2004). 21 Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine 22 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 23 R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). Material facts are 24 25 those which might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 26 248. In ruling on summary judgment, a court does not weigh evidence to determine the truth 27 of the matter but “only determine[s] whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Crane v. 28 Conoco, Inc., 41 F.3d 547, 549 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. O’Melveny 1 2 & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1992)). 3 On a motion for summary judgment, the court views the evidence and draws inferences 4 in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Sullivan v. 5 U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 365 F.3d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 2004). The Court must draw all reasonable 6 inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See O’Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d at 747, rev’d 7 8 on other grounds, 512 U.S. 79 (1994). However, the nonmoving party must make a “sufficient 9 showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof” 10 to survive summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 11 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) provides that the Court must dismiss an action 12 13 if it determines, at any time, that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. This issue can be raised 14 directly by the Court without a motion by a party. District courts have discretion to exercise or 15 decline supplemental jurisdiction upon consideration of “the values of judicial economy, 16 convenience, fairness, and comity.” Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350, 17 108 S. Ct. 614, 98 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1988). While “in a case in which all federal claims are 18 19 eliminated before trial, the balance of these factors will generally point toward declining to 20 exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims . . . this[ ] is not a mandatory rule to be 21 applied inflexibly in all cases.” Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach & Assocs., 903 F.2d 709, 715 22 (9th Cir. 1990). However, the Ninth Circuit has noted that judicial economy typically weighs 23 most heavily in a trial court’s analysis. See Schneider v. TRW, Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 994 (9th 24 25 Cir.1990) (“[I]t is the district judge who is in the best position to determine whether enough 26 resources have been expended to make dismissal a waste at any given point.”). 27 28 The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claim is properly dismissed on summary 1 2 judgment for the reasons argued by Defendants. Specifically, it is undisputed that the debt at 3 issue was related to a state court judgment in a quiet title case and not a commercial 4 transaction. A threshold issue in an FDCPA case “is whether or not the dispute involves a 5 ‘debt’ within the meaning of the statute.” Turner, 362 F.3d at 1226-27 (citing Slenk v. 6 Transworld Sys., Inc., 236 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2001)). The FDCPA defines “debt” as 7 8 “any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in 9 which the money, property, insurance or services which are the subject of the transaction are 10 primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been 11 reduced to judgement.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). The statute is limited in its reach “to those 12 13 obligations to pay arising from consensual transactions, where parties negotiate or contract for 14 consumer-related goods or services.” Turner, 362 F.3d at 1227. Dismissal of the FDCPA claim 15 is appropriate now, given the unusual procedural history and nature of the claims in this case, 16 and because Plaintiffs failed to respond to the motion for summary judgment. 17 The Court declines to entertain supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state 18 19 claims or to award sanctions to either party. This dispute properly belongs in state court. 20 Accordingly, the Court hereby finds and ORDERS that Plaintiffs’ claims are 21 DISMISSED as stated above. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. #8, is 22 GRANTED IN PART as stated above. All other pending Motions are DENIED as MOOT. 23 This case is CLOSED. 24 25 DATED this 6th day of April, 2026. A 26

27 RICARDO S. MARTINEZ 28 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE