Laker Airways v. British Airways

182 F.3d 843
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedJuly 30, 1999
Docket98-4229
StatusPublished

This text of 182 F.3d 843 (Laker Airways v. British Airways) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Laker Airways v. British Airways, 182 F.3d 843 (11th Cir. 1999).

Opinion

LAKER AIRWAYS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BRITISH AIRWAYS, PLC, Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 98-4229, 98-5561.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

July 30, 1999.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. (No. 97-6766-CV-WDF), Wilkie D. Ferguson, Jr., Judge.

Before BIRCH and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and MILLS*, Senior District Judge.

BIRCH, Circuit Judge:

Laker Airways, Inc. ("Laker") appeals the district court's order dismissing its antitrust action against

British Airways PLC ("BA") pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 and the "act of state" doctrine.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

Laker sued BA under federal and Florida state antitrust laws alleging that BA combined and

conspired to restrain and monopolize scheduled passenger air service between Miami, Florida and London,

England. Laker named as co-conspirators certain individuals and Airport Coordination Ltd. ("ACL"), a

private English corporation appointed by the government of the United Kingdom to coordinate requests for

landing and take-off times ("slots") at British airports. As relief, Laker sought treble damages and a

permanent injunction requiring BA to (1) cease violating antitrust laws, (2) transfer to Laker a single daily

arrival and departure slot at London's Gatwick Airport, and (3) enter into an interline ticketing and baggage

agreement with Laker.1

* Honorable Richard Mills, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Central District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 1 Although Laker sought a transfer of slots at the time this case was before the district court, because the airline no longer operates in the transatlantic market, Laker now asserts that it seeks only monetary The district court dismissed Laker's complaint because Laker failed to join ACL, an indispensable

party within the meaning of Rule 19, and further concluded that even had ACL been joined, the act of state

doctrine barred Laker's suit. Laker then filed a motion for relief from the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3), which the district court denied.

On appeal, Laker argues that the district court improperly applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

19 because it did not consider whether in equity and good conscience Laker's suit should be allowed to

proceed in the absence of ACL. Laker also contends that the district court should not have applied the act of

state doctrine to the actions of ACL because the government of the United Kingdom has no role in slot

allocation.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Slot Allocation Process

The transatlantic airline industry is a highly regulated business controlled, to a great extent, through

negotiations among national governments.2 The governments of the United States and the United Kingdom

have signed two bilateral treaties which control many aspects of the transatlantic industry, including factors

such as the number of carriers, fares, capacity, and route designations.3 As a result of these international

agreements, a backdrop of national sovereignty pervades discussions about transatlantic air transport issues.

While bilateral treaties control the number of entrants into the Miami-London market and designate

the U.S. airlines given access to London's Heathrow Airport, forcing Laker to land at London's Gatwick

Airport, the gravamen of Laker's complaint is that BA conspired with ACL to prevent Laker from being

relief. Because the specific form of relief does not change our analysis, we need not further address this issue. 2 Although in the past decade there has been an increased push to deregulate the international air transportation business in order to increase competitiveness, national governments remain highly involved. 3 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain Relating to Air Services Between Their Respective Territories, Feb. 11, 1946. U.S.-U.K., 60 Stat. 1499 [Bermuda I], and 23 July 1977, 28 U.S.T. 5367, T.I.A.S. No. 8641 [Bermuda II]. allocated desirable landing and take-off slots at Gatwick.4 We must first consider, then, the United Kingdom's

procedure for slot allocation. On January 18, 1993, the Council of the European Communities issued a

regulation setting forth the common rules for the allocation of slots at Community airports. See Council

Regulation 95/93, 1993 O.J. (L 14). This regulation required Member States to "ensure the appointment of

a natural or legal person" to act as airport coordinator, after consultations with the air carriers regularly using

the airport facilities. Id., art. 4(1). The coordinator is then responsible for the allocation of slots. Id., art.

4(5). The regulations further provide that the Member State "shall ensure that the coordinator carries out his

duties ... in an independent manner." Id., art. 4(2). The coordinator is to act in "a neutral, non-discriminatory

and transparent way." Id., art. 4(3). Finally, the regulations provide that "[s]lots may be freely exchanged

between air carriers or transferred by an air carrier from one route, or type of service, to another, by mutual

agreement or as a result of a total or partial takeover or unilaterally. Any such exchanges or transfers shall

be transparent and subject to confirmation of feasibility." Id., art. 8(4).

To implement the European Community regulation, the Parliament of the United Kingdom enacted

The Airports Slot Allocation Regulations 1993, S.I.1993, No. 1067 ("ASAR"). This legislation provides that

the appointment of any person as a coordinator must be approved by the Secretary of State for Transport, the

Minister designated for the purpose of monitoring, among other things, the allocation of slots. The Secretary

may withdraw approval of a coordinator if he has not performed in an independent manner. ASAR, ¶ 4(3).

ACL is the designated slot allocation coordinator for London's Gatwick Airport. ACL is composed of a

representative of all United Kingdom airlines who wish to participate. Each member of ACL may designate

a representative to the Board of ACL. Each representative, or director, has an equal, single vote in the actions

of the organization. Laker alleges that by virtue of its size and importance in the airline business, BA has

been able to control the decisions of ACL.

4 Although Laker receive slots at Gatwick Airport for the summer 1997 season, it contends that BA and ACL acted in tandem to prevent Laker from obtaining time slots that are more commercially advantageous. Laker asserts that slots allowing for arrival in London in the early morning hours and departures between 10:00am and 1:00pm local time are the most commercially desirable because they allow for convenient connections to other flights and enable passengers to reach Miami before dark. B. Rule 19 Dismissal—Slot Allocation

We review dismissal for failure to join an indispensable party for abuse of discretion. Mann v. City

of Albany, 883 F.2d 999, 1003 (11th Cir.1989).

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