Lakeland Highlands Canning Co. v. Mayo

28 F. Supp. 44, 1939 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2494
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedMay 3, 1939
DocketNo. 89
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 28 F. Supp. 44 (Lakeland Highlands Canning Co. v. Mayo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lakeland Highlands Canning Co. v. Mayo, 28 F. Supp. 44, 1939 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2494 (S.D. Fla. 1939).

Opinion

ERVIN, District Judge.

This case was argued and submitted on April 10, 1939, on the bill and testimony.

The defendants appeared and though they had not filed answers, argued the case and requested the Court to pass on all questions presented, and especially on the constitutionality of the Act involved.

The Act is found in Florida Acts of 1935, c. 16862, p. 268 (Growers’ Cost Guarantee Law) :

“An Act Relating to Citrus Fruit: Prescribing Conditions and Limitations Upon the Sale, Marketing and Processing Thereof, and the Effect of Contracts of Sale and of Marketing and Processing Agreements.
“Whereas, it is found by the Legislature and hereby declared that the production and distribution of citrus fruit is a paramount industry in Florida upon which the prosperity of the State in a large measure depends; that such fruit and the juices thereof have become and are generally used in great and rapidly increasing quantities, both voluntarily and upon advice of physicians, by people of all classes, ages and conditions; that it is necessary for the reasonable comfort, welfare, and health of the people and in order to build up their strength and vigor that an adequate and dependable supply of high grade citrus fruit be constantly available, and the production, transportation, processing, distribution and sale of citrus fruit in the State of Florida is therefore hereby declared to be a business affecting the public health and interest, that unfair, unjust, destructive, demoralizing, and uneconomic trade practices have been and are continuing to be carried on in the sale and distribution of citrus fruit in this state to the extent that such fruit has been and is continuing to sell in many cases at prices below the cost of production and the constant, dependable and adequate supply of such fruit for sale and consumption is thereby so seriously imperiled as to threaten the break down of the industry; that the present acute economic condition in Florida is in part the consequence of a severe and increasing disparity between the prices of citrus fruit and other commodities ; that it is both expedient and necessary to build up the quality and reputation of Florida’s citrus fruit in the market and to stabilize the Florida citrus industry and to protect the public and the growers against fraud, deception, and financial loss through further continuation of unscrupulous practices and haphazard methods in connection with the marketing of citrus fruits, and to that end, to assure the grower returns at least equal to the cost of production of high grade citrus fruit.
“Therefore, in the exercise, of the police power of the State, for the purpose of protecting and promoting the public health and general welfare.
i|: % % % %
“Section 3. The Commissioner of Agriculture in his discretion and by and with the consent and advice of the Governor shall have the power to declare the existence of a State Emergency in the Citrus Industry, and upon petition or petitions signed by persons, firms, corporations, or associations, owning or controlling 50% or more of the producing acreage of citrus fruit, requesting such action, being filed with the Citrus Commission, such percentage to be based upon the survey heretofore made by the Federal Emergency Relief Administration and supplemented by such further surveys as the Citrus Commission from time to time may make, and after the Citrus Commission shall have procured from the producers, shippers, or handlers of citrus fruit, not subject to the provisions of this Act, binding agreements to conform thereto and abide by its terms, the Florida Citrus Commission shall determine and record in permanent form annually the average reasonable cost per standard packed box of producing citrus fruit and every contract, agreement, plan or arrangement with the grower by or under which his citrus fruit shall be bought, marketed, or processed shall be held to require that the person, firm, corporation, or association buying, marketing or processing said citrus fruit shall in any event pay the grower said cost of production, to be ascertained by multiplying the said cost per standard packed box as shown by the record of the Commission current at the time the contract, agreement, plan of arrangement with the grower shall be made, by the number of packed boxes so bought, marketed and [46]*46processed during the season or under the particular contract, agreement, plan or arrangement if for less than a marketing season. Any contract, plan, scheme or device whereby it shall be attempted to preclude the grower from recovering such cost of production shall to that extent be held to be unlawful and against the public policy of this State, but in all other respects and particulars contracts of sale, marketing and processing shall be valid and binding and the terms thereof shall measure the rights of the respective parties.”

We are not 'concerned with Sections 1 and 2, but the provisions of Section 3 raise all the questions with which we are concerned.

Taking up these in the order of their importance, we consider whether it violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S.C.A.Const. We are aware of the fact that many of the later decisions on the due process clause have gone far beyond the earlier ones.

The latest authoritative decision in which this question is discussed is West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391, 57 S.Ct. 578, 581, 81 L.Ed. 703, 108 A.L.R. 1330, which says:

“The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. In prohibiting that deprivation, the Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable liberty. Liberty in each of its phases has its history and connotation. But the liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organization which requires the protection of law against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people. Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due process, and regulation which is reasonable in relation" to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process.
“This essential limitation of liberty in general governs freedom of contract in particular. More than twenty-five years ago we set forth the applicable principle in these words, after referring to the cases where the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment had been broadly described.
“ ‘But it was recognized in the cases cited, as in many others, that freedom of contract is a qualified, and not an absolute, right. There is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses. The guaranty of liberty does not withdraw from legislative supervision that wide department of activity which consists of the making of contracts, or deny to government the power to provide restrictive safeguards. Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community.’ ” Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 565, 31 S.Ct. 259, 55 L.Ed. 328.

The definition of due process here given ' contains two positive requirements.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Quing N. Wong
252 F. Supp. 608 (D. Puerto Rico, 1966)
Sunbeam Corp. v. Payless Drug Stores
113 F. Supp. 31 (N.D. California, 1953)
Bank of Nova Scotia v. San Miguel
9 F.R.D. 171 (D. Puerto Rico, 1949)
Family Security Life Ins. Co. v. Daniel
79 F. Supp. 62 (E.D. South Carolina, 1948)
Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Holmes
32 F. Supp. 964 (D. Montana, 1940)
Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co.
309 U.S. 310 (Supreme Court, 1940)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
28 F. Supp. 44, 1939 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2494, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lakeland-highlands-canning-co-v-mayo-flsd-1939.