Lake v. . McElfatrick

34 N.E. 922, 139 N.Y. 349, 54 N.Y. St. Rep. 610, 94 Sickels 349, 1893 N.Y. LEXIS 1009
CourtNew York Court of Appeals
DecidedOctober 3, 1893
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 34 N.E. 922 (Lake v. . McElfatrick) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lake v. . McElfatrick, 34 N.E. 922, 139 N.Y. 349, 54 N.Y. St. Rep. 610, 94 Sickels 349, 1893 N.Y. LEXIS 1009 (N.Y. 1893).

Opinion

Maynard, J.

The compass of our inquiry in this case is restricted within narrow bounds by the form of the pleadings and the admissions contained in them and made upon the trial.

The plaintiff alleges that his assignor, on April 1,1887, was .about to construct an opera house at Titusville, Pa., and desired the services of a competent architect for such purpose; *351 that. the defendants were copartners doing business in blew York city, and that they held themselves out to be, and represented and warranted themselves to be, competent, skilled architects, and particularly skilled in the art and science of making plans, specifications, drawings and detailed statements of all that was necessary in and about the construction of theaters and opera houses, so that if their plans, details and specifications were followed, the building would be constructed in a good, accurate and substantial manner; that plaintiff’s ■assignor relied upon such representations and warranty, and employed the defendants to make the plans, drawings, specifications and detailed statements of all that was necessary to be done in and about the construction of a theater or opera house for him, and agreed to pay them for their services three hundred and fifty dollars; that in consideration thereof, the defendants agreed to make such plans, specifications, drawings •and detailed statements, and that they should in all things be •accurate, sufficient and correct, and that if they were followed in the construction of the building, the plaintiff’s assignor should have a fine, well-constructed opera house or theater, complete in all its parts, and without injury or damage to him by reason of any defect in the plans, or any failure or neglect on the part of the defendants in making the plans, drawings, specifications and detailed statements.

These averments were admitted by the defendants, and were not litigated on the trial. The complaint further alleges the furnishing of the plans by the defendants and the payment of the agreed price, and that the plaintiff’s assignor constructed the building according to the plans, specifications, drawings and detailed statements furnished, and followed the directions given therein; and that they were faulty to such an extent as to cause damage to the plaintiff’s assignor to the amount of $2,261, for which plaintiff has recovered judgment. The defendants put in issue the truth of these allegations by a general denial. To succeed, the plaintiff was, therefore, required to affirmatively establish two material facts: 1st. That his assignor had followed the plans, specifications and *352 drawings in the construction of the building in all essential matters; and 2nd. That the plans were defective; and unless there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury upon both of these issues, the judgment which he has recovered cannot stand.

The sole defect complained of was in the plan of the proscenium arch. This opening was in the form of a segmental arch, as it is called in architecture, thirty-six feet long, with a rise of eight feet. It was built of brick, and when the cradle, which supported it, was removed, it fell in and nad to be reconstructed, and the cost of rebuilding it and of repairing the injury done to other parts of the structure by its fall, constituted the amount of the plaintiff’s recovery. The particular fault which the plaintiff alleged in his complaint was the omission by the defendants in the plans and drawings of what is known as a blind arch over the segmental arch, and that by reason of this omission no such blind arch was. constructed, and in consequence thereof the wall fell. The plaintiff was permitted to give evidence upon the trial, against objection, tending to show that the fall of the arch might have been occasioned because it was too flat; that a rise of eight feet in an arch of that width was insufficient to give it the necessary spring for self-support, and that the arch was so planned and constructed that the thrust of the arch did not fall within the abutments upon which it rested, but outside of them, and that this may have been the cause of its ruin; and also that its destruction might have been due to the use of lime mortar instead of cement; but this latter evidence was not objected to,- as the defendants claim that the specifications require cement, and that, therefore, the failure to use it would defeat the plaintiff’s cause of action.

We need not review the exceptions to the admissibility of evidence, or those based upon a variance between the pleadings and proof, for we think the plaintiff’s complaint should have been dismissed- iipon the ground of a failure to prove that the arch was built in substantial compliance with the plans and. specifications furnished by the defendants. The *353 plan of the arch was separate from the plans of the other parts of the building, and required that stone skewbacks should be put in at each heel for it to rest upon at the points where the arch meets the abutments. These were designed to be each of solid stone the thickness of the wall, and seventeen inches in width, and twenty-six inches the other way, and weighing seven or eight hundred pounds, and then* office was to furnish a firm foundation for the arch, and distribute its thrust over a larger area of the abutments. The senior member of the defendants’ firm was an architect of forty-five years experience, and it was shown that he had made a specialty of the preparation of plans for theaters and opera houses; that he had drawn such plans for many of the principal theaters in all of the large cities of the country; from seventy-five to one hundred of them; that in more than twenty of them he had put in segmental arches, having no greater rise than this one, without difficulty; that a ratio of the height to the length of an arch of one to six was regarded as safe, while in this case the ratio was one to four and three-fourths; that he always provided in every such plan for stone skewbacks; that he considered them of vital importance for the strength and stability of the structure. The utility and necessity of these supports cannot be questioned, for they sufficiently appear from the evidence of plaintiff’s witnesses. His superintendent and builder, who was responsible for the omission to put them in, testified that the whole weight of the arch rested upon the skewbacks; that the thrust of the arch in this case equalled 122,000 pounds; that its direction was in a line right through the center of the skewbacks, and that this weight must be counteracted by the abutments or the arch would fall; that the burden of the mass of masonry composing the arch is distributed upon the two skewbacks substantially.

Another witness for the plaintiff, a skilled architect, says that he has always used a stone skewback where he constructed such work with quicklime; that it gives it more of an even bearing, and throws the thrust of the arch more upon a larger space of brick around it, and that he would not build such an *354 arch with quicklime without a stone skewback.

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Bluebook (online)
34 N.E. 922, 139 N.Y. 349, 54 N.Y. St. Rep. 610, 94 Sickels 349, 1893 N.Y. LEXIS 1009, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lake-v-mcelfatrick-ny-1893.