Reason: I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Date: 2022.06.07 Cite as 2021 Ark. 207 15:25:31 -05'00' Adobe Acrobat SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS version: No. CR-20-284 2022.001.20117 Opinion Delivered: November 12, 2021 LAJASON J. COAKLEY APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE MILLER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 46CR-16-661]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE BRENT HALTOM, APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED.
RHONDA K. WOOD, Associate Justice
LaJason J. Coakley was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder. He received a
sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Coakley petitioned for postconviction relief,
contending his trial counsel was ineffective. The circuit court denied him relief without a
hearing. Coakley appeals on four grounds. He argues the circuit court erroneously found
counsel was not ineffective for failing (1) to develop the defense of provocation; (2) to object
to the witness’s t-shirt with the victim’s picture; (3) to seek a mistrial after the State
introduced documents from Texas physicians; and (4) to investigate the victim’s medical
history or obtain a separate expert witness to impeach the cause-of-death testimony. We
affirm.
I. Background
Coakley petitioned for relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel under Rule
37.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. He later filed amended motions too. But
Coakley’s petition and motions had a difficult path to resolution. The circuit court denied him relief on his Rule 37.1 claims, and Coakley appealed. But on appeal, the State argued
that his initial petition had been untimely because the circuit clerk tendered but did not file
it. This court remanded to settle and supplement the record to determine whether Coakley’s
initial petition was timely. Coakley v. State, 2021 Ark. 32.
Upon remand, the circuit court found that the circuit clerk erred when it did not
file Coakley’s initial petition and that his “[p]etition should be deemed as timely filed with
the Circuit Court.” The record—as supplemented—shows that Coakley’s petition was
timely and that the circuit court had jurisdiction. See Reynolds v. State, 2019 Ark. 144, 572
S.W.3d 869.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Our standard for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims is a two-prong analysis set
forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail under the Strickland
standard, the petitioner must show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the
deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Reynolds v. State, 2020 Ark. 174, 599 S.W.3d
120. Unless a petitioner shows both, we will not grant relief on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Williams v. State, 2019 Ark. 289, 586 S.W.3d 148.
In evaluating the first Strickland prong, we presume counsel is effective, and
allegations without factual substantiation cannot overcome that presumption. Henington v.
State, 2012 Ark. 181, 403 S.W.3d 55. The petitioner has the burden of identifying specific
acts and omissions that, when viewed from counsel’s perspective at the time of trial, could
not have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. Id.
This court will not reverse a circuit court’s denial of a Rule 37.1 petition unless the
circuit court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Williams v. State, 2019 Ark. 129, 571 S.W.3d 2 921. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the
appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, has a firm conviction there has been a
mistake. Id. On appeal, Coakley alleges four areas where his trial counsel was ineffective.
We affirm because he did not meet this first Strickland prong in any of the four areas.
A. Defense of Provocation
First, Coakley argued that his trial counsel should have pursued the defense of
provocation. He contended that video footage from a nightclub would have supported his
claim that the victim’s death resulted from manslaughter rather than murder. Yet on appeal
he changed his argument. He now argues that his trial counsel did not investigate Coakley’s
psychiatric health or seek a mental-health evaluation to support a claim of extreme
emotional disturbance. But Coakley makes this argument for the first time on appeal, and
this court does not address new arguments on appeal. See Swift v. State, 2018 Ark. 74, 540
S.W.3d 288. We do not find error in the circuit court’s decision on provocation as Coakley
abandoned that claim on appeal.
B. Witness with Photograph of the Victim on a Shirt
Next, Coakley claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial
when a witness, Larry Waller, wore a shirt with the victim’s picture on it. Coakley claims
his counsel merely objected and let the witness change shirts. The circuit court denied relief
because Coakley and his counsel discussed the matter and decided not to ask for a mistrial.
We affirm on this point.
The direct-appeal record reveals that when the witness arrived, trial counsel objected
to the witness’s shirt and button that displayed a photo of the victim and the words “Long
live Montel,” contending that both were prejudicial to Coakley. The trial court had the 3 witness step out to change. After, the trial court asked whether counsel had any other record
to make on the witness’s clothing. Counsel stated that he spoke with Coakley and they
sought no other relief. Counsel noted another jury instruction would likely draw more
attention to the issue and that he would not be requesting a mistrial.
Counsel is not ineffective when the decision stems from professional judgment and
trial strategy. Fukunaga v. State, 2016 Ark. 164, at 3, 489 S.W.3d 644, 646. The record bears
this out here. In denying postconviction relief, the circuit court found that trial counsel had
(1) stated his reasons for objecting; (2) stated his reasons for not seeking a jury instruction or
requesting a mistrial; and (3) conferred with Coakley. The trial court determined that trial
counsel was not ineffective. The circuit court’s finding on ineffective assistance of counsel
was not clearly erroneous because counsel conferred with Coakley and made a reasonable
professional judgment not to seek a mistrial.
C. Medical Examiner’s Testimony
Coakley next argues that his trial counsel failed to protect his constitutional right to
confront the witnesses against him by failing to object and move for a mistrial during
testimony from an expert witness. At trial, Dr. Stephen A. Erickson testified about his
autopsy report and findings. Coakley claims his trial counsel should have moved for a mistrial
when Dr. Erickson referenced the victim’s medical records, which included records
prepared by other physicians. Particularly, Coakley is upset that some of these physicians
were from Texas.
Coakley correctly asserts that the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also Vankirk v. State, 2011 Ark. 4 428, 385 S.W.3d 144 (noting that the Confrontation Clause is incorporated into the
Arkansas Constitution through the Fourteenth Amendment). In Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S.
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Reason: I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Date: 2022.06.07 Cite as 2021 Ark. 207 15:25:31 -05'00' Adobe Acrobat SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS version: No. CR-20-284 2022.001.20117 Opinion Delivered: November 12, 2021 LAJASON J. COAKLEY APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE MILLER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 46CR-16-661]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE BRENT HALTOM, APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED.
RHONDA K. WOOD, Associate Justice
LaJason J. Coakley was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder. He received a
sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Coakley petitioned for postconviction relief,
contending his trial counsel was ineffective. The circuit court denied him relief without a
hearing. Coakley appeals on four grounds. He argues the circuit court erroneously found
counsel was not ineffective for failing (1) to develop the defense of provocation; (2) to object
to the witness’s t-shirt with the victim’s picture; (3) to seek a mistrial after the State
introduced documents from Texas physicians; and (4) to investigate the victim’s medical
history or obtain a separate expert witness to impeach the cause-of-death testimony. We
affirm.
I. Background
Coakley petitioned for relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel under Rule
37.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. He later filed amended motions too. But
Coakley’s petition and motions had a difficult path to resolution. The circuit court denied him relief on his Rule 37.1 claims, and Coakley appealed. But on appeal, the State argued
that his initial petition had been untimely because the circuit clerk tendered but did not file
it. This court remanded to settle and supplement the record to determine whether Coakley’s
initial petition was timely. Coakley v. State, 2021 Ark. 32.
Upon remand, the circuit court found that the circuit clerk erred when it did not
file Coakley’s initial petition and that his “[p]etition should be deemed as timely filed with
the Circuit Court.” The record—as supplemented—shows that Coakley’s petition was
timely and that the circuit court had jurisdiction. See Reynolds v. State, 2019 Ark. 144, 572
S.W.3d 869.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Our standard for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims is a two-prong analysis set
forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail under the Strickland
standard, the petitioner must show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the
deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Reynolds v. State, 2020 Ark. 174, 599 S.W.3d
120. Unless a petitioner shows both, we will not grant relief on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Williams v. State, 2019 Ark. 289, 586 S.W.3d 148.
In evaluating the first Strickland prong, we presume counsel is effective, and
allegations without factual substantiation cannot overcome that presumption. Henington v.
State, 2012 Ark. 181, 403 S.W.3d 55. The petitioner has the burden of identifying specific
acts and omissions that, when viewed from counsel’s perspective at the time of trial, could
not have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. Id.
This court will not reverse a circuit court’s denial of a Rule 37.1 petition unless the
circuit court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Williams v. State, 2019 Ark. 129, 571 S.W.3d 2 921. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the
appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, has a firm conviction there has been a
mistake. Id. On appeal, Coakley alleges four areas where his trial counsel was ineffective.
We affirm because he did not meet this first Strickland prong in any of the four areas.
A. Defense of Provocation
First, Coakley argued that his trial counsel should have pursued the defense of
provocation. He contended that video footage from a nightclub would have supported his
claim that the victim’s death resulted from manslaughter rather than murder. Yet on appeal
he changed his argument. He now argues that his trial counsel did not investigate Coakley’s
psychiatric health or seek a mental-health evaluation to support a claim of extreme
emotional disturbance. But Coakley makes this argument for the first time on appeal, and
this court does not address new arguments on appeal. See Swift v. State, 2018 Ark. 74, 540
S.W.3d 288. We do not find error in the circuit court’s decision on provocation as Coakley
abandoned that claim on appeal.
B. Witness with Photograph of the Victim on a Shirt
Next, Coakley claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial
when a witness, Larry Waller, wore a shirt with the victim’s picture on it. Coakley claims
his counsel merely objected and let the witness change shirts. The circuit court denied relief
because Coakley and his counsel discussed the matter and decided not to ask for a mistrial.
We affirm on this point.
The direct-appeal record reveals that when the witness arrived, trial counsel objected
to the witness’s shirt and button that displayed a photo of the victim and the words “Long
live Montel,” contending that both were prejudicial to Coakley. The trial court had the 3 witness step out to change. After, the trial court asked whether counsel had any other record
to make on the witness’s clothing. Counsel stated that he spoke with Coakley and they
sought no other relief. Counsel noted another jury instruction would likely draw more
attention to the issue and that he would not be requesting a mistrial.
Counsel is not ineffective when the decision stems from professional judgment and
trial strategy. Fukunaga v. State, 2016 Ark. 164, at 3, 489 S.W.3d 644, 646. The record bears
this out here. In denying postconviction relief, the circuit court found that trial counsel had
(1) stated his reasons for objecting; (2) stated his reasons for not seeking a jury instruction or
requesting a mistrial; and (3) conferred with Coakley. The trial court determined that trial
counsel was not ineffective. The circuit court’s finding on ineffective assistance of counsel
was not clearly erroneous because counsel conferred with Coakley and made a reasonable
professional judgment not to seek a mistrial.
C. Medical Examiner’s Testimony
Coakley next argues that his trial counsel failed to protect his constitutional right to
confront the witnesses against him by failing to object and move for a mistrial during
testimony from an expert witness. At trial, Dr. Stephen A. Erickson testified about his
autopsy report and findings. Coakley claims his trial counsel should have moved for a mistrial
when Dr. Erickson referenced the victim’s medical records, which included records
prepared by other physicians. Particularly, Coakley is upset that some of these physicians
were from Texas.
Coakley correctly asserts that the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also Vankirk v. State, 2011 Ark. 4 428, 385 S.W.3d 144 (noting that the Confrontation Clause is incorporated into the
Arkansas Constitution through the Fourteenth Amendment). In Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36 (2004), the Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause bars the admission
of testimonial statements unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant has previously
had the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Nontestimonial statements are not
subject to the Sixth Amendment. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
As the circuit court determined, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object
because Dr. Erickson testified only about his own findings. Dr. Erickson testified that, as
part of his autopsy, he gathered information from law enforcement; reviewed medical
records; performed an examination of the body; and evaluated any ancillary stages that may
be important, such as toxicology or x-rays. Dr. Erickson noted that the victim’s medical
records reflected the victim was shot on August 20 but did not die until September
12. Because of the prolonged interval and medical interventions, Dr. Erickson relied on
medical records, some from Texas, for the placement of the wounds. But only Dr.
Erickson’s autopsy report was introduced at trial, a report which reflected his own findings
about the victim’s cause of death. Dr. Erickson did not testify to any findings made by
another doctor about the cause of death.
Because Dr. Erickson was present at trial and it was his report that was admitted, we
do not find counsel was ineffective regarding his handling of this witness. Arkansas Rule of
Evidence 703 provides that an expert witness may base his opinion on facts or data
inadmissible as evidence if of a type reasonably relied on by experts in a particular field.
Counsel is not expected to make objections or motions that are not based in law. Dennis v.
5 State, 2020 Ark. 28, at 12, 592 S.W.3d 646, 654. The circuit court’s finding that counsel
was not ineffective for declining to object was not clearly erroneous.
D. Victim’s Cause of Death
Last, Coakley contends that trial counsel did not conduct an independent
investigation into the victim’s medical records. He argues that trial counsel should have
investigated the victim’s cause of death and whether it stemmed from an unrelated event
like medical negligence. Coakley also argues that without further investigation by counsel,
Coakley lacked his own expert to rebut the State expert’s testimony about the victim’s cause
of death. The trial court found that Coakley’s claim was “totally unsupported by the
evidence in this case.”
Coakley provides no factual substantiation to support his claim that trial counsel was
ineffective for his failure to investigate or rebut the State’s expert with an independent expert
on the claim of medical negligence. A conclusory claim without factual substantiation is not
a basis for postconviction relief. Ortega v. State, 2017 Ark. 365, 533 S.W.3d 68. And despite
his claim to the contrary, trial counsel asked Dr. Erickson several questions related to medical
negligence, the gunshot wound, and the degree of healing to the victim’s wounds. We
affirm the circuit court’s findings denying postconviction relief on this final point.
Affirmed.
LaJason J. Coakley, pro se appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Karen Virginia Wallace, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.