Lainhart v. West Palm Beach Zoning Board of Appeals

7 Fla. Supp. 42

This text of 7 Fla. Supp. 42 (Lainhart v. West Palm Beach Zoning Board of Appeals) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Circuit Court of the 15th Judicial Circuit of Florida, Palm Beach County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lainhart v. West Palm Beach Zoning Board of Appeals, 7 Fla. Supp. 42 (Fla. Super. Ct. 1955).

Opinion

OTIS FARRINGTON, Circuit Judge.

Petitioner applied to this court for certiorari under section 176.17 F.S. to review a decision of the zoning board of appeals of the city of West Palm Beach made July 8, 1954 granting the application of Antonio and Sophia Tito for a special exception to permit construction of a four-unit apartment rental building on the lake front portion of the south half of lot 20 and all of lots 21, 22 and 23, block 2, North Palm Beach, a subdivision in the city of West Palm Beach, which construction would not be otherwise permitted under the R-2 (single family district) zoning thereof under the West Palm Beach Zoning Ordinance of 1954.

Writ of certiorari was issued on July 12, 1954, and in response thereto the respondent has filed its sworn return and transcript of proceedings before it incident to the application.

Pursuant to motion by. respondent this causé was Sót for trial beforé the court on August 20, 1954. The order setting the case [44]*44for trial provided for a trial, de novo — “as provided by the charter of the city of West Palm Beach.” The applicable portion of the said charter, section 4 (27) (d), provides as follows: — “Any person or persons jointly or severally aggrieved by any decision of the board of appeals or any officer, department, board or bureau of the city, may present to any court having chancery jurisdiction, a petition duly verified setting forth that such decision is illegal in whole or in part, specifying the grounds of the illegality. If, upon hearing, it shall appear that testimony is necessary for the proper disposition of the matter, the court may take evidence . . . which shall constitute a part of the proceedings upon which the determination of the court shall be made. The court may reverse or affirm, wholly or in part, or may modify the decision brought up for review.”

Antonio and Sophia Tito filed a motion for leave to intervene, which was denied. However, they were present at the trial where they were permitted to testify. Their attorney was permitted to offer testimony and question witnesses at the trial and has filed briefs herein which have been considered by the court.

The court has considered the transcript of the proceedings before the zoning board of appeals and the findings of that board as well as the evidence presented at the trial before this court on August 20, 1954. The findings of the board are summarized in the following quotations from its sworn return and certified transcript of prcoeedings — “. . . and it was their considered opinion that the property involved, being a large lot lying west of Poinsettia Avenue in the city of West Palm Beach; that because of the depth of the lot and size thereof that it was not suitable for any purpose other than that applied for in the request for special exception, and that the applicants were suffering from a grave hardship, it being the opinion of the board that the property could not be used for any other purpose and because of the character of the neighborhood, there being numerous rental units adjacent thereto . . . The board also considered the fact that the applicants purchased the property at a time when it was zoned so that they could build thereon the type of an improvement that they were requesting a special exception for, and that the same was rezoned at a time when they were absent from the city of West Palm Beach, and also the board, from an inspection of the adjacent properties, found that it was surrounded by other properties being used for two-family or more residences and rental units, and that the application as presented and inspection of the property made by the zoning board of appeals convinced the board that a sufficient hard[45]*45ship existed to justify the relief which was granted in giving the exception.”

It appears, therefore, that the board granted the exception for three reasons — (1) That because of its size, shape and location applicants’ lot is suitable only for multiple unit housing. (2) That applicants’ lot is surrounded by multiple unit and rental property and is not suitable for any purpose other than multiple unit construction, and that adherence to the R-2 zoning classification would result in grave hardship to applicants. (3) That at the time applicants purchased the lot, the zoning regulations thereon permitted multiple unit construction and that they purchased the lot with the intention of proceeding with such construction.

The applicants’ lot has 87% feet frontage on Poinsettia Ave. and extends in depth approximately 400 feet to the shore of Lake Worth. It was established by the evidence presented at the trial that the lot in question would command a higher price in the market and would produce more income for the applicants if multiple unit construction were permitted thereon than under its present R-2 classification.

The evidence does not support the board’s finding that the Tito property is suitable only for multiple unit construction. The Titos have used it for single family residence purposes since acquisition. The fact that attractive rental units have been constructed on the adjacent lot to the south lessens its desirability as a residence lot, but does not render it valueless for such purpose. The court is of the opinion that the value of their lot is depressed not more than 25% because of the R-2 zoning restrictions. The fact that the proposed non-conforming use would be financially advantageous or more profitable to the applicant is not, of itself, a basis for a' claim of unnecessary hardship. See annotation in 168 A.L.R., pages 30, 31.

An examination of the plat of the area clearly indicates that applicants’ situation, i.e., the ownership of a deep lot with comparatively narrow street frontage, is in no way unique and distinct from that of adjoining owners. In fact, all the lots in the R-2 area in which the lot is located have exactly the same characteristics as to shape. The general rule in zoning cases is that if the alleged hardship is common to the whole area the case is not one for the board of appeals but one for the legislative body — rezoning is the proper relief, not the granting of the special privilege of a variation to a single owner. This rule is stated in A.L.R. as follows— “It is generally held that, to warrant the granting of a variancé [46]*46on the ground of unnecessary hardship, the hardship relied upon must be special and peculiar to the applicant, and must not arise from a condition which affects other property in the same zone or district generally.” (Citing many cases as authority.) Annotation, 168 A.L.R. 28.

The evidence does not sustain the finding of the board that the Tito property is “surrounded” by multiple-unit and rental property. It is true that the Fields property, which is adjacent to the Tito property on the south, is used for multiple rental units. Adjacent to the Fields, property on the south there are multiple rental units on the Beymer property, south of which is a non-conforming boat yard. Thus it appears that commencing with the Fields property and continuing south the use is generally not in conformity with R-2 zoning classification. However, the court finds from the evidence presented that there is no serious deviation from the letter, purpose or intent of the existing R-2 classification in the area commencing with the Tito property and extending for a considerable distance to the north.

The Tito property is in the unfortunate position of being the border lot.

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Related

The City of Miami Beach v. Ocean Inland Co.
3 So. 2d 364 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1941)

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Bluebook (online)
7 Fla. Supp. 42, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lainhart-v-west-palm-beach-zoning-board-of-appeals-flacirct15pal-1955.