Laing v. Superior Court
This text of 199 P.2d 373 (Laing v. Superior Court) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Petitioners have applied for a writ of prohibition to prohibit the superior court from enforcing by execution an order made in a proceeding instituted under the provisions of sections 6121 and 6132 of the Probate Code.
Facts
1. December 1, 1945, John Earl Riggan died leaving surviving his sister, Florence Vesely, petitioner herein. At the time of his death decedent was the registered owner of a Ford automobile of the approximate value of $575, which automobile was in the possession of petitioner Vesely. Decedent left no other property or estate.
2. January 2, 1946, petitioner Vesely executed and filed with the Department of Motor Vehicles of the State of [643]*643California an affidavit pursuant to the provisions of section 1853 of the Vehicle Code of the State of California, whereupon the Department of Motor Vehicles transferred the ownership of the aforementioned Ford to petitioner Vesely. Immediately thereafter said petitioner sold the automobile to petitioner Laing.
3. February 5, 1946, Jeanne E. Eiggan was appointed administratrix of the estate of decedent.
4. June 27, 1946, the administratrix of decedent’s estate filed a petition in the probate court requesting that a citation issue to petitioners to appear and be examined under the provisions of sections 612 and 613 of the Probate Code. A petition was issued as prayed and petitioners were examined on July 30, 1946, relative to the above mentioned automobile. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge of the probate court entered a judgment decreeing that petitioners deliver said automobile to the administratrix and if it could not be delivered that she recover from petitioners the sum of $575.
5. October 9, 1947, the Sheriff of Los Angeles County, pursuant to an alias writ of execution theretofore issued by the clerk of the superior court for the enforcement of said judgment, levied on all of the interest of petitioner Laing in the estate of Jack Lewis Forsmit then being administered in the probate department of the Los Angeles County Superior Court.
6. July 15, 1948, the probate court made an order in the estate of Jack Lewis Forsmit directing the administrator of such estate by virtue of the above mentioned writ of execution to distribute to the Sheriff of Los Angeles County all of the property and interest of petitioner Laing in said estate.
Question
Did the prohate court have jurisdiction in the proceedings instituted pursuant to the provisions of sections 612 [644]*644 and 613 of the Probate Code to determine as between the conflicting claimants title to the Ford automobile registered in the name of decedent Biggan?
This question must be answered in the negative. It is the general rule that the probate court does not have jurisdiction to try title to property where it is claimed adversely by a stranger to the probate proceedings. (Stratton v. Superior Court, 87 Cal.App.2d 809 [197 P.2d 821] ; McCarthy v. Superior Court, 64 Cal.App.2d 468, 472 [149 P.2d 55] ; Koerber v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.App. 31, 34 [206 P. 496].)
The foregoing rule is applicable to the facts of the instant case. Petitioners were strangers to the probate proceedings and therefore the probate court was without jurisdiction to determine the conflicting claims of the adverse parties to the automobile in question.
Since the order of the probate court was beyond its jurisdiction it was void and a writ of prohibition is an appropriate remedy to prohibit the enforcement of the order of execution to collect the money judgment.
Heydenfeldt v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. 348 [49 P. 210] and Estate of DeBarry, 43 Cal.App.2d 715 [111 P.2d 728] (Cf., McCarthy v. Superior Court, supra), relied on by respondent, are not here applicable for the reason that each case is factually distinct from the present case. In the case first mentioned the court merely held that where a decree of distribution was reversed upon appeal the probate court had inherent power to order the distributees to return to the executors property which had been improperly delivered to them. In the second ease counsel directs our attention to the statement on page 725 which merely holds that the probate court had jurisdiction to pass upon the question of the allowance of extraordinary attorney’s fees for services rendered to an estate. Clearly neither case has any application to the present situation.
Let the premptory writ of prohibition issue as prayed.
Moore, P. J., and Wilson, J., concurred.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
199 P.2d 373, 88 Cal. App. 2d 641, 1948 Cal. App. LEXIS 1513, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/laing-v-superior-court-calctapp-1948.