LaFrantz v. Diocese of Brooklyn

• Court: District Court, E.D. New York
• Decided: January 19, 2024
• Docket: 1:21-cv-04920
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JBANNE LAFRANTZ, MEMORANDUM & ORDER Plaintiff, 21-CV-04920 (NGG) (CLP) -against- ST. MARY’S ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH, DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN, Defendants.

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, United States District Judge. Jeanne L. LaFrantz (“Plaintiff or “Ms. LaFrantz”) brought this action against St. Mary’s Roman Catholic Church (“St. Mary's”) and The Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn (the “Brooklyn Di- ocese”) (collectively, the “Defendants”) under the New York Child Victims Act (“CVA”), 2019 N.Y. Sess. Laws c. 11, § 3, asa result of sexual abuse she suffered as a minor at the hands of the Defendants’ employee, Father John F. Campbell (“Campbell”). Both Defendants separately move to dismiss Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12{b) (6). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. I. BACKGROUND! Plaintiff alleges that from approximately 1960 to 1966, she was subjected to sexual abuse by Father Campbell, a diocesan priest

1 The following facts are taken from the First Amended Complaint and, for the purposes of this motion to dismiss, are assumed to be true. See Ark. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 28 F.4th 343, 349 (2d Cir. 2022). In response to supplemental authority filed by the Brooklyn Diocese (Dkts. 44, 46}, Plaintiff submitted a response in support of her FAC (Dkt.

who was employed by Defendants to work at St. Mary’s. (First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) (Dkt. 28) 99 3-5, 15.) According to the FAC, Campbell began abusing Plaintiff when she was in sixth grade and approximately ten years old. (Id. 4 19.) At the time the abuse began, Plaintiffs father was sick with terminal cancer, and Campbell began providing “spiritual guid- ance” as well as financial support to PlaintifPs mother. (Id. 4 22- 23.) While Plaintiffs mother tended to Plaintiffs ill father, Plain- tiff was entrusted to the Defendants and Campbell’s care. Ud. § 24.) Plaintiff alleges, however, that Campbell was a “regularly .. . touchy man” with students at St. Mary’s, including Plaintiff. Gd. | 27.) Campbell would lure Plaintiff to St. Mary’s rectory “under the guise of needing [Plaintiff] to run errands for him.” Ud. { 28.) Plaintiff frequented the rectory so often that the housekeeper al- lowed Plaintiff to take a shorter route through the kitchen and a back passageway. Ud. □□ 34-36.) Plaintiff alleges that she often passed other priests and visitors who sat in the communal areas of the rectory and watched her walk to Campbell's “private area” which consisted of an office, pantry, couch, television, and bed. (id. 44 37-40.) Once alone, Plaintiff alleges that Campbell would sexually abuse her, instruct her not to tell anyone about their en- counters, and send her off with $2-5. Ud. (4 41-48.) Plaintiff asserts this abuse occurred three to four times a week and coin- cided with changes in her behavior at school. Ud. 30.) Plaintiff alleges that her teacher, Sister Mary Anselm, noticed how much time Plaintiff was spending alone with Campbell and rather than prevent the abuse, Sister Anslem warned Plaintiff that if she “con- tinued on the path she was on” and her “behavior” did not

47), which is not properly before the court on this motion to dismiss, and whose consideration would require the court to convert the motion to a motion for summary judgment and allow an opportunity for discovery. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Ine., 282 F.3d 147, 154 (2d Cir. 2002).

improve, she would “end up in jail.” Gd. 1 29, 32-33.) Plaintiff recalls the abuse continuing for six years and only stopping when she left St. Mary’s to attend high school. (Id. 7 49.) During freshman year of high school at Mater Christi Diocesan High School, Plaintiff disclosed the sexual abuse by Campbell while in confessional. (id. 51-52.) The school’s priest did not believe Plaintiff and told her that she was “shameful” and “would go to Hell” for the lie she told. (id. 9 54.) Plaintiff asserts she never spoke of the abuse again, fearful that she would be ex- pelled and bring shame on her mother. Ud. { 55.) H. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On August 13, 2021, Plaintiff commenced this action by filing her Complaint in the Southern District of New York. (See Complaint (Dkt. 1).) Following transfer to this court, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. (See generally FAC.) The FAC alleges five causes of action against Defendants: (i) negligence, (id. 4 59- 82); Gi) negligent training, supervision, and retention, (FAC {4 83-95); Gil} gross negligence, Gd. 96-111); (iv) premises lia- bility, Gd. {§ 112-18); (v} and breach of fiduciary duty, (id. {4 119-32). On June 27, 2022, Defendants moved to dismiss Plain- tifPs FAC pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (St. Mary’s Not. of Mot. to Dismiss (Dkt. 36); St. Mary’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“St. Mary’s Mot.”} (Dkt. 36-1) at 1; Brooklyn Diocese’s Not. of Mot. (Dkt. 40); Brooklyn Diocese’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. (“Brooklyn Diocese’s Mot.”) (Dkt. 40-4) at 1.) Plaintiff submitted an Opposition, (Opp. (Dkt. 41)) and

2 The court notes that, as a factual matter, Plaintiff alleges the abuse began when she was ten years of age and continued for six years, (Id. 4 19, 49.) This suggests that the abuse continued until she was sixteen and in the twelfth grade or senior year of high school (assuming she did not repeat or skip grades). Plaintiff alleges, however, that the abuse stopped when she left to attend high school. (id. □ 49.} The court notes this inconsistency for the record.

Defendants filed Replies in support of their motions to dismiss. (St. Mary’s Reply (Dkt. 39); Brooklyn Diocese’s Reply (Dkt. 42).) Ti. LEGAL STANDARD To survive a Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).? “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the miscon- duct alleged.” Id. “Plausibility depends on a host of considerations: the full factual picture presented by the com- plaint, the particular cause of action and its elements, and the existence of alternative explanations so obvious that they render plaintiffs inferences unreasonable.” L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLG, 647 F.3d 419, 430 (2d Cir. 2011). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court will accept all factual allegations in the com- plaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. Fink v. Time Warner Cable, 714 F.3d 739, 740-41 (2d Cir. 2013). However, allegations that “are no more than conclusions . [ ] are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Hayden v. Pater- son, 594 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir. 2010). Thus, “at a bare minimum, the operative standard requires the plaintiff to provide the grounds upon which his claim rests through factual allega- tions sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 56-57 (2d Cir. 2008).

3 When quoting cases, unless otherwise noted, all citations and internal quotation marks are omitted, and all alterations are adopted,

IV. DISCUSSION A. Group Pleading As a threshold matter, Defendant Brooklyn Diocese argues that Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 because it does not distinguish the acts of each Defendant. (Brooklyn Diocese’s Mot. at 6-7.) Plaintiff as- serts that she has properly alleged that the Defendants acted in unison and are jointly liable for the conduct of Father Campbell. (Opp. at 5-7.) Rule 8 requires a complaint to give each defendant “fair notice of the grounds for entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561. “A complaint generally fails to meet that minimum requirement where allegations lump all the defendants together in each claim and provide no factual basis to distinguish their conduct.” Gomez- Kadawid v. Lee, No. 20-CV-01786 (VEC) (DF), 2022 WL 676096, at “6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 20-CV-1786 (VEC) (DF), 2022 WL 558125 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2022), Here, the Brooklyn Diocese asserts that Plaintiff overlooks the fact that it is a separate legal entity from St. Mary’s and fails to specify which Defendant engaged in what misconduct. (Brooklyn Diocese’s Mot. at 6.) Tellingly, of the six times the Brooklyn Dio- cese is mentioned in the First Amended Complaint, none of them are within the “Facts Common to All Counts” section, but rather in sections describing the nature of the claim, the parties, and the causes of action. (See FAC 7] 1, 10-11, 60, 84, 104.) While true that “nothing in Rule 8 prohibits collectively referring to multiple defendants where the complaint alerts defendants that identical claims are asserted against each defendant,” New York.Am. Water Co., Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 19-CV-2150 (NG), 2020 WL 9427226, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2020), the rule re- quires, “at a minimum, that a complaint give each defendant fair

notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the ground upon which it rests.” Atuahene v. City of Hartford, 10 F. App’x 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2001) (Summary Order). The Brooklyn Diocese argues that Plaintiffs First Amended Com- plaint improperly conflates the Defendants without specifying which Defendant engaged in which acts. (See Brooklyn Diocese Mot. at 6.) While the court notes that Plaintiff could have alleged in greater detail conduct specific to each Defendant, the court cannot conclude that Plaintiffs complaint failed to give any no- tice to the Defendants. In particular, Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that Campbell was a diocesan priest employed by St. Mary’s and “under Defendants’ direct supervision, employ, and control when he committed the wrongful acts.” (FAC §{ 5, 84.) Thus, while vague, the group pleading alone does not rise to the level of a Rule 8 violation sufficient to dismiss the First Amended Complaint in its entirety at this stage. See Vantone Grp. Liab. Co. v. Yangpu NGT Indus. Co., No. 13-CV-7639 (LTS), 2015 WL 4040882, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2015) (noting that the test for Rule 8 pleading is “simply whether Defendants have received ad- equate notice of the claims”). Drawing all reasonable inferences in PlaintifPs favor, the court declines to dismiss the First Amended Complaint on group pleading grounds and considers the Brooklyn Diocese and St. Mary’s as joint employers for pur- poses of this motion. The court now turns to the merits. B. Negligence “To establish a prima facie case of negligence under New York law, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a duty owed by the defend- ant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach thereof, and (3) injury proximately resulting therefrom.” Curtis v. Gates Cmty. Chapel of Rochester, Inc., No. 20-CV-06208 (HAW), 2023 WL 1070650, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2023). Plaintiff asserts a negligence claim against both Defendants, alleging they are liable under New York law based on a school-student relationship between the Plaintiff

and the Defendants as well Defendants’ duty as landowners to keep its premises safe. (FAC 59-82, 115; Opp. at 8-9.) 1. Duty Owed “In New York, schools owe a special duty... to students, requir- ing a school to act when a child, while in its charge, is threatened by the negligence of a third party, and it must make reasonable efforts to anticipate such threats and will be held liable for fore- seeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision.” Curtis, 2023 WL 1070650, at *2. Schools are there- fore required to “exercise such care of their charges as a parent of ordinary prudence would observe in comparable circum- stances.” PC-41 Doe v. Poly Prep Country Day Sch., 590 F. Supp. 3d 551, 568 (E.D.N.Y. 2021). And the nature of this duty, often known as the duty of in loco parentis, “derives from the simple fact that a school, in assuming physical custody and control over its students, effectively takes the place of parents and guardians.” Mirand v, City of New York, 84 N.Y.2d 44, 49 (1994). Likewise, landowners have “a duty to maintain their property in a reasonably safe condition” such that the “foreseeable conduct of third parties on the property [is prevented] from intentionally harming or creating an unreasonable risk of harm to others.” Murray, 2022 WL 3139116, at *3. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the Defendants had a duty to Plaintiff in loco parentis. Specifically, the First Amended Com- plaint alleged that the Defendants’ duty “arose because of, inter alia, a special relationship between the school and the minor stu- dents attending the school” and that Defendants “agreed to educate, care for, and keep safe the minor students in exchange for tuition, for which Defendants accepted.” (FAC {{ 103-04): see also Davila v. Orange Cnty., 187 N.Y.S.3d 261, 263 (2d Dep’t 2023).

The court also finds that Defendants had a duty to Plaintiff by virtue of their status as landowners. Not only did Plaintiff attend school on the Defendants’ premises, but Plaintiff alleges that she participated in programs and activities Defendants offered to mi- nors and ran errands for Campbell that included meeting him at the rectory. (FAC 94 34, 69.) It was therefore reasonable to ex- pect Plaintiff to be on Defendants property—even outside of school or church hours—such that the Defendants owed her a duty. See C.Q. v. Est. of Rockefeller, No. 20-CV-2205 (VSB), 2021 WL 4942802, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2021). 2. Breach of Duty and Harm Arising from Breach Plaintiff alleges that Defendants breached their duties by failing to exercise reasonable care to safely manage the priests under their direction and control who are tasked with educating stu- dents and minor parishioners, like the Plaintiff. (FAC {| 16, 27, 62-63, 75, 78; Opp. at 9.) Specifically, Plaintiff points to ten fac- tual allegations from her First Amended Complaint that, when taken together, allow the court to plausibly infer that Defendants had notice of Campbell’s propensities and acts. (See Opp. at 10.) For example, Plaintiff alleges that her teacher, Sister Mary An- selm, was “very in tune” with her students and noticed that Plaintiff was spending three to four afternoons a week alone with Campbell, and that this time period coincided with Plaintiffs change in behavior at school. (FAC { 30.) Rather than prevent Father Campbell from sexually abusing her, Sister Anselm only warned Plaintiff that if she did not change her behavior, she would “end up in jail.” Gd. § 33.) Moreover, Plaintiff claims that she “almost always” passed other priests on the way to see Camp- bell and instead of conversing with her, the other priests observed Campbell take Plaintiff to his private living quarters which had an office, couch television, bar, and bed. Ud. {| 38- 40.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges that “Father Campbell was a regu- larly—and uncomfortably—touchy man.” Gd. { 27.) Plaintiff

contends, and this court agrees, that when considered in tandem, these allegations could plausibly suggest that Defendants should have made a reasonable effort to anticipate the threat of abuse by Campbell. (fd. 178.) Thus, Defendants’ failure to anticipate Campbell’s abuse, coupled with their failure to warn parents and report his conduct (FAC {{ 76, 78), their failure to prevent Campbell from private “unfet- tered access” to students like the Plaintiff (id. € 62), and their failure to create or enforce procedures to prevent sexual abuse of children (id. { 78), plausibly show that the level of supervision and protection provided by Defendants fell below that of an iden- tically situated, ordinarily prudent parent. See Poly Prep Country Day Sch., 590 F, Supp. 3d at 569; Digiorgio v. The Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, No. 520009/2019, 2021 WL 1578326, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 22, 2021) (holding the diocese and parish vicariously liable not for the intentional torts by a priest but for “negligence committed in allowing such abuse to take place when a duty of reasonable care existed to safely manage the sub- ject educational facilities”). Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that as a result of Defendants’ breach and Campbell’s abuse, she has suffered severe physical and emotional injuries necessitating psychiatric and medical treatment. (FAC {{ 81-82.) Taking the allegations in Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint as true, the court concludes that De- fendants’ motions to dismiss are DENIED with respect to Plaintiffs negligence claim. Cc. Negligent Training, Retention, and Supervision In addition to the standard elements of negligence, a plaintiff al- leging negligent training, retention, and supervision must show: “(1) that the tort-feasor and the defendant were in an employee- employer relationship; (2) that the employer knew or should have known of the employee’s propensity for the conduct which caused the injury prior to the injury’s occurrence; and (3) that

the tort was committed on the employer's premises or with the employer's chattels.” Ehrens v. Lutheran Church, 385 F.3d 232, 235 (2d Cir, 2004). New York courts have held that in the context of sexual assault allegations, “a plaintiff must in its complaint provide factual alle- gations concerning the tortfeasor’s propensity for sexual assault, as well as factual allegations suggesting that the defendant knew or should have known of any such prior acts by the tortfeasor.” Est. of Rockefeller, 202.1 WL 4942802, at *9; see also Doe v. Alsaud, 12 F. Supp. 3d 674, 680 (S.D.N-Y. 2014). And the prior miscon- duct by the tortfeasor “must be of the same kind that caused the injury.” Alsaud, 12 F, Supp. 3d at 681, As with Plaintiffs negligence claim, Plaintiff has sufficiently al- leged facts showing Defendants knew or should have known of Campbell’s propensities for sexual abuse. See supra IV.B.2. But Plaintiff has failed to allege any prior sexual abuse—let alone any prior history at all—on the part of Father Campbell. See Murray, 579 F, Supp. 3d at 390 (“[A]n employer is only liable for negli- gent supervision if the employer is aware of specific prior acts or allegations against the employee.”) (emphasis in original). The absence of such factual allegations are “fatal” to Plaintiffs claim and “warrant[] dismissal.” Alsaud, 12 F. Supp. 3d at 680. Defend- ants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs negligent training, retention, and supervision claim. D. Gross Negligence Gross negligence, like ordinary negligence, requires breach of a legal duty. Curley v. AMR Corp., 153 F.3d 5, 13 (2d Cir. 1998). But the alleged conduct must be of an “aggravated character” that “evinces a reckless disregard for the rights of others or smacks of intentional wrongdoing.” Id, Plaintiff alleges in her First Amended Complaint that Defendants’ acts and omissions were “committed with reckless disregard for,

and with willful, wanton, and conscious indifference to, the rights, safety, and welfare of Plaintiff and the general public,” (FAC § 97), particularly where Defendants’ agents, including Sis- ter Anselm and other priests and nuns “deliberately turned a blind eye” to Campbell’s conduct (Opp. at 12-13). The court dis- agrees with Plaintiffs contention that Defendants deliberately ignored Campbells conduct and finds Plaintiff has failed to allege any intentional wrongdoing on the part of the Defendants. Plain- tifPs accusations that she was “smugglled}” into a private residence of adult men through a “special passageway” are belied by the fact that Plaintiff concedes that other priests and visitors also frequented the communal areas and hallways of the rectory. (Opp. at 12; FAC §{ 35-39.) Plaintiff admits that she was led by Campbell to his office and suite past these visitors without issue. (FAC { 38.) Similarly, the housekeeper’s decision to have Plaintiff use a shorter route to the rectory does not amount to gross neg- ligence where there are no facts alleging that it was improper or abnormal for Plaintiff to run errands or visit Campbell’s living quarters and no facts alleging Campbell had a history of inappro- priate conduct. While the allegations as pled could support negligence on the part of the Defendants, they do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. Accordingly, Defendants’ mo- tions are GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs gross negligence claim. E. Premises Liability “Under a theory of premises liability, it is the duty of a property owner to protect plaintiff from foreseeable harm caused by third persons, including its own employees.” Poly Prep Country Day Sch., 2022 WL 4586237, at *11. Courts in similar CVA actions have dismissed premises liability claims as duplicative of other tort claims. See Est. of Rockefeller, 2021 WL 4942802, at *4; Poly Prep Country Day Sch., 590 F. Supp. 3d at 571; Fay v. Troy City Sch. Dist., 151 N.Y.S.3d 642, 643 (3d Dep’t 2021).

Here, the “gravamens of [Plaintiffs premises liability claim and negligence claim] are substantially identical.” Sang Lan v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., No. 11-CV-2870 (LBS), 2012 WI, 1633907, at *2. (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2012). Plaintiffs assertions that Plaintiff was an invitee at the Defendants’ premises where Defendants pro- vided inadequate security and supervision such that the risk of harm was foreseeable (FAC {9 112-118), fall entirely within the scope of her negligence claims (id. {{ 59-111). See Fay, 151 N.Y.S.3d at 643. Plaintiffs premises liability claim is therefore DISMISSED as du- plicative of her negligence claims and Defendants’ motions to dimiss are GRANTED for this claim. F. Breach of Fiduciary Duty To state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must plau- sibly allege facts demonstrating “breach by a fiduciary of a duty owed to plaintiff; defendant’s knowing participation in the breach; and damages.” SCS Comme’ns, Inc. v. Herrick Co., 360 F.3d 329, 342 (2d Cir. 2004) And a fiduciary relationship is “one founded upon trust or confidence reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of another. It is said that the relationship exists in all cases in which influence has been acquired and abused, in which confidence has been reposed and betrayed.” Pe- nato v. George, 383 N.Y.S.2d 900, 904 (2d Dep’t 1976). Absent an allegation of a special relationship, mere assertions of “trust and confidence” are insufficient to support a claim of a fiduciary relationship. (FAC § 122); see also Freedman y. Pearlman, 706 N.Y.S.2d 405, 409 (1st Dep’t 2000). Where, as here, “a parishioner plaintiff seeks to establish the ex- istence of a fiduciary relationship with an institutional church defendant, the plaintiff may not merely rely on the church’s sta- tus in general, but must come forward with facts demonstrating that his or her relationship with the institution was somehow unique or distinct from the institution’s relationship with other

parishioners generally.” Doe v. Holy See (State of Vatican City), 793 N.Y.S.2d 565, 568 (3d Dep’t 2005). The court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish a fiduciary relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants. Generalized aile- gations of a relationship by nature of Plaintiffs attendance at Defendants’ school and participation in church are precisely the types of claims courts have held insufficient to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. See Holy See, 793 N.Y.S.2d at 568-69 (providing pastoral services and instructional programs for chil- dren found insufficient to demonstrate existence of fiduciary relationship); Bouchard v. New York Archdiocese, No. 04-CV-9978 (CSH), 2006 WL 1375232, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2006) (“Plaintiffs allegations do not make out the existence of any sort of special relationship between the Church Defendants and Plain- tiff beyond that general relationship between a church or religious body and a congregant.”). Further, it cannot be said that Defendants assumed a fiduciary duty by attempting to resolve issues of sexual abuse where Plaintiff did not report any allega- tions to any agent of the Defendants. See Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Cath. Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 430 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding diocese had a fiduciary duty when it was informed of misconduct); Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 323 (Golo, 1993) (finding diocese assumed fiduciary duty when it acted to resolve complaints of sexual abuse), Plaintiff has therefore failed to allege that a fiduciary relationship was created with Plaintiff and the Defendants. Caldwell y. Arch- diocese of New York, No. 20-CV-1090 (VSB), 2021 WL 1999421, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2021) (“Plaintiffs’ sexual abuse as chil- dren by Defendants’ clergy employees does not, by itself, establish a special relationship.”). Plaintiffs claim for breach of a fiduciary duty is therefore DISMISSED.

G. Leave to Amend Plaintiff has requested the opportunity to amend her pleadings should this court find her First Amended Complaint in any way deficient. (See Opp. at 21.) Leave to amend a party’s pleadings “shall be freely given” by the court “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The court declines to grant leave to amend but concludes that Plaintiff may seek this court’s leave to amend within 30 days of the date of this Memorandum & Order. While Plaintiff has amended her complaint once, the court notes that this is the first adjudication of Plaintiffs claims on the merits. Ac- cordingly, if Plaintiff finds that she can, in good faith, clarify the timeline of factual allegations regarding her alleged abuse and plead with particularity facts showing that a special relationship existed between Plaintiff and both St. Mary’s and the Brooklyn Diocese, she may seek leave to file a Second Amended Complaint outlining the amendments that purport to resolve these issues.

V. CONCLUSION For the aforementioned reasons, Defendants St. Mary’s and Brooklyn Diocese’s motions to dismiss are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendants’ motions are DENIED with respect to Plaintiffs negligence claim. Defendants’ motions are GRANTED without prejudice with respect to Plaintiffs claims for negligent training, supervision, and retention; premises liability; gross negligence; and breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiff may seek leave to amend her complaint within 30 days of the date of this Memorandum and Order,

SO ORDERED,

Dated: Brooklyn, New York January 4 2024 s/Nicholas G, Garaufis NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS United States District Judge