IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
LAFFON GLYMPH, No. 85539-5-I
Appellant, DIVISION ONE v.
OMR R.A. SERVICES LLC, UNPUBLISHED OPINION OVERLAKE HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Respondent.
SMITH, C.J. — Laffon Glymph was admitted to Overlake Hospital for a
tooth infection but after being discharged, she refused to leave the hospital and
was eventually arrested. Glymph later initiated a lawsuit against Overlake
alleging medical malpractice, medical negligence, and a lack of informed
consent, because of the pain medication administered and her eventual arrest.
Overlake moved for summary judgment, pointing to Glymph’s lack of expert
testimony. Following oral argument, the court granted Overlake’s summary
judgment motion.
On appeal, Glymph asserts that she provided facts sufficient to survive
summary judgment and alleges that res ipsa loquitur negates the need for expert
testimony. We disagree and affirm.
FACTS
In October 2018, paramedics took Laffon Glymph to the Overlake Hospital
(Overlake) emergency department after she complained of shortness of breath No. 85539-5-I/2
because of a tooth infection. Once there, a physician administered lorazepam,1
a pain medication and sedative. The medication improved Glymph’s condition
and she was discharged. Once discharged, however, Glymph refused to leave
without a doctor’s note permitting her to take a week off from work. She was told
that her treating doctor would order only one day off and would not write a note
for a week. After about three hours, Overlake called Bellevue Police, who
arrested Glymph for trespass and removed her from the hospital. Glymph told
officers that she did not know why she was being arrested and asserted that she
did not consent to receiving medication from hospital staff.
In October 2022, Glymph filed a lawsuit with the trial court against
Overlake alleging medical malpractice, medical negligence, and a lack of
informed consent. She claimed that she suffered a schedule IV narcotic
overdose and that she was falsely arrested and wrongfully trespassed from
Overlake. In response, Overlake moved for summary judgment, arguing that
Glymph failed to provide competent expert testimony to support her claims.
Glymph then asserted res ipsa loquitur, contending that it negated her need for
expert testimony. Following oral argument, the trial court granted Overlake’s
motion for summary judgment. The court noted that Glymph had not provided
facts sufficient to survive summary judgment nor expert testimony to support her
claims. The court further noted that Glymph failed to provide any evidence of
damages to support her claims.
Glymph appeals.
1 Lorazepam is the generic name for Ativan.
2 No. 85539-5-I/3
ANALYSIS
Summary Judgment
We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, engaging in
the same inquiry as the trial court. Keck v. Collins, 184 Wn.2d 358, 370, 357
P.3d 1080 (2015). We consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Keck, 184 Wn.2d at
370. Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue exists as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
CR 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists “if reasonable minds could
differ on facts which control the outcome of the proceeding.” Ghodsee v. City of
Kent, 21 Wn. App. 2d 762, 768, 508 P.3d 193 (2022). A party opposing
summary judgment cannot rely simply on allegations, denials, opinions, or
conclusory statements, but instead must provide specific facts establishing a
genuine issue for trial. Allen v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd., 138 Wn. App. 564, 570, 157
P.3d 406 (2007). We hold pro se litigants to the same standards as attorneys.
Winter v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 12 Wn. App. 2d 815, 844, 460 P.3d 667
(2020).
Medical Negligence
Glymph alleges that Overlake committed medical negligence by
administering lorazepam and in allowing her arrest on hospital property. But
because Glymph fails to explain how the hospital’s administration of medication
violated the standard of care, we disagree.
3 No. 85539-5-I/4
To prevail on a claim of medical negligence based on a breach of the
standard of care, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) “the health care provider
failed to exercise that degree of care, skill, and learning expected of a reasonably
prudent health care provider at that time in the profession or class to which he or
she belongs, in the state of Washington, acting in the same or similar
circumstances,” and that (2) “such failure was a proximate cause of the injury
complained of.” RCW 7.70.040(1)(a), (2)(a)(ii). Importantly, the plaintiff must
establish actual injury. RCW 7.70.040. Expert testimony is generally required to
establish the standard of care and to prove causation. Behr v. Anderson, 18 Wn.
App. 2d 341, 363, 491 P.3d 189 (2021).
Glymph contends that an Overlake doctor administered a schedule IV
narcotic to her, resulting in an overdose and her eventual arrest. But Glymph
does not provide any specific evidence supporting her assertion that she suffered
a narcotic overdose and does not explain how the doses of lorazepam she
received constitute an overdose. Without additional evidence or facts, this bare
assertion is not sufficient to show that Overlake breached the standard of care.
As to her arrest, Glymph provides documentation that she was arrested
but does not provide any evidence as to how her arrest demonstrates that
Overlake breached its standard of care. Glymph provides no expert testimony or
other evidence that the arrest was improper and she does not explain how any
health care provider’s alleged failure to exercise the requisite degree of care
relates to her arrest. This is again insufficient to establish a genuine issue able
to survive summary judgment.
4 No. 85539-5-I/5
Because Glymph failed to prove that Overlake breached its standard of
care, the trial court did not err in dismissing Glymph’s medical negligence claim.
Res Ipsa Loquitur
In response to Overlake’s motion for summary judgment, Glymph argued
that she is exempt from providing expert testimony because of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur. We disagree.
Res ipsa loquitur “spares the plaintiff the requirement of proving specific
acts of negligence in cases where a plaintiff asserts that [they] suffered injury, the
cause of which cannot be fully explained, and the injury is of a type that would
not ordinarily result if the defendant were not negligent.” Pacheco v. Ames, 149
Wn.2d 431, 436, 69 P.3d 324 (2003). Res ipsa loquitur is applicable only when
the evidence shows that (1) the incident producing the injury is of a kind which
ordinarily does not happen without negligence, (2) the injuries are caused by an
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
LAFFON GLYMPH, No. 85539-5-I
Appellant, DIVISION ONE v.
OMR R.A. SERVICES LLC, UNPUBLISHED OPINION OVERLAKE HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Respondent.
SMITH, C.J. — Laffon Glymph was admitted to Overlake Hospital for a
tooth infection but after being discharged, she refused to leave the hospital and
was eventually arrested. Glymph later initiated a lawsuit against Overlake
alleging medical malpractice, medical negligence, and a lack of informed
consent, because of the pain medication administered and her eventual arrest.
Overlake moved for summary judgment, pointing to Glymph’s lack of expert
testimony. Following oral argument, the court granted Overlake’s summary
judgment motion.
On appeal, Glymph asserts that she provided facts sufficient to survive
summary judgment and alleges that res ipsa loquitur negates the need for expert
testimony. We disagree and affirm.
FACTS
In October 2018, paramedics took Laffon Glymph to the Overlake Hospital
(Overlake) emergency department after she complained of shortness of breath No. 85539-5-I/2
because of a tooth infection. Once there, a physician administered lorazepam,1
a pain medication and sedative. The medication improved Glymph’s condition
and she was discharged. Once discharged, however, Glymph refused to leave
without a doctor’s note permitting her to take a week off from work. She was told
that her treating doctor would order only one day off and would not write a note
for a week. After about three hours, Overlake called Bellevue Police, who
arrested Glymph for trespass and removed her from the hospital. Glymph told
officers that she did not know why she was being arrested and asserted that she
did not consent to receiving medication from hospital staff.
In October 2022, Glymph filed a lawsuit with the trial court against
Overlake alleging medical malpractice, medical negligence, and a lack of
informed consent. She claimed that she suffered a schedule IV narcotic
overdose and that she was falsely arrested and wrongfully trespassed from
Overlake. In response, Overlake moved for summary judgment, arguing that
Glymph failed to provide competent expert testimony to support her claims.
Glymph then asserted res ipsa loquitur, contending that it negated her need for
expert testimony. Following oral argument, the trial court granted Overlake’s
motion for summary judgment. The court noted that Glymph had not provided
facts sufficient to survive summary judgment nor expert testimony to support her
claims. The court further noted that Glymph failed to provide any evidence of
damages to support her claims.
Glymph appeals.
1 Lorazepam is the generic name for Ativan.
2 No. 85539-5-I/3
ANALYSIS
Summary Judgment
We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, engaging in
the same inquiry as the trial court. Keck v. Collins, 184 Wn.2d 358, 370, 357
P.3d 1080 (2015). We consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Keck, 184 Wn.2d at
370. Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue exists as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
CR 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists “if reasonable minds could
differ on facts which control the outcome of the proceeding.” Ghodsee v. City of
Kent, 21 Wn. App. 2d 762, 768, 508 P.3d 193 (2022). A party opposing
summary judgment cannot rely simply on allegations, denials, opinions, or
conclusory statements, but instead must provide specific facts establishing a
genuine issue for trial. Allen v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd., 138 Wn. App. 564, 570, 157
P.3d 406 (2007). We hold pro se litigants to the same standards as attorneys.
Winter v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 12 Wn. App. 2d 815, 844, 460 P.3d 667
(2020).
Medical Negligence
Glymph alleges that Overlake committed medical negligence by
administering lorazepam and in allowing her arrest on hospital property. But
because Glymph fails to explain how the hospital’s administration of medication
violated the standard of care, we disagree.
3 No. 85539-5-I/4
To prevail on a claim of medical negligence based on a breach of the
standard of care, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) “the health care provider
failed to exercise that degree of care, skill, and learning expected of a reasonably
prudent health care provider at that time in the profession or class to which he or
she belongs, in the state of Washington, acting in the same or similar
circumstances,” and that (2) “such failure was a proximate cause of the injury
complained of.” RCW 7.70.040(1)(a), (2)(a)(ii). Importantly, the plaintiff must
establish actual injury. RCW 7.70.040. Expert testimony is generally required to
establish the standard of care and to prove causation. Behr v. Anderson, 18 Wn.
App. 2d 341, 363, 491 P.3d 189 (2021).
Glymph contends that an Overlake doctor administered a schedule IV
narcotic to her, resulting in an overdose and her eventual arrest. But Glymph
does not provide any specific evidence supporting her assertion that she suffered
a narcotic overdose and does not explain how the doses of lorazepam she
received constitute an overdose. Without additional evidence or facts, this bare
assertion is not sufficient to show that Overlake breached the standard of care.
As to her arrest, Glymph provides documentation that she was arrested
but does not provide any evidence as to how her arrest demonstrates that
Overlake breached its standard of care. Glymph provides no expert testimony or
other evidence that the arrest was improper and she does not explain how any
health care provider’s alleged failure to exercise the requisite degree of care
relates to her arrest. This is again insufficient to establish a genuine issue able
to survive summary judgment.
4 No. 85539-5-I/5
Because Glymph failed to prove that Overlake breached its standard of
care, the trial court did not err in dismissing Glymph’s medical negligence claim.
Res Ipsa Loquitur
In response to Overlake’s motion for summary judgment, Glymph argued
that she is exempt from providing expert testimony because of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur. We disagree.
Res ipsa loquitur “spares the plaintiff the requirement of proving specific
acts of negligence in cases where a plaintiff asserts that [they] suffered injury, the
cause of which cannot be fully explained, and the injury is of a type that would
not ordinarily result if the defendant were not negligent.” Pacheco v. Ames, 149
Wn.2d 431, 436, 69 P.3d 324 (2003). Res ipsa loquitur is applicable only when
the evidence shows that (1) the incident producing the injury is of a kind which
ordinarily does not happen without negligence, (2) the injuries are caused by an
agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and
(3) the plaintiff did not contribute to the injury or accident-causing occurrence.
Ripley v. Lanzer, 152 Wn. App. 296, 307, 215 P.3d 1020 (2009). The doctrine is
disfavored and only sparingly applied by courts, in “exceptional cases[,] where
the facts and demands of justice make its application essential.” Jackass Mt.
Ranch, Inc., v. S. Columbia Basin Irrig. Dist., 175 Wn. App. 374, 400, 305 P.3d
1108 (2013).
Although Glymph contends that she satisfied all three requirements of her
res ipsa loquitur claim, she does not, in fact, offer any evidence to support her
claim.
5 No. 85539-5-I/6
As to the first element, Glymph cannot establish that her alleged injuries
are of a kind which ordinarily do not happen without negligence. Glymph asserts
two injuries: a narcotic overdose and her arrest.
She provides no evidence that she suffered a narcotic overdose. Glymph
appears to assert that her doctor administered too much lorazepam, causing the
behavior that prompted her arrest and limiting her memory of the incident. But
she fails to establish that the amount of medication she was given caused an
overdose or is sufficient to do so. The side effects of an appropriately
administered medication cannot be considered an injury which ordinarily does
not happen without negligence.
Glymph also fails to provide evidence proving that her arrest was an injury
resulting from negligence. Glymph acknowledges that she does not remember
the behavior that prompted her arrest. The patient advocate nurse clarified that
she was arrested for trespassing because, despite being discharged, she would
not leave the hospital without a note indicating that she was to take a week off
work. But Glymph provides no evidence that the arrest was improper, much less
that it was an injury resulting from medical negligence.
Because Glymph cannot meet the first res ipsa loquitur factor, her claim
fails and the trial court did not err in dismissing it on summary judgment.2
2 In support of its assertion that Glymph fails to meet the third res ipsa loquitur factor, Overlake repeatedly refers to a lawsuit that Glymph brought against the City of Bellevue and the Bellevue Police Department. That case is not at issue here.
6 No. 85539-5-I/7
Informed Consent
Lastly, Glymph asserts that the lorazepam was administered without her
informed consent. Because she provides no evidence to support this claim, we
conclude that the court did not err in dismissing Glymph’s claim at summary
judgment.
To succeed on an informed consent claim, a plaintiff must establish
“(a) [t]hat the healthcare provider failed to inform the patient of material fact or
facts relating to the treatment; (b) [t]hat the patient consented to the treatment
without being aware of or fully informed of such material fact or facts; (c) [t]hat a
reasonably prudent patient under similar circumstances would not have
consented to the treatment if informed of such material fact or facts; [and]
(d) [t]hat the treatment in question proximately caused injury to the patient.”
RCW 7.70.050.
Glymph does not address any of these factors. Rather, Glymph’s opening
brief states that “[t]his is a claim for Medical Malpractice, the cause of this claim
is Schedule IV narcotic overdose, lack of informed consent,” but this is the only
detail she provides. Glymph did not identify an employee or agent who failed to
obtain informed consent or state the information they failed to provide. And,
once again, Glymph did not offer any expert testimony. Without that expert
testimony on the issue, or truly any evidence regarding facts relating to treatment
that she was not informed of, Overlake clearly establishes a lack of genuine
issue of material fact. Glymph’s informed consent claim cannot survive summary
7 No. 85539-5-I/8
We affirm.
WE CONCUR: