STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
WCA 18-760
LADESSA CAROL LEBLANC
VERSUS
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
**********
APPEAL FROM THE OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION - # 4 PARISH OF VERMILION, NO. 16-03594 ADAM C. JOHNSON, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION JUDGE
JOHN E. CONERY JUDGE
Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Billy Howard Ezell, and John E. Conery, Judges.
REVERSED AND REMANDED. Matthew Douglas McConnell McConnell Law Offices 1021 Coolidge Boulevard Lafayette, Louisiana 70503 (337) 347-6404 COUNSEL FOR CLAIMANT/APPELLANT: Ladessa Carol LeBlanc
Sylvia M. Fordice Assistant Attorney General Louisiana Department of Justice, Division of Risk Management 556 Jefferson Street, 4th Floor Lafayette, Louisiana 70501 (337) 262-1700 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE: Louisiana Department of Education CONERY, Judge.
The claimant, Ladessa Carol LeBlanc, appeals the ruling of the Workers’
Compensation Judge (WCJ) dismissing her Disputed Claim For Compensation
(Form 1008) on the basis that she was not within the course and scope of her
employment with the Louisiana Department of Education (DOE). After her
termination from the DOE on November 22, 2015, she claims to have sustained on-
the-job injuries while returning her files and equipment at the DOE’s request on
February 3, 2016. For the following reasons, we reverse.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The State of Louisiana employed Mrs. LeBlanc for eighteen years and five
months. Her most recent position, which she had held for approximately the
previous eight years, was as a Licensing Specialist II with the DOE. Mrs. LeBlanc’s
duties involved investigation and inspection of both licensed and unlicensed daycare
facilities. Accordingly, she worked from her home in Abbeville, Louisiana, and
maintained in her possession for use in her work duties both equipment and files
belonging to the DOE.
Beginning on July 7, 2015, Mrs. LeBlanc took temporary sick leave from her
position for stress and mental health reasons stemming from alleged sexual
harassment.1 In correspondence dated November 2, 2015, from Shelia Campbell,
Program Manager 2 - Social Services Division of Licensing, and copied to Mr. Jason
Hannaman, the Human Resources Director, Mrs. LeBlanc was notified as follows:
As of today, you have fewer than eight hours of sick leave and you are medically unable to perform the essential functions of your job as a 1 Mrs. LeBlanc filed a separate workers’ compensation Form 1008 claim on December 18, 2015, subsequent to her termination, claiming that her stress leave was due to the sexual harassment of a former supervisor. That claim was dismissed on summary judgment, which is now final and is not at issue herein. Licensing Specialist. Therefore, I propose to non-disciplinarily remove you from your position under Civil Service Rule 12.6(a)1, which provides:
12.6 Non-disciplinary Removals.
(a) An employee may be non-disciplinarily removed under the following circumstances:
1. When, on the date of the notice required by Rule 12.7 is mailed, hand delivered, or orally given, the employee is unable to perform the essential functions of his job due to illness or medical disability and has fewer than eight hours of sick leave. An employee removed under this provision shall be paid for all remaining sick leave.
You have the right to respond to this proposed action. This is your opportunity to explain why you should not be removed. To be considered, your response should be received in writing by 1:00 p.m. on Wednesday, November 11, 2015. For your convenience, your response may be faxed . . . or emailed . . . .
Mrs. LeBlanc did not timely respond to the November 2, 2015 correspondence,
and on November 13, 2015, she was sent correspondence from State Superintendent
of Education, John White, informing her that she was to be formally removed from
her position with the DOE pursuant to Civil Service Rule 12.6(a), effective “at the
close of business on Sunday, November 22, 2015.” Mrs. LeBlanc was further
informed that since this was a non-disciplinary removal, she was entitled to retain
certain eligibilities should she seek state employment in the future. The November
2, 2015 correspondence was also copied to Ms. Campbell, Mr. Hannaman, and
Ashley Dorsey-Foster, Program Manager I - Social Services.
On December 8, 2015, Ms. Joan Hunt, Executive Counsel for the DOE,
responded to letters dated November 9 and November 29, 2015, from Mrs.
LeBlanc’s attorney, Mr. Matthew McConnell, objecting to the DOE contacting Mrs.
LeBlanc directly when she was represented by counsel. The DOE responded to Mr.
2 McConnell that it was entitled to “contact its employees directly regarding
employment issues,” despite Mrs. LeBlanc’s “non-disciplinary removal” from her
position in accordance with Louisiana Civil Service Rule 12.6(a)1. Accordingly,
Mr. McConnell was also informed that the “Human Resources staff from the
Department will be contacting Mrs. LeBlanc this week to schedule a date and time
for her to return the following equipment owned by the Department.” A listing of
eleven items followed in the correspondence which Mrs. LeBlanc was expected to
return to what was eventually determined to be the loading dock of the DOE’s
Claiborne Office Building in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Testimony at the hearing
revealed that the December 8, 2015 letter signed by Ms. Hunt had been prepared by
Ms. Denise Brou, also an attorney for the DOE.
On December 9, 2015, in an email to Ms. Brou, counsel for the DOE, Mr.
Hannaman, the DOE Human Resources Director, indicated that he had attempted to
call Mrs. LeBlanc, but reached her father who advised that he needed to refer this
request to her attorney, Mr. McConnell. Mr. Hannaman suggested to Ms. Brou that
Mrs. LeBlanc’s attorney be sent the attached list of equipment and that he be
reminded that the equipment was state-owned property that must be returned to the
DOE by Mrs. LeBlanc.
Also, on December 9, 2015, in an email from Mr. Hannaman to Ms. Brou, he
indicated that Mrs. LeBlanc had left him a message to call her. Mr. Hannaman
returned Mrs. LeBlanc’s call, and she explained her situation. She told him she did
not see how she could return the equipment from her home in Abbeville, Louisiana,
as she had not received a release to work from her medical provider. The record
reflects that Mrs. LeBlanc was being treated for Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome
(PTSD) and Acute Anxiety Disorder. Mr. Hannaman advised Mrs. LeBlanc that her
3 attorney had been notified about the equipment and that maybe she could coordinate
with him. Mr. Hannaman testified at the hearing that after speaking with Mrs.
LeBlanc for the first time on December 9, 2015, he learned she had been on medical
leave prior to her termination and was not yet released to work by her medical
provider.
Upon obtaining this information, Mr. Hannaman emailed Debbie Threeton,
Operational Support Services Administrative Program Specialist for the DOE. In
the email he informed Ms. Threeton that Mrs. LeBlanc was no longer an employee
of DOE. He further stated, “We are working with her representatives to retrieve the
property listed below . . . however we are unsure of the time it may take to retrieve
these items.” Mr. Hannaman requested that Ms. Threeton “deactivate any services
currently attached to any of this equipment.” Ms. Threeton responded that she
intended to “temporally [sic] suspend the service to the iphone and the MiFi.”
The email correspondence on December 9, 2015, appears to be the last contact
made with Mrs. LeBlanc until the middle of January. Under direct examination at
the hearing, Mr. Hannaman testified he did not mention to Mrs. LeBlanc anything
about picking up what turned out to be seven boxes of files from her home, along
with the listed equipment contained in the December 8, 2015 letter from Ms. Hunt.
“Nor did anyone else say anything to him about picking up the files from her home.”
Nonetheless, on cross-examination at the hearing, a discussion ensued about
the ability of Mrs. LeBlanc to return the equipment when Mr. Hannaman was
specifically asked:
Q So, you never said anything to Ladessa LeBlanc saying you have to return it by date X?
A I don’t recall having something where I said having to return by date X. It was an attempt to retrieve the equipment in a timely fashion.
4 Q Yes, your goal was to get the equipment back?
A Right. Because we have - -
Q And as far as you know, or maybe you don’t know about confidential case files, investigation files. Is that your bailiwick?
A No. My only knowledge was of the equipment as outlined in this letter [December 8, 2015]. The technology.
Mr. Hannaman was then questioned on cross-examination about Mrs.
LeBlanc’s prior testimony that she had requested that the DOE come to her home in
Abbeville, Louisiana, to pick up the equipment and file materials in her possession.
Q Okay. So[,] she requested at some point that the State come pick the stuff up?
A I believe that there was, yes, there was - -
Q In January.
A Yes, January - - I think it was January 25, 2016, and then - -
Q I’ll show you an earlier one as well, see if your remember this, Exhibit B-4?
A Is it 19? And, I’m not sure.
Q So it looks like on the 19th, she [Mrs. LeBlanc] said I’m requesting the State Office pick up their equipment from my home next week instead of this week? Do you recall that”
A I don’t recall, but this is the email.[2]
Q Okay, so at least on the 19th and then on the 25th, Exhibit B-5, she requested that the State pick the things up and at some point, I guess it was advised to her that the State wasn’t going to be picking it up? Or is this when we were all trying to communicate through various different people?
2 The email of January 19, 2016 indicated that Mrs. LeBlanc’s children were ill with the flu and Mrs. LeBlanc did not want them to be present when the equipment was picked up by the DOE. She further requested that certain members of the DOE staff not be present. Finally, she stated, “please let me know when the State Office (LDOE) has made proper arrangements to pick up my equipment from my home next week.”
5 A I believe that’s when we were trying to communicate through various different people. It was - -I didn’t, again my understanding was that she was she was upset with the entire process and how things had unfolded, so sending someone to a private residence, I did not find to be - -
Q Wouldn’t work for you?
A Wasn’t going to be in the best interest of general safety.
During her testimony Ms. Brou indicated that Mr. Hannaman was her primary
contact and that it was her understanding they were working through Mr. McConnell,
Mrs. LeBlanc’s attorney, to get the equipment back. Ms. Brou testified, “that was
good for us, because that took us out of the issue of sending a person, which we were
not going to do, sending a person to her house. If it got to his office, we’d have
picked it up.”
Ms. Brou testified she attempted to call Mr. McConnell twice, on January 22,
2016, and January 28, 2016, with no response. However, a subsequent email from
Mr. McConnell indicates he attempted to return Ms. Brou’s call and was left on hold
“indefinitely.” Nonetheless, on the afternoon of January 28, 2016, Ms. Brou sent an
email requesting that Mr. McConnell assist with having Mrs. LeBlanc return the
equipment, and enclosed a list of the items. Later that same afternoon, Mr.
McConnell forwarded Ms. Brou’s email to Mrs. LeBlanc and stated, “I believe the
plan was for you to get the property back to them.”
On the morning of January 29, 2016, Mrs. LeBlanc sent an email to Mr.
McConnell and copied Ms. Brou. Her email indicated she had spoken with Ms. Brou
and they had arranged for a return of all “State Issued Equipment” to the Claiborne
Office Building on Wednesday, February 3, 2016, between 10:00 a.m. and 10:30
a.m. Mc LeBlanc further indicated in her email that she had advised Ms. Brou that
6 she had attempted through various calls and emails to contact Mr. Hannaman, but
had received no confirmation of how the return of the equipment was to be handled.
On the morning of January 29, 2016, at approximately the same time, Ms.
Brou sent an email to Mr. McConnell confirming the return of the equipment on
February 3, 2016, to the Claiborne Office Building, the location designated by the
DOE. Ms. Brou also indicated, “Our Human Resources director, Jason Hannaman
and I will meet her to receive the equipment.” Mr. McConnell responded to Ms.
Brou, “Thank you. I wasn’t aware she would do that. Sounds like it is being
handled.”
As instructed by Ms. Brou, on the morning of February 3, 2016, Mrs. LeBlanc
and her father, Francis Plaisance, loaded up the equipment, which also included the
filing cabinet and seven boxes of files, for return to the Claiborne Office Building,
in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Due to the heavy traffic, they were unable to make the
anticipated 10:00 to 10:30 a.m. time of delivery. Mrs. LeBlanc called and notified
Ms. Brou’s administrative assistant that they would not arrive until 1:00 p.m.
Mrs. LeBlanc had been told that either Ms. Brou or Mr. Hannaman would
meet her, neither were available when they arrived at the designated DOE office at
the Claiborne Building. Mr. Hannaman was home with a sick child and Ms. Brou
was otherwise engaged at the actual delivery time of 1:00 p.m. Mrs. LeBlanc and
her father were instructed by Aarika Spruel-Dorcy, Mr. Hannaman’s second in
command, to go to the back of the building to the loading dock where they were met
by Ms. Spruel-Dorcy. Ms. Brou testified that she never told Mrs. LeBlanc that
someone would “help them unload anything,” but that “someone will meet you… it
wasn’t arranged for somebody to load boxes. No.”
7 On cross-examination, Ms. Brou admitted that the files in Mrs. LeBlanc’s
possession contained “criminal background checks,” “social security numbers,” and
“identifiable information for minors and their health information,” which she agreed
was confidential and should have been returned to the DOE or shredded.
Further, although the DOE did not make a formal demand that the files be
returned, Ms. Brou testified that in a telephone conversation with Mrs. LeBlanc “she
mentioned something about the files to me, and I didn’t tell her not to bring them, …
so she was going to bring them and I just said, fine. We’ll see you then.” When
asked if she agreed that Mrs. LeBlanc could bring the files, Ms. Brou responded,
“Yeah, I didn’t tell her she couldn’t, so if that’s agreeing, yeah. I agreed.”
Additionally, on cross examination, Ms. Brou clarified that the DOE had made
it clear that it had the right to communicate with Mr. McConnell’s client, Mrs.
LeBlanc, based on her prior employment and the requirement that she return the
DOE’s property. Therefore, it would have been consistent with the DOE’s letter of
December 8, 2015, for the DOE to coordinate with Mrs. LeBlanc for the return of
the property. When Ms. Brou was questioned about how Mr. McConnell became
involved, she agreed that both Mrs. LeBlanc and Mr. McConnell were attempting to
work with the DOE for the return of the property, but ultimately Mrs. LeBlanc was
responsible for the return of the DOE’s property.
On February 3, 2016, Ms. Spruel-Dorcy oversaw the return by Mrs. LeBlanc
and her father of the equipment, the filing cabinet, and seven boxes of files to the
loading dock at the Claiborne Office Building, as designated by the DOE. After the
equipment was returned on February 3, 2016, there was an email exchange between
Ms. Spruel-Dorcy and Ms. Brou wherein Ms. Spruel-Dorcy discussed the details of
8 the return of the DOE property by Mrs. LeBlanc. Ms. Spruel-Dorcy reported that
the items were returned and taken to “Licensing.”
It was during unloading of the DOE’s property, more specifically the files, that
Mrs. LeBlanc claims she injured her shoulder, neck, elbow, wrist, and right hand,
for which she required medical attention later that day. Her claimed injuries
ultimately led Mrs. LeBlanc to file a Form 1008 seeking workers’ compensation
benefits. The WCJ found in favor of the DOE on the basis that Mrs. LeBlanc had
been terminated on November 22, 2015, and therefore was no longer in the course
and scope of her employment at the time of her alleged injury on February 3, 2016.
It is from the WCJ’s December 11, 2017 judgment that Mrs. LeBlanc has timely
appealed.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
Mrs. LeBlanc appeals the WCJ’s ruling asserting four assignments of error:
1. The trial court’s finding, that Le[B]lanc’s injury did not occur within the reasonable period of time after termination for winding up her affairs, was legal error. Ardoin v. Cleco Power, L.L.C., [10-815] (La. [7/2/10]), 38 So.3d 264, 266 [ ] holds that to determine whether an employee’s post-termination injury while winding up the employment occurred within a reasonable period of time, i.e., within the course and scope of work, there are two relevant factors:
a. the purpose that prompted the employee to return, and
b. the relationship between that purpose and the conditions surrounding his work.
The trial court distinguished Le[B]lanc’s case from Ardoin because of time, which is not a relevant factor per Ardoin. The trial court erred because it did not consider the Ardoin factors and only considered time.
2. Where Le[B]lanc was motivated by the employer’s requirement that she return the employer’s property to the employer’s premises to wind up her employment, the trial court legally erred by failing to consider the two Ardoin factors but instead strictly count[ed] time/days between termination and injury.
9 3. Where Le[B]lanc was unable to report to work for health reasons when she was terminated for running out of sick leave and where her superiors required her to return the employer’s property to the employer’s premises but told Le[B]lanc she could return the property whenever she felt she could, i.e., to take all the time she needed, the trial court legally erred by failing to consider the two Ardoin, factors but instead strictly count[ed] time/days between termination and injury to determine course and scope.
4. The trial court legally erred in failing to find that Le[B]lanc suffered a disabling injury within the course and scope of her employment and in failing to award indemnity and medical benefits as well as attorney’s fees and penalties for the denial.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Standard Of Review
Factual findings in workers’ compensation cases are subject to the manifest
error or clearly wrong standard of appellate review. Smith v. La. Dep’t. of Corrs.,
93-1305 (La. 2/28/94), 633 So.2d 129. Nevertheless, “when legal error interdicts
the fact-finding process in a workers’ compensation case, the manifest error or
clearly wrong standard of review no longer applies and de novo review of the matter
is required.” Gaines v. Home Care Solutions, LLC, 15-895, p. 9 (La.App. 4 Cir.
4/6/16), 192 So.3d 794, 801 (citing Marti v. City of New Orleans, 12-1514 (La.App.
4 Cir. 4/10/13), 115 So.3d 541), writ denied, 16-847 (La. 6/17/16), 192 So.3d 765.
“‘Likewise, interpretation of statutes pertaining to workers’ compensation is a
question of law and warrants de novo review to determine if the ruling was legally
correct.’” Id. (quoting Tulane Univ. Hosp. & Clinic v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 11-
0179, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/29/11), 70 So.3d 988, 990).
“An employee’s exclusive remedy against his employer for injuries suffered
in the course and scope of his employment is limited to recovery pursuant to the
Workers’ Compensation Act. [La.R.S.] 23:1032.” Ardoin v. Cleco Power, L.L.C.,
10 10-815, p. 2 (La. 7/2/10), 38 So.3d 264, 265. This case involves the statutory
interpretation of the “course and scope” of an employee’s employment after
termination. Therefore, we will conduct a de novo review of the WCJ’s ruling in
favor of the DOE which found that that Mrs. LeBlanc did not carry her burden of
proof that she was in the “course and scope” of her employment at the time of the
incident at issue.
Assignment of Errors One, Two and Three
Mrs. LeBlanc’s first three assignments of error all urge that the WCJ failed to
apply the two relevant factors described by the supreme court in Ardoin, 38 So.3d
264, which apply when a determination must be made by the trial court as to whether
and under what circumstances an employee who has been terminated is still entitled
to the protections of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Accordingly, we will address
these three assignments of error together.
In Ardoin, the Louisiana Supreme Court explained:
An employee’s exclusive remedy against his employer for injuries suffered in the course and scope of his employment is limited to recovery pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act. La.[R.S.] 23:1032. Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, § 26.01 instructs:
Compensation coverage is not automatically and instantaneously terminated by the firing or quitting of the employee. The employee is; deemed to be within the course of employment for a reasonable period while winding up his or her affairs and leaving the premises. The difficult question is what is a reasonable period?
See also, Livings v. Reliance Ins. Co., 525 So.2d 620, 622 (La. Ct.App. 3 Cir.1988), writ not considered, 530 So.2d 557 (La.1988); Matthews v. Milwhite - Mud Sales Co., 225 So.2d 391, 395 (La. Ct.App. 3 Cir.1969), writ denied, 254 La. 772, 226 So.2d 526 (1969), writ refused, 255 La. 149, 229 So.2d 732 (1970). The court of appeal correctly observed the few cases dealing with a terminated employee seeking workers’ compensation benefits have been addressed by extrapolating from situations dealing with employees injured on the employer’s premises before or after work. Ardoin, 09-1085 at p.2, 33 So.3d at 422.
11 If the injury occurs during the reasonable period of time for winding up his affairs, the employee is considered to be within the course and scope of employment. Livings, supra; Matthews, supra; see also Carter v. Lanzetta, 249 La. 1098, 193 So.2d 259, 261-262 (1966).
Ardoin, 38 So.3d at 265-66.
The Ardoin court further instructed that the relevant factors to be considered
in determining whether an injury occurred within a reasonable time for winding up
an employee’s affairs are “the purpose that prompted him to return and the
relationship between that purpose and the conditions surrounding his work. See 13
H. Alston Johnson III, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise–Workers’ Compensation, § 167,
p. 336 (4th ed 2002).” Ardoin, 38 So.3d at 266.
The Ardoin court then found that based on the facts in that case “Ardoin was
within a reasonable period of time to wind up his affairs,” and stated:
Ardoin was on the Eunice premises with Cleco’s permission to clean out his office after being terminated. Cleco allowed Ardoin to do this on the Monday following the discharge that occurred on Friday in Opelousas. It is immaterial that Cleco avers it considered any of its property Ardoin attempted to return on Monday insignificant . . . . It was undisputed that Cleco permitted Ardoin to go to his office on Monday to remove his personal effects. Under these circumstances, we find as a matter of law Ardoin was within a reasonable period of time to wind up his affairs.
Id. (Citation omitted.)
Workers’ Compensation Judge’s Reasons for Ruling
The WCJ, after summarizing the testimony of the individuals from the DOE
involved in the attempt to retrieve the property of the DOE from Mrs. LeBlanc,
distinguished Ardoin only on the basis of the amount of time that it took for Mrs.
LeBlanc to coordinate with the DOE employees to facilitate the return of the
equipment and files in her possession: “The Court finds that this case is
distinguishable from Ardoin in that Ardoin was discharged on a Friday, and the next
12 Monday Ardoin was injured cleaning out his office. In this case, the alleged accident
was 73 days from termination and 56 days from the December 8, [2015]
correspondence.”
In only considering the time period between Mrs. LeBlanc’s termination on
November 22, 2015 and the December 8, 2015 correspondence from the DOE, to the
time of Mrs. LeBlanc’s injury on February 3, 2016, the WCJ failed to apply the two
relevant factors of Ardoin which must be examined in order to determine “what was
a reasonable period of time for the winding up” of employment. Id.
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Ardoin instructed that the first factor to be
considered is the “purpose” that required Mrs. LeBlanc to return to the DOE’s
Claiborne Office Building location in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. In Mrs. LeBlanc’s
case, she worked remotely in Abbeville, Louisiana. Her work as a Licensing
Specialist II inspecting daycare centers required her to work out of her home in
Abbeville, Louisiana, and have in her possession certain equipment and file
materials which the DOE demanded be returned after her termination on November
22, 2015. The record is clear that Mrs. LeBlanc was at the Claiborne Office Building
on February 3, 2016, at the invitation, indeed the demand, of the DOE for her to
return the equipment and, arguably, the files belonging to the DOE.
The second factor in Ardoin requires a consideration of the “relationship”
between the purpose of the return to the DOE premises and the conditions
surrounding her work. As previously stated, Mrs. LeBlanc worked remotely, and
therefore, the equipment and files necessary for her employment with the DOE were
kept at her home in Abbeville. Once again, the DOE expected and required that
those items in Mrs. LeBlanc’s possession be returned, and required that they be
delivered to the DOE’s Claiborne Office Building location, as the DOE refused to
13 send someone to pick up the files and equipment from Mrs. LeBlanc’s home, citing
“security reasons.”
As in Ardoin, we find the two required factors have been met. Mrs. LeBlanc
was at the Claiborne Office Building at the instruction of the DOE to return the
equipment and files in her possession as required by her former employer for the
“winding up” of her employment. The question then becomes whether the return of
her equipment and files on February 3, 2016, constitutes a reasonable period of time
to consider Mrs. LeBlanc to still be in the course and scope of her employment with
the DOE.
The WCJ only counted the days between her termination on November 22,
2015 and the letter from the DOE on December 8, 2015 and the February 3, 2016
return of the equipment. We find under the facts of this case that the DOE never set
a date certain for the return of the equipment, and it was further aware of Mrs.
LeBlanc’s medical condition when the initial request for return of the equipment was
made in the December 8, 2015 correspondence.
Further, the emails and testimony at the hearing reflect that Mrs. LeBlanc and
her counsel engaged in good faith negotiations with the staff at the DOE, who by
their own admission did not set a deadline for the return of the equipment and file
materials by Mrs. LeBlanc. The testimony and documentation support a finding by
this court that there was no agreement reached between Mrs. LeBlanc and the DOE
for the required return of the equipment and file materials until Friday, January 29,
2016. All parties then agreed upon a date certain, February 3, 2016. This date is
confirmed in an email correspondence between Ms. Brou, counsel for the DOE, and
Mr. McConnell, counsel for Mrs. LeBlanc. Considering that January 30 and 31,
2016, were weekend days, only two business days elapsed before the return of the
14 equipment and files by Mrs. Leblanc and her father on February 3, 2016, to the DOE.
Accordingly, we find that Mrs. LeBlanc acted within a reasonable period of time to
wind up her affairs with the DOE and therefore was within the course and scope of
her employment when she claims she was injured while unloading file boxes at the
DOE’s facility in accordance with the DOE’s request.
Assignment of Error Four
In her assignment of error number four, Mrs. LeBlanc claims the trial court
legally erred by failing to find that her injury was in the course and scope of her
employment and that she was entitled to indemnity and medical benefits, in addition
to attorney fees and penalties. The WCJ found that Mrs. LeBlanc was not in the
course and scope of her employment with the DOE and thus not entitled to workers’
compensation benefits resulting from her claimed injuries. Therefore, the WCJ
made no ruling on whether or not Mrs. LeBlanc suffered disabling injuries while
unloading DOE’s property at its facility.
Moreover, in its “ANSWER WITH A REQUEST FOR PRELIMINARY
DETERMINATION,” the DOE specifically outlined several alternative requests for
relief if the WCJ, or by extension this court, were to find the “Defendant [DOE]
liable for any workers’ compensation benefits.” In Paragraph 2, of its answer, the
DOE seeks “entitlement to any offset and/or offsets as per La. R.S. 23:1225 and/or
La. R.S. 23:1212 and/or La. R.S. 23:1223 and/or La. R.S. 23:1206.” In Paragraph
3, the DOE “reserves the right to amend its answer to plead the affirmative defenses
of misrepresentations as per La. R.S. 23:1208 and in particular, Section (E) of
23:1208 and La. R.S. 23:1208.1.”
Therefore, considering that this court has found that Mrs. LeBlanc was within
the course and scope of winding up her employment with the DOE, and thus is
15 covered by the workers’ compensation act, La.R.S. 23:1032, we do not make any
determination of the specific benefits, attorney fees or penalties, if any, to which she
may be entitled and that may be owed by DOE. Instead we remand all remaining
issues to the WCJ to determine Mrs. LeBlanc’s right to workers’ compensation
benefits and all related issues.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the Workers’ Compensation Judge’s
December 11, 2017 judgment in favor of the Louisiana Department of Education
and find that claimant Ladessa Carol LeBlanc was within the course and scope of
her former employment with the Louisiana Department of Education on February 3,
2016. All remaining issues are remanded to the Workers’ Compensation Judge for
decision consistent with the opinions expressed herein. All costs of this proceeding
are assessed to the Louisiana Department of Education.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.