Lacy v. United States

105 F. Supp. 601, 42 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 384, 1952 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4200
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedJuly 24, 1952
DocketNo. 49-C-1495
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 105 F. Supp. 601 (Lacy v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lacy v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 601, 42 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 384, 1952 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4200 (N.D. Ill. 1952).

Opinion

PERRY, District Judge.

The sole issue of fact and law presented by the pleadings and evidence is whether 500 shares of Class A stock in Van Schaack Bros. Chemical Works, Inc., purchased by plaintiff, Kenneth B. Lacy, for $10,000 in 1926, became worthless during 1944. If the stock did become worthless, then under the provisions of Section 23(e) (2) and (g)(2), Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. § 23(e)(2), (g)(2), plaintiffs are entitled to a deduction of $1,000 for that year and for each succeeding year through 1948, as a capital loss carry-over permitted by Section 117 Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. § 117(e). If not, judgment should be for the defendant.

The Government contends that a series of events had occurred prior to 1944, when the last asset consisting of improved industrial realty was sold, which established the worthlessness of the plaintiff’s stock. These alleged identifiable events may be summarized as follows:

[602]*6021. The audit of September 30, 1935, filed by the debtor corporation, disclosing that the corporation had not paid taxes for the preceding four years, that it has operated at a loss of $89,646.43 for the preceding nine months, and that working capital had decreased from $51,608.05 from April 30, 1935, when the petition for reorganization was filed under 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 207 to $23,348.53 on September 30, 1935.

2. The stipulation by the debtor corporation of June 7, 1937, that (a) no feasible plan of reorganization of the debtor could be proposed or accepted, (b) that the estate and assets of the debtor should be liquidated, and (c) that it should be adjudicated bankrupt.

3. The cessation of business operations in 1937.

4. The Court order of June 16, 1937, confirming the finding of the Special Master that the aggregate value of the corporation assets was less than the total amount of its liabilities, and that the corporation was unable to submit a fair and feasible plan of reorganization, - and further adjudicating the corporation bankrupt.

5. The Court order of June 16, 1937, appointing a trustee to take possession of the bankrupt’s property for purposes of liquidation.

6. The sworn statement of the bankrupt’s treasurer of July 23, 1937, listing liabilities at that time as $360,000 and the only substantial assets as real estate, plants and equipment of the bankrupt in Chicago, Illinois, and Heath, Ohio.

7. The appraisal by three appointees of the Court in the bankruptcy proceeding, filed April 18, 1938, reporting the Chicago property at a fair market value of only $204,706 and the appraisal of May 23, 1938, reporting the property in Heath, Ohio, at a market value of $5,100.

8. The sale of the Heath property of the bankrupt on September 23, 1938 for $1,725.

9. The order of April 18, 1938, authorizing private sale -of the Chicago property because no bids had been received by the trustee at public sale.

10. The trustee’s report of October 30, 1939, showing his inability to obtain a purchaser for the Chicago property at private sale and the expiration of the contract of the brokers who were employed to obtain a purchaser.

11. The sale of July 22, 1940, of three parcels of the Chicago land with six buildings, together with furniture and machinery, for $7,500, subject to $30,000 of tax liens, leaving but 316,000 square feet.

12. The petition of the trustee of October 20, 1941, to pay the costs of unsuccessfully advertising the remaining 316,-000 feet of property at 35^ per square foot, which, if sold at the offered price, would have netted only $110,600.

Both parties concede that the plaintiff’s stock was worthless by the end of 1944. The issue presented is whether the stock had become worthless before 1944 or whether it continued to have some value until the time the last corporate asset was sold during 1944, as maintained by the plaintiff.

Worthlessness of stock is a question of fact, subject to a practical and not a legal test. Boehm v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 287, 66 S.Ct. 120, 90 L.Ed. 78. Worthlessness of stock being a fact question and difficult of establishment, the determination of each case must rest upon its own peculiar facts. Morton v. Commissioner, 7 Cir., 112 F.2d 320; Dunbar v. Commissioner, 7 Cir., 119 F.2d 367, 135 A.L.R. 1424. Plaintiff must establish that the stock had some potential or intrinsic value in 1944 before the sale of the last corporate asset. Dunbar v. Commissioner, supra. The act does not contemplate, and the regulations specifically forbid, a reduction by the taxpayer for an amount claimed as loss merely on account of shrinkage or fluctuation in value of capital stock. The income tax law is concerned only with realized losses as it is with realized gains. Dunbar v. Commissioner, supra. Neither the existence of a balance sheet of the corporation showing no equity for the stockholders, nor the appointment of a trustee in reorganization proceedings, nor the adoption of a resolution 'by the board of [603]*603directors of a corporation providing for the liquidation is decisive upon the question of the worthlessness of stock where the evidence also establishes the existence of potential value which may be realized on liquidation or through continuation of business. Nelson v. United States, 8 Cir., 131 F.2d 301.

Whether or not the stock had any potential value after the adjudication of bankruptcy depends upon the valuation which is placed upon the corporate realty in Heath, Ohio, and Chicago, Illinois. The land in both instances was improved with industrial buildings, which were unique in that they were designed for specialized chemical production. The improvement was particularly true in the case of the Chicago property, composed of approximately eight acres, which was sold in 1944. The plaintiff, Kenneth Lacy, who, as an employee of the bankrupt, supervised these construction projects, evaluates the property at a figure between a. half million and a million dollars. His evaluation was based upon replacement. He naturally contends that, in view of this evaluation, the identifiable event as to the worthlessness of the stock, did not occur until the sale of the premises in 1944 for $15,000. The Government, however, points to the evaluation of $204,706.00 submitted by the three appraisers, who had been appointed by the Court. It also emphasizes the low appraisal of the Heath property and the subsequent sale at a low figure in 1938 as well as the inability to secure a purchaser for the Chicago premises. It is the Government’s position that the identifiable event occurred long before 1944.

It is the Court’s view that the unique nature of the Chicago premises was such as warrants saying that the stock could not be definitely considered worthless until they were finally disposed of in 1944. The premises were designed for a specialized type of chemical production, which was becoming increasingly more important as we approached the war period.

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Related

Laystrom v. Continental Copper & Steel Industries, Inc.
133 F. Supp. 130 (N.D. Illinois, 1955)
Lacy Et Ux. v. United States
207 F.2d 352 (Seventh Circuit, 1953)

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Bluebook (online)
105 F. Supp. 601, 42 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 384, 1952 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4200, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lacy-v-united-states-ilnd-1952.