Lacy v. State

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: November 24, 2025
• Docket: 135, 2025
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

MICHAEL J. LACY, § § Defendant Below, § No. 135, 2025 Appellant, § § Court Below—Superior Court v. § of the State of Delaware § STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. N1908020399 § Appellee. §

Submitted: October 1, 2025 Decided: November 24, 2025

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; LEGROW and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

ORDER

After consideration of the brief and motion to withdraw filed by the

appellant’s counsel under Supreme Court Rule 26(c), the State’s response, and the

Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that:

(1) On August 30, 2019, Larry Butler called 911 to report that the driver of

a maroon or burgundy Acura SUV had cut him off in traffic in the Cool Springs area

of Wilmington, pointed a gun at him, and pursued him. Butler was able to provide

the license plate number, and Wilmington police officers began looking for the

subject vehicle. Officer Cintron, who was driving a marked police vehicle in the

area, encountered the Acura at an intersection and got a good look at the driver while

they were each stopped at a stop sign. Officer Cintron attempted a traffic stop but the other vehicle fled, running multiple stop signs and driving the wrong way down

a one-way street. During the brief pursuit, the driver threw a firearm from the car;

Officer Cintron stopped pursuing the Acura to recover the gun. Shortly thereafter,

other officers found the Acura abandoned in the middle of a nearby street with

disabling damage caused by having run over a street sign.

(2) The Acura was registered to the appellant, Michael J. Lacy. Officers

went to Lacy’s last known address. A woman who identified herself as Lacy’s

former significant other allowed the officers into the home, where the officers found

Lacy shaving his head and took him into custody.

(3) Officers went to Butler’s place of employment to interview him. Butler

identified Lacy in a six-photo lineup and at trial as the driver who had pointed the

gun at him. At trial, Officer Cintron also identified Lacy as the driver who had

thrown the gun from the Acura.

(4) Counsel from the Office of the Public Defender represented Lacy at

trial. A Superior Court jury found Lacy guilty of aggravated menacing, two counts

of possession of a firearm during commission of a felony, disregarding a police

signal, and reckless driving. The court granted Lacy’s motion for a judgment of

acquittal on a charge of carrying a concealed deadly weapon, and the prosecution

agreed to dismiss additional firearm charges. The Superior Court later granted the

State’s habitual-offender motion as to the aggravated menacing charge and

2 sentenced Lacy to a total of seventeen years and 30 days of imprisonment, suspended

after fifteen years for decreasing levels of supervision.

(5) In November 2023, Lacy filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief

in which he argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal.

The Superior Court appointed conflicts counsel to represent Lacy in the

postconviction proceeding. Conflicts counsel asked the court to reissue the sentence

order so that Lacy could file a timely direct appeal. The Superior Court reissued the

sentence order and dismissed the postconviction proceeding without prejudice.

Conflicts counsel then filed this direct appeal on Lacy’s behalf.

(6) On appeal, conflicts counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw

under Supreme Court Rule 26(c). Conflicts counsel asserts that, based upon a

conscientious review of the record, the appeal is wholly without merit. In her

statement filed under Rule 26(c), conflicts counsel indicates that she informed Lacy

of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided him with a copy of the motion to

withdraw and the accompanying brief. She also informed Lacy of his right to submit

issues for the Court’s consideration. In his submission, Lacy argues that the Rule

26(c) brief should be stricken and the matter remanded to the Superior Court to

reinstate postconviction proceedings. He asserts that the purpose of his ineffective

assistance claim was to “protect [his] constitutional right to a direct appeal,” and that

3 conflicts counsel’s request that the court reissue the sentence order interfered with

that claim. The State argues that the Superior Court’s judgment should be affirmed.

(7) When reviewing a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief

under Rule 26(c), this Court must be satisfied that the appellant’s counsel has made

a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable claims.1 This

Court must also conduct its own review of the record and determine whether “the

appeal is indeed so frivolous that it may be decided without an adversary

presentation.”2

(8) We find no merit to the appeal. Lacy asserts that the purpose of his

postconviction proceeding was to protect his right to a direct appeal. That is what

conflicts counsel achieved by requesting reissuance of the sentence order. Thus,

there is no basis to remand for reinstatement of postconviction proceedings on the

grounds that prior counsel was ineffective by failing to file a direct appeal. If Lacy

wants to pursue ineffective-assistance claims based on the actual representation

provided before or at sentencing—as distinct from the failure to file a direct appeal—

he will have the opportunity to do so when the matter returns to the Superior Court

after the mandate issues in this direct appeal.3 To the extent that Lacy argues that he

1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 2 Penson, 488 U.S. at 82. 3 See Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160, 175 (Del. 2020) (stating that the Supreme Court generally does not hear ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal). When reissuing Lacy’s

4 is entitled to have his conviction overturned or to be resentenced because (i) different

lawyers from the Office of Defense Services represented him at trial and sentencing,

and (ii) his trial counsel became a Deputy Attorney General after his representation

of Lacy concluded, we find no merit to those claims.

(9) We have carefully reviewed the record and conclude that Lacy’s appeal

is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable issue. We also are

satisfied that Lacy’s counsel has made a conscientious effort to examine the record

and has properly determined that Lacy could not raise a meritorious claim in this

appeal.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior

Court is AFFIRMED. The motion to withdraw is moot.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths Justice

sentence order, the Superior Court dismissed his motion for postconviction relief without prejudice and with leave to refile.