1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8
Mona L isa Lacy, ) No. CV-18-04117-PHX-SPL ) 9 ) 10 Plaintiff, ) ORDER vs. ) ) 11 ) Commissioner of Social Security ) 12 Administration, ) 13 ) ) 14 Defendant. )
15 At issue is the Court’s March 18, 2020 Order (Doc. 23) (the “Order”) regarding 16 Plaintiff Mona Lisa Lacy’s Application for Disability Insurance Benefits under the Social 17 Security Act (the Act). The Order reversed the decision of the Administrative Law Judge 18 (AR 12–40)1 denying Plaintiff’s application for benefits and remanded the case to the 19 Social Security Administration for a calculation of benefits. (Order at 12) Defendant Social 20 Security Commissioner filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. 21 Civ. P. 59(e) (Doc. 25) (the “Motion”), to which Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 26). 22 Defendant then filed a reply. (Doc. 27) The Court now remands the case for further 23 proceedings. 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 Plaintiff filed an application for Social Security Disability Insurance on September 26 16, 2014 for a period of disability beginning September 4, 2014. (AR 15) Plaintiff’s claim 27
28 1 Administrative Record (Doc. 10). 1 was denied initially on February 18, 2015, and upon reconsideration on August 13, 2015. 2 (AR 15) Plaintiff then testified at a hearing held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 3 on June 15, 2017. (AR 15) On November 28, 2017, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s Application. 4 (AR 33) On September 20, 2018, the Appeals Council denied a request for review of the 5 ALJ’s decision. (AR 1) 6 Upon reviewing the ALJ’s decision Court found that “the ALJ failed to provide 7 legally sufficient reasons for rejecting Dr. Nolan’s opinion and Plaintiff’s subjective 8 testimony.” (Order at 12) The Court based its conclusions primarily on the ALJ’s 9 evaluation of Plaintiff’s medical record, what the Court believed to have been the incorrect 10 standard of review of the medical records by the ALJ, and the testimony and medical 11 opinions related to Plaintiff’s impairment. After determining that the ALJ committed 12 reversible error, the Court found that “the record has been fully developed and, as a result, 13 a remand for further proceedings would not be useful.” (Order at 12) Next, the Court found 14 that “based on the vocational expert’s testimony, the ALJ would have been required to find 15 Plaintiff’s disabled had she credited Dr. Nolan’s opinion.” (Order at 12) 16 Defendant now argues that the Court “did not properly assess whether the facts of 17 this case justify the extraordinary remedy of remand for payment of benefits.” (Doc. 25 at 18 2) Specifically, Defendant points to one error: the Court did not consider the record as 19 whole and failed to explain why it concluded the record as a whole did not create serious 20 doubt about Plaintiff’s alleged disability. Defendant focuses on this error in the Motion but 21 also pointed out that he would reserve the right to challenge the Court’s conclusions that 22 the ALJ failed to properly support her findings on further appeal. Defendant generally 23 asserts that, contrary to the Court’s conclusion, “serious doubt” exists as to whether 24 Plaintiff is actually disabled. (Doc. 25 at 3) 25 II. LEGAL STANDARD 26 Reconsideration is appropriate only in rare circumstances. Kona Enters., Inc. v. 27 Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court may grant a motion under 28 Rule 59(e) if the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed 1 clear error, the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or there is an intervening change in 2 controlling law. Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2001). 3 III. ANALYSIS 4 Because the record contains conflicting evidence documenting the severity of 5 Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia-related impairment, the Court agrees with Defendant that it 6 committed clear error in determining that additional proceedings would serve no useful 7 purpose. Accordingly, it is necessary to further develop the record in this case, so the 8 ordinary remand rule applies. Although the ALJ erred in rejecting the treating physician’s 9 opinion and Plaintiff’s own testimony, the credit-as-true rule does not apply. There are still 10 outstanding issues to be resolved in this case, most importantly determining what true 11 limitations are caused by Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia. Therefore, the appropriate remedy is to 12 remand the case for further development of the record. 13 Importantly, Plaintiff’s impairments are well-documented and the ALJ herself 14 recognized that Plaintiff suffered medically-determinable impairments. (AR 22, 30) 15 Nevertheless, an outstanding issue remains because the record is not clear, and at times 16 conflicting, as to the extent of Plaintiff’s limitations due to fibromyalgia and the associated 17 symptoms. Defendant points to numerous medical records that identify normal findings 18 that appear to be inconsistent with disabling fibromyalgia as well as evidence suggesting 19 malingering. (Doc 25 at 4–6) 20 Moreover, Defendant also points to other evidence in the record that he asserts is 21 inconsistent with Plaintiff’s alleged completely disabling symptoms, including Plaintiff’s 22 daily activities, prior work history, and conflicting medical opinions between treating and 23 reviewing physicians. (Docs. 25 at 4–6; 27 at 2–3) The Court agrees with Defendant that 24 these outstanding issues cast “serious doubt that Plaintiff is entitled to disability benefits” 25 and create conflicts, ambiguities, or gaps in the record, which the ALJ must resolve. (Doc. 26 25 at 7) Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 409 (9th Cir. 2015). Indeed, it is the ALJ’s 27 duty to resolve conflicts, gaps, or ambiguities in the record. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 28 F.3d 1035, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 1995). 1 Finally, the Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiff’s response for several reasons. First, 2 Plaintiff seems to mischaracterize Defendant’s argument regarding the credit-as-true rule. 3 Indeed, Plaintiff argues that “[t]he Commissioner does not appear to question the 4 application of the well-known credit-as-true rule.” (Doc. 26 at 3) Furthermore, Plaintiff 5 summarizes Defendant’s argument as “the belief that ‘even though all condition[s] of the 6 credit-as-true rule are satisfied, an evaluation of the record as a whole creates serious doubt 7 that a claimant is, in fact, disabled.’” (Doc. 26 at 3) It is true that Defendant does not 8 question the application of the credit-as-true rule in general. There is no argument that the 9 rule must be changed or otherwise abandoned. However, Defendant clearly argues that the 10 conditions of the rule are not present here and it should not be applied. The three prongs of 11 the credit-as-true rule, where a reviewing court can credit certain evidence as true, are 12 (1) an ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for 13 rejecting that evidence; (2) there are no outstanding issues that 14 must be resolved before a determination of disability can be 15 made; and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be 16 required to find the claimant disabled were such evidence 17 credited. 18 See, e.g., Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004). Even if all the conditions 19 of the creid-as-true rule are satisfied, a court must remand for further proceedings when the 20 evaluation of the record as a whole creates serious doubt that a claimant is, in fact, disabled. 21 Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014).
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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8
Mona L isa Lacy, ) No. CV-18-04117-PHX-SPL ) 9 ) 10 Plaintiff, ) ORDER vs. ) ) 11 ) Commissioner of Social Security ) 12 Administration, ) 13 ) ) 14 Defendant. )
15 At issue is the Court’s March 18, 2020 Order (Doc. 23) (the “Order”) regarding 16 Plaintiff Mona Lisa Lacy’s Application for Disability Insurance Benefits under the Social 17 Security Act (the Act). The Order reversed the decision of the Administrative Law Judge 18 (AR 12–40)1 denying Plaintiff’s application for benefits and remanded the case to the 19 Social Security Administration for a calculation of benefits. (Order at 12) Defendant Social 20 Security Commissioner filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. 21 Civ. P. 59(e) (Doc. 25) (the “Motion”), to which Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 26). 22 Defendant then filed a reply. (Doc. 27) The Court now remands the case for further 23 proceedings. 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 Plaintiff filed an application for Social Security Disability Insurance on September 26 16, 2014 for a period of disability beginning September 4, 2014. (AR 15) Plaintiff’s claim 27
28 1 Administrative Record (Doc. 10). 1 was denied initially on February 18, 2015, and upon reconsideration on August 13, 2015. 2 (AR 15) Plaintiff then testified at a hearing held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 3 on June 15, 2017. (AR 15) On November 28, 2017, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s Application. 4 (AR 33) On September 20, 2018, the Appeals Council denied a request for review of the 5 ALJ’s decision. (AR 1) 6 Upon reviewing the ALJ’s decision Court found that “the ALJ failed to provide 7 legally sufficient reasons for rejecting Dr. Nolan’s opinion and Plaintiff’s subjective 8 testimony.” (Order at 12) The Court based its conclusions primarily on the ALJ’s 9 evaluation of Plaintiff’s medical record, what the Court believed to have been the incorrect 10 standard of review of the medical records by the ALJ, and the testimony and medical 11 opinions related to Plaintiff’s impairment. After determining that the ALJ committed 12 reversible error, the Court found that “the record has been fully developed and, as a result, 13 a remand for further proceedings would not be useful.” (Order at 12) Next, the Court found 14 that “based on the vocational expert’s testimony, the ALJ would have been required to find 15 Plaintiff’s disabled had she credited Dr. Nolan’s opinion.” (Order at 12) 16 Defendant now argues that the Court “did not properly assess whether the facts of 17 this case justify the extraordinary remedy of remand for payment of benefits.” (Doc. 25 at 18 2) Specifically, Defendant points to one error: the Court did not consider the record as 19 whole and failed to explain why it concluded the record as a whole did not create serious 20 doubt about Plaintiff’s alleged disability. Defendant focuses on this error in the Motion but 21 also pointed out that he would reserve the right to challenge the Court’s conclusions that 22 the ALJ failed to properly support her findings on further appeal. Defendant generally 23 asserts that, contrary to the Court’s conclusion, “serious doubt” exists as to whether 24 Plaintiff is actually disabled. (Doc. 25 at 3) 25 II. LEGAL STANDARD 26 Reconsideration is appropriate only in rare circumstances. Kona Enters., Inc. v. 27 Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court may grant a motion under 28 Rule 59(e) if the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed 1 clear error, the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or there is an intervening change in 2 controlling law. Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2001). 3 III. ANALYSIS 4 Because the record contains conflicting evidence documenting the severity of 5 Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia-related impairment, the Court agrees with Defendant that it 6 committed clear error in determining that additional proceedings would serve no useful 7 purpose. Accordingly, it is necessary to further develop the record in this case, so the 8 ordinary remand rule applies. Although the ALJ erred in rejecting the treating physician’s 9 opinion and Plaintiff’s own testimony, the credit-as-true rule does not apply. There are still 10 outstanding issues to be resolved in this case, most importantly determining what true 11 limitations are caused by Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia. Therefore, the appropriate remedy is to 12 remand the case for further development of the record. 13 Importantly, Plaintiff’s impairments are well-documented and the ALJ herself 14 recognized that Plaintiff suffered medically-determinable impairments. (AR 22, 30) 15 Nevertheless, an outstanding issue remains because the record is not clear, and at times 16 conflicting, as to the extent of Plaintiff’s limitations due to fibromyalgia and the associated 17 symptoms. Defendant points to numerous medical records that identify normal findings 18 that appear to be inconsistent with disabling fibromyalgia as well as evidence suggesting 19 malingering. (Doc 25 at 4–6) 20 Moreover, Defendant also points to other evidence in the record that he asserts is 21 inconsistent with Plaintiff’s alleged completely disabling symptoms, including Plaintiff’s 22 daily activities, prior work history, and conflicting medical opinions between treating and 23 reviewing physicians. (Docs. 25 at 4–6; 27 at 2–3) The Court agrees with Defendant that 24 these outstanding issues cast “serious doubt that Plaintiff is entitled to disability benefits” 25 and create conflicts, ambiguities, or gaps in the record, which the ALJ must resolve. (Doc. 26 25 at 7) Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 409 (9th Cir. 2015). Indeed, it is the ALJ’s 27 duty to resolve conflicts, gaps, or ambiguities in the record. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 28 F.3d 1035, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 1995). 1 Finally, the Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiff’s response for several reasons. First, 2 Plaintiff seems to mischaracterize Defendant’s argument regarding the credit-as-true rule. 3 Indeed, Plaintiff argues that “[t]he Commissioner does not appear to question the 4 application of the well-known credit-as-true rule.” (Doc. 26 at 3) Furthermore, Plaintiff 5 summarizes Defendant’s argument as “the belief that ‘even though all condition[s] of the 6 credit-as-true rule are satisfied, an evaluation of the record as a whole creates serious doubt 7 that a claimant is, in fact, disabled.’” (Doc. 26 at 3) It is true that Defendant does not 8 question the application of the credit-as-true rule in general. There is no argument that the 9 rule must be changed or otherwise abandoned. However, Defendant clearly argues that the 10 conditions of the rule are not present here and it should not be applied. The three prongs of 11 the credit-as-true rule, where a reviewing court can credit certain evidence as true, are 12 (1) an ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for 13 rejecting that evidence; (2) there are no outstanding issues that 14 must be resolved before a determination of disability can be 15 made; and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be 16 required to find the claimant disabled were such evidence 17 credited. 18 See, e.g., Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004). Even if all the conditions 19 of the creid-as-true rule are satisfied, a court must remand for further proceedings when the 20 evaluation of the record as a whole creates serious doubt that a claimant is, in fact, disabled. 21 Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014). Nowhere does Defendant agrees 22 that there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of 23 disability can be made. The crux of Defendant’s argument is that there are issues and 24 conflicting evidence in the record, which viewed as a whole, create serious doubt that 25 Plaintiff was disabled. Defendant actually argues that the second factor of the credit-as- 26 true rule is not met, and it must be viewed in light of the whole record and whether serious 27 doubt exists. 28 Second, the Commissioner is entitled to file a motion under rule 59(e) and such 1 motion is not akin to litigating the case twice. It offers limited grounds for the Court to 2 review a judgment it issued without asking litigants to engage in the appellate process 3 immediately. It offers protection against litigating the case twice because only limited 4 grounds are available to file such motion and a Court has broad discretion in granting it. 5 Defendant identified clear error the Court committed, and it is a proper ground for the filing 6 of a rule 59(e) motion. 7 Third, Plaintiff argues that Defendant failed to address the “false standard” the Court 8 found the ALJ applied when evaluating Plaintiff’s medical records and whether they fully 9 supported her symptoms. (Doc. 26 at 7–8) Defendant points out in his reply that this was a 10 mischaracterization of the ALJ’s decision but, more importantly, that Defendant did not 11 challenge such error in the Motion because “he is challenging only the remedy here” and 12 not the Court’s conclusions that the ALJ erred in assessing the merits of Plaintiff’s 13 disability. (Doc. 27 at 3, fn.3)2 Accordingly, the Defendant did not waive an argument on 14 such standard, which is related to the first prong of the credit-as-true rule, but focused his 15 Motion on the second prong of such rule. 16 Finally, Plaintiff argues that the Court found no error “in weighing the desktop 17 reviewer’s opinion, which is far from a finding that opinion would be substantial evidence 18 sufficient to drive the outcome of this case.” (Doc. 26 at 5) Plaintiff further argues that “if 19 the Commissioner’s argument were accepted, there would never be a remand for award of 20 benefits, because state agency reviewer’s assessments appear in all hearing records.” (Doc. 21 26 at 5) This argument misconstrues the Court’s statement. When reviewing the ALJ’s 22 decision and reasoning on her weighing of Dr. Sapin’s opinion, the Court concluded she 23 did not commit error in according great weight to such opinion. (Order at 11) Indeed, the 24 ALJ accorded great weight to such opinion and little weight to another non-treating 25 physician’s opinion and Plaintiff argued it was unclear why. (Order at 11) The Court found
26 2 Indeed, the Commissioner stated in his Motion that he was only challenging the 27 remedy but reserved the right on a potential appeal to also challenge the Court’s determination that the ALJ erred in assessing the merits of Plaintiff’s alleged disability. 28 (Doc. 25 at 3, fn. 3) 1| it was clear why the ALJ did so. (Order at 11) The Court concluded that the ALJ did not 2| commit error in weighing Dr. Sapin’s opinion, which means did not commit error in 3| according great weight to such opinion. Plaintiff's argument on this point 1s unpersuasive 4| and miscontrues the Court’s conclusion. Furthermore, as Defendant pointed out in his 5| reply, the Court is not saying that each time a desktop reviewer’s opinion is present, it would mean that a remand for further proceedings is necessary. Quite the opposite, the Court clarifies that when, like in this case, it finds that an ALJ did not commit reversible 8 | error when weighing such opinion, then the ALJ’s conclusion on this issue must be considered appropriately. A lot of decisions by federal courts reviewing ALJ’s decisions 10 | find that such weighing is in error, this is not the case here. 11 Accordingly, 12 IT IS ORDERED granting Defendant’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment 13 | pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (Doc. 25); 14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED amending the Court’s prior Order (Doc. 23) to the 15 | extent it is inconsistent with this Order; 16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED remanding this matter for further consideration 17 | consistent with this Order; and 18 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to enter an amended 19 | judgment accordingly. This matter shall remain closed. 20 Dated this 13th day of May, 2020. 21 22 23 LEC KGS 24 25 26 27 28