LACRUZE v. ZATECKY

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

NICHOLAS LACRUZE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 1:20-cv-02148-JPH-DML ) D. ZATECKY, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE MOTION FOR ASSISTANCE WITH RECRUITING COUNSEL

Plaintiff, Nicholas LaCruze, has filed a motion for assistance recruiting counsel. Dkt. 67. Litigants in federal civil cases do not have a constitutional or statutory right to court-appointed counsel. Walker v. Price, 900 F.3d 933, 938 (7th Cir. 2018). Instead, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) gives courts the authority to "request" counsel. Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 300 (1989). As a practical matter, there are not enough lawyers willing and qualified to accept a pro bono assignment in every pro se case. See Olson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2014) ("Whether to recruit an attorney is a difficult decision: Almost everyone would benefit from having a lawyer, but there are too many indigent litigants and too few lawyers willing and able to volunteer for these cases."). "'When confronted with a request under § 1915(e)(1) for pro bono counsel, the district court is to make the following inquiries: (1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?'" Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 682 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007)). These two questions "must guide" the Court's determination whether to attempt to recruit counsel. Id. These questions require an individualized assessment of the plaintiff, the claims, and the stage of litigation. See Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655-56. The Seventh Circuit has specifically declined to find a presumptive right to counsel in some categories of cases. McCaa v

Hamilton, 893 F.3d 1027, 1037 (7th Cir. 2018) (Hamilton, J., concurring); Walker, 900 F.3d at 939. The first question, whether litigants have made a reasonable attempt to secure private counsel on their own "is a mandatory, threshold inquiry that must be determined before moving to the second inquiry." Eagan, 987 F.3d at 682; see also Thomas v. Anderson, 912 F.3d 971, 978 (7th Cir. 2019) (because plaintiff did not show that he tried to obtain counsel on his own or that he was precluded from doing so, the judge's denial of these requests was not an abuse of discretion). Plaintiff has attempted to contact multiple attorneys with requests for representation without success. The Court finds that he has made a reasonable effort to recruit counsel on his own before seeking the Court's assistance. He should continue his efforts to find counsel.

"The second inquiry requires consideration of both the factual and legal complexity of the plaintiff's claims and the competence of the plaintiff to litigate those claims himself." Eagan, 987 F.3d at 682 (citing Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655). "Specifically, courts should consider 'whether the difficulty of the case—factually and legally—exceeds the particular plaintiff's capacity as a layperson to coherently present it to the judge or jury himself.'" Id. (quoting Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655). "This assessment of the plaintiff's apparent competence extends beyond the trial stage of proceedings; it must include 'the tasks that normally attend litigation: evidence gathering, preparing and responding to motions and other court filings, and trial.'" Id. (quoting Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655). Plaintiff's complaint raises excessive force and deliberate indifference claims arising from an incident in the gym at Pendleton Correctional Facility where inmates were awaiting results of COVID-19 testing. Although his claims are numerous, they are relatively straightforward. He has personal knowledge of the alleged events and his damages. Plaintiffs motion reflects that he dropped out of school after completing eighth grade and that he reads and writes at a fifth or sixth- grade level. He suffers from bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and a sleep disorder. He has no legal training and limited access to the law library. Neither Plaintiff's reading level nor his various mental health conditions necessarily render him incompetent to litigate this action. His filings in this case have been appropriate and reflect an understanding of his claims and the litigation process. His motion does not indicate how his mental health conditions have or will limit his ability to litigate. The defendants intend to file dispositive motions by the deadline of September 30, 2022. Dkt. 76; dkt. 77. Plaintiff can respond in opposition to any motion for summary judgment and support his response with an affidavit sworn under penalties of perjury stating his personal knowledge of facts he believes are material and in dispute. At this stage of litigation, Plaintiff's motion for assistance recruiting counsel, dkt. [67], is denied without prejudice. The Court will remain alert to changes in circumstances that may warrant reconsideration of the motion, such as a settlement conference or trial. SO ORDERED. Date: 8/18/2022

James Patrick Hanlon United States District Judge Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

NICHOLAS LACRUZE 239236 WABASH VALLEY - CF WABASH VALLEY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY - Inmate Mail/Parcels 6908 S. Old US Hwy 41 P.O. Box 1111 CARLISLE, IN 47838

Douglass R. Bitner Stoll Keenon Ogden PLLC doug.bitner@skofirm.com

Erica Lee Sawyer INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL Erica.Sawyer@atg.in.gov

Sarah Jean Shores-Scisney Stoll Keenon Ogden PLLC (SKO) sarah.shores@skofirm.com

Eric Ryan Shouse Lewis And Wilkins LLP shouse@lewisandwilkins.com