Lacresha Moore Williams v. Commissioner of Social Security

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH DIVISION

LACRESHA MOORE WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 4:25-cv-01138-P-BP

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court is the Unopposed Motion for Entry of Judgment with Remand that the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) filed on April 27, 2026. ECF No. 15. The Commissioner seeks a remand pursuant to the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). For good cause shown, the undersigned recommends that United States District Judge Mark T. Pittman GRANT the Motion, REVERSE the case, and REMAND it to the Commissioner for further administrative action consistent with the Commissioner’s Unopposed Motion for Entry of Judgment with Remand filed on April 27, 2026 (ECF No. 15). In Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 97-102 (1991), the Supreme Court made clear that there are only two types of remand orders permitted under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The first method arises under “[t]he fourth sentence of § 405(g) [that] authorizes a court to enter ‘a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the [Commissioner], with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.’” Id. at 98 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). A sentence four remand “requires the district court to enter a decision on the merits before remanding a case to the Commissioner.” Schriner v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 3:08-CV-2042-N, 2010 WL 2941120, at *15

(N.D. Tex. June 22, 2010), rec. adopted, 2010 WL 2944782 (N.D. Tex. July 22, 2010) (citing Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 98). The second method arises under the sixth sentence of § 405(g) and “may be ordered in only two situations: where the [Commissioner] requests a remand before answering the complaint, or where new, material evidence is adduced that was for good cause not presented before the agency.” Shalala v. Shaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 297

n.2 (1993) (citing § 405(g); Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 99-100). Under sentence six, “[t]he district court does not . . . rule in any way as to the correctness of the administrative determination. Rather, the court remands” the case for reconsideration if the “new evidence might have changed the outcome of the prior proceeding.” Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 98; see also McKenzie v. Astrue, 442 F. App’x 161, 162 (5th Cir. 2011). The “[i]mmediate entry of judgment (as opposed to entry of judgment after post-remand agency proceedings have been completed and their results filed with the court) is the

principal feature that distinguishes a sentence-four remand from a sentence-six remand.” Chelette v. United States Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:11-CV-1860, 2012 WL 2870842, at *2 (W.D. La. June 12, 2012), rec. adopted, 2012 WL 2873635 (W.D. La. July 12, 2012) (citing Shaefer, 509 U.S. at 296-97; Istre v. Apfel, 208 F.3d 517, 520 (5th Cir. 2000)). Here, the Commissioner’s Motion is unopposed. ECF No. 15. Under these circumstances, remand under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is appropriate. Having carefully considered the Commissioner’s Motion (ECF No. 15), and noting

that it is unopposed, the undersigned recommends that the Court GRANT the Motion, REVERSE this case, and REMAND it to the Commissioner for further administrative action consistent with the Commissioner’s Unopposed Motion for Entry of Judgment with Remand filed on April 27, 2026 (ECF No. 15). A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1). To be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure

to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections to 14 days). SIGNED on April 30, 2026.

Ia ‘ { . Hal R. Ray, Jr. : UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE