LaCrescent Township v. City of LaCrescent

515 N.W.2d 608, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 391, 1994 WL 145256
CourtCourt of Appeals of Minnesota
DecidedApril 26, 1994
DocketC3-93-2017
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 515 N.W.2d 608 (LaCrescent Township v. City of LaCrescent) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
LaCrescent Township v. City of LaCrescent, 515 N.W.2d 608, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 391, 1994 WL 145256 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).

Opinion

OPINION

SHORT, Judge.

The City of LaCrescent and William and Delores Cornforth petitioned to annex by ordinance two tracts of land located within an area governed by a joint orderly annexation agreement. Ordinances were passed and approved pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 414.038, subd. 2a (1992). The Township of LaCres-eent brought this action seeking a declaration of its rights under the joint orderly annexation agreement. The trial court found annexation by ordinance valid. On appeal, the township argues (1) a joint orderly annexation agreement cannot be modified, and (2) Minn.Stat. § 414.033, subd. 2a is ambiguous and at odds with Chapter 414.

FACTS

In approximately 1979, the Township of LaCrescent entered into a joint agreement with the City of LaCrescent for the orderly annexation of certain township property pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 414.0325 (1978). That agreement was revised and readopted in 1985. The agreement provided that the subject land could not be divided, and that at least sixty percent of landowners must petition the city to initiate annexation.

In 1993, the Comforths and the city petitioned for the annexation of platted property subject to that annexation agreement. In March 1993, the city council passed, and the Minnesota Municipal Board approved, the annexation ordinances. The township sued the city arguing the annexation was void because it violated the terms of the annexation agreement by dividing the land and by failing to secure a petition from sixty percent of the landowners.

The township moved for a temporary injunction to enjoin the city from publishing the annexation ordinances. The trial court denied that motion because the township had an adequate remedy at law. The township appealed the municipal board’s decision, seeking declaratory relief and an interpretation of the annexation agreement. The trial court denied declaratory relief, concluding the agreement was not a binding contract and the two annexation statutes did not conflict. The township now appeals from that judgment.

ISSUES

I. Can a joint orderly annexation agreement be modified?

II. Can an ordinance annexing township property bypass the terms of a joint orderly annexation agreement?

ANALYSIS

The parties agree on the relevant facts. This case involves the annexation by ordinance of land which is part of an area designated for orderly annexation, a process governed by Minn.Stat. § 414.033, subd. 2a (1992). The sole issue before us is one of statutory interpretation, which is a question of law subject to de novo review. Doe v. Minnesota State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 435 N.W.2d 45, 48 (Minn.1989), reh’g denied (Apr. 18, 1989).

I.

The township argues an annexation agreement is a binding contract that cannot be modified by the city, township, or state. We disagree. Municipalities cannot limit the power of the legislature over annexation because the legislature preempted that field by adopting Chapter 414. Independent Sch. *610 Dist. No. 700 v. City of Duluth, 284 Minn. 279, 289, 170 N.W.2d 116, 122 (1969); In re City of Watertown, 375 N.W.2d 582, 584 (Minn.App.1985). In addition, the contract rights of government entities are not constitutionally protected from state interference. City of Trenton v. State of New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182,188, 43 S.Ct. 534, 537, 67 L.Ed. 937 (1923); Town of Bridgie v. County of Koochiching, 227 Minn. 320, 323, 35 N.W.2d 537, 540 (1948). While a joint annexation agreement represents a mutually agreeable plan for the orderly annexation of specified areas, the state legislature is not precluded from interfering with such an agreement when exercising its statutory authority over property held by municipal corporations. See City of Safety Harbor v. Birchfield, 529 F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th Cir.1976) (annexation agreements between municipalities do not prevent legislature from ordering annexation contrary to the agreements); State v. Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Airports Comm’n, 248 Minn. 134, 143, 78 N.W.2d 722, 728 (1956) (absent constitutional restriction, the legislature has the power to modify, alter, or withdraw any municipal power). Finally, the parties’ annexation agreement specifically acknowledges it is subject to “overriding rules and regulations.” Thus, a joint annexation agreement can be modified by the legislature when it creates new annexation procedures.

II.

Annexation of land within a designated area is governed by Minn.Stat. § 414.0325 (1992). Section 414.033 (1992) specifies the circumstances under which a municipality may annex land by ordinance. The township argues subdivision 2a of Minn.Stat. § 414.033 is ambiguous. That subdivision provides:

[I]f land is owned by a municipality or if all of the landowners petition for annexation, and the land is within an existing orderly annexation area as provided by section 414.0325, then the municipality may declare the land annexed.

Id. The subdivision prescribes the limited conditions under which property within an orderly annexation agreement may be annexed by ordinance: (1) if the municipality owns the land, and (2) if all of the landowners petition for annexation.

That subdivision does not require annexation by ordinance to comply with the terms of a previously existing annexation agreement. Nor does section 414.0325 confer exclusive jurisdiction on the municipal board or require the board to deny annexation if its terms conflict with a joint agreement. See City of Watertown, 375 N.W.2d at 584-85 (concluding that the municipal board is not bound by conditions imposed by joint resolutions which are not statutory procedures). Where a statute is unambiguous and its provisions are couched in plain and simple language, we cannot insert a requirement into the statute. See Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (1992) (when a statute speaks for itself, there is no room for judicial construction); Commissioner of Revenue v. Richardson, 302 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Minn.1981) (same). Under the plain language of the statute, there is no conflict between section 414.033, subd. 2a, and section 414.0325. See Minn.Stat. §§ 645.16 (laws should be construed to give effect to all provisions), 645.17(2) (courts may presume legislature intends entire statute to be effective and certain).

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Bluebook (online)
515 N.W.2d 608, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 391, 1994 WL 145256, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lacrescent-township-v-city-of-lacrescent-minnctapp-1994.