Lacour v. Sanders

442 So. 2d 1280
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedDecember 14, 1983
Docket83-282
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 442 So. 2d 1280 (Lacour v. Sanders) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lacour v. Sanders, 442 So. 2d 1280 (La. Ct. App. 1983).

Opinion

442 So.2d 1280 (1983)

Leah Maxine LACOUR, Administratrix, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Joseph E. SANDERS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 83-282.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

December 14, 1983.
Writ Denied March 16, 1984.

*1281 William E. Skye, Alexandria, for plaintiff-appellant.

Trimble, Randow, Percy, Wilson & Foote, H. Gregory Walker, Alexandria, for defendant-appellee.

Before CUTRER, DOUCET and LABORDE, JJ.

CUTRER, Judge.

This is a suit for partition by licitation of approximately thirty acres of land located near Woodworth, Rapides Parish, Louisiana. Leah Maxine Jett Lacour, in her capacity as administratrix of the succession of her mother, Mary Ellen Scott Jett, sued Joseph E. Sanders claiming a one-half interest in a tract of land Sanders purchased from Ms. Lacour's father, Robert Jett, Jr. Sanders answered the suit pleading the affirmative defense of ten year acquisitive prescription. The trial judge rendered judgment recognizing Sanders as the owner of the disputed tract of land. Ms. Lacour appeals. We affirm.

The trial judge has favored us with excellent reasons for judgment and we will take the liberty of quoting from his statement of the facts and his discussion of the issues.

"Robert Jett, Jr. and Mary Ellen Scott were married in Grant Parish on September 1, 1932 .... The property in dispute was acquired by Robert Jett, Jr. while married and living with Mary Ellen Scott by act of sale dated May 25, 1937 .... About the time of the deed, Robert Jett, Jr. and Mary Ellen Scott Jett moved on this property and farmed it with their children and Ellen's children by her first marriage. In 1947 the Jett family moved about a mile away to a twenty-acre tract which Jett had purchased. The Jetts continued to farm the property, the subject of this lawsuit, until the death of Mary Ellen Scott on December 14, 1959 .... Joe Sanders, the purchaser and possessor, testified that three or four years before Ellen Scott Jett died no one lived on the property.... Joe Sanders, his family, and the Jett family were friends for many years in a small community. The families attended the same church. The Jett children and the Sanders children played together and went to school together. Joe Sanders and his wife knew Mary Ellen Scott Jett died on December 14, 1959. Both attended the wake.
"Shortly after the funeral, Robert Jett, Jr. married Willie Mae Williams. On July 9, 1960, Robert Jett, Jr. alone sold the property, subject of this lawsuit, to defendant, Joe Sanders.
*1282 "Shortly thereafter the Sanders family occupied a frame house, which they moved onto the property, and lived there until 1976, when they constructed on the property the brick veneer house in which they presently reside .... Mr. Sanders further testified that he executed two mineral leases on the property. He executed a ten-year lease in 1970 and a five-year lease in 1982.... Mr. Sanders testified that from the date of purchase until the date of this trial he believed he was indeed the owner of the full 30.30 acres which he possessed as owner.
"To plaintiff's claim to be recognized as co-owners of an undivided one-half interest in the property, defendant has answered alleging ten years acquisitive prescription; estoppel, and ownership of his home. Defendant third partied his vendor, Robert Jett, Jr., who answered and third partied Ellen Scott's forced heirs, which issues were deferred for later hearing." (Reference to trial exhibits omitted.)

ISSUES

The determinative issue in this appeal is whether the trial judge's ruling, that Sanders had proven ownership of the property by prescription, is correct. Ms. Lacour also raised questions concerning equitable estoppel and the appropriateness of partition by licitation. Because of our resolution of the prescription issue it is not necessary that we discuss these other questions.

ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION

Civil Code art. 3458, as it read at the time this suit was filed, defined acquisitive prescription as follows:

"The prescription by which the ownership of property is acquired, is a right by which a mere possessor acquires the ownership of a thing which he possesses by the continuance of his possession during the time fixed by law."

An immovable, such as the tract of land at issue in this case, can be acquired in full ownership, by the operation of acquisitive prescription, in ten years, if four criteria are met. These criteria are set out in Civil Code art. 3479. They are: (1) Good faith on the part of the possessor; (2) A title which shall be legal, and sufficient to transfer the property; (3) Possession during the time required by law; and (4) An object which may be acquired by prescription.[1]

The trial judge, after enumerating the prerequisites of art. 3479, stated:

"This Court finds that Joe Sanders proved without contradiction that he exercised continuous and uninterrupted, peaceable, public, and unequivocal possession as owner for more than ten years and with a legal title sufficient to transfer the property. Melancon v. Wood, 357 So.2d 75 (4th Cir., 1978), [writ denied, 359 So.2d 201 (La.1978)], C.C. 3479, 3483, 3487, (C.C. 3475, 3476, 3483 as amended by Act No. 187 of 1982.)
"The final element to be determined for ten-year acquisitive prescription and the only element disputed by plaintiff is good faith on the part of Sanders.
"Civil Code Article 3451 provides:
"The possessor in good faith is he who has just reason to believe himself the master of the thing which he possesses, although he may not be in fact; as happens to him who buys a thing which he supposes to belong to the person selling it to him, but which, in fact, belongs to another."
"Civil Code Article 3481 provides:
`Good faith is always presumed in matters of prescription; and he who *1283 alleges bad faith in the possessor, must prove it.'
"The Court in Melancon, supra, at page 77, held that to be in good faith, `..., a possessor must have legitimately and reasonably believed that the person from whom he acquired title was the true owner of the property.'
* * * * * *
"Both Robert Jett, Jr. and Joe Sanders are uneducated ... men who lived in the rural community of Woodworth. Sanders was ignorant of Louisiana community property laws .... The property in dispute is located in the Ashton [Community]. Furthermore, at the time of the sale Article 2404 of the Civil Code, the Head and Master rule, was in effect whereby the husband could transfer full interest in the community by onerous title without the permission of his wife.
"Plaintiff's position is that defendant is in bad faith because he knew of the death of Ellen Scott Jett. Plaintiff's contention is based upon Juneau vs. Laborde [219 La. 921], 54 So.2d 325 (1951) and Thibodeaux v. Quebodeaux, 282 So.2d 845 (3rd Cir., 1973). These cases are inapposite. It is clear that in these cases the vendee had knowledge of title defects.
"In Juneau, the vendee was warned against buying the property and told that the title was not good. In Thibodeaux, the vendee lived near the vendor.

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Related

Lacour v. Sanders
446 So. 2d 1221 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1984)

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