Laclede Steel Co. v. United States

19 Ct. Int'l Trade 1076
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedAugust 11, 1995
DocketConsolidated Court No. 92-12-00784
StatusPublished

This text of 19 Ct. Int'l Trade 1076 (Laclede Steel Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Laclede Steel Co. v. United States, 19 Ct. Int'l Trade 1076 (cit 1995).

Opinion

Memorandum and Opinion

Goldberg, Judge:

This matter is before the court following remand to the U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration (“Commerce”). Laclede Steel Co. v. United States, 18 CIT 965, Slip Op. 94-160 (Oct. 12,1994). The reasoning and conclusions of the aforementioned slip opinion are incorporated herein by reference. In remanding this action, the court directed Commerce to review home market sales of overrun production of the subject merchandise (i.e. circular welded non-alloy steel pipe from the Republic of Korea) to determine whether they were made in the ordinary course of trade, taking into account all of the relevant facts and circumstances particular to the sales in question. Laclede Steel, Slip Op. 94-160 at 28. The court also directed Commerce to grant adjustments for duty drawback on all U.S. sales, including those compared to constructed value, and to conduct a correlation test to determine whether there is a correlation between price and level of trade for the subject merchandise. Id. at 29.

Commerce filed its remand results on March 3,1995. To correct certain typographical errors in the “Summary” section, Commerce filed amended results on March 9, 1995. Upon remand, Commerce determined that for both Hyundai Pipe Co., Ltd. (“Hyundai”) and Pusan Steel Pipe Co., Ltd. (“Pusan”) (collectively “respondents”), sales of [1077]*1077overrun pipe were made outside the ordinary course of trade and are thus appropriately excluded for purposes of calculating foreign market value (“FMV”). Second, in accordance with the court’s instructions, Commerce granted adjustments for duty drawback on all U.S. sales, including those compared to constructed value. Finally, because the results of the correlation test were inconclusive, Commerce determined that FMV should be calculated without regard to level of trade.

Plaintiff, Laclede Steel Co. (“Laclede”), presently challenges the first aspect of Commerce’s remand determination; namely, Commerce’s conclusion that sales of overrun pipe in the home market are outside the ordinary course of trade. Laclede raises three main arguments in support of its position. The court exercises its jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1988).

Discussion

In reviewing the results of Commerce’s redetermination pursuant to court remand, the court must determine whether any determination, finding, or conclusion is unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B) (1988). “Substantial evidence is something more than a ‘mere scintilla,’ and must be enough reasonably to support a conclusion.” Ceramica Regiomontana, S.A. v. United States, 10 CIT 399, 405, 636 F. Supp. 961, 966 (1986) (citations omitted), aff’d, 5 Fed. Cir. (T) 77, 810 F.2d 1137 (1987). The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from evidence on the record does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 3 Fed. Cir. (T) 44, 51, 750 F.2d 927, 933 (1984) (citing Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 619-20 (1966)).

Initially, the court notes that no party disputes the latter two aspects of Commerce’s remand determination, i.e. the granting of adjustments for duty drawback on all U.S. sales and the results of Commerce’s correlation test for levels of trade. The court has reviewed these results, and finds them each to be supported by substantial evidence on the record and in accordance with law. Accordingly, these aspects of Commerce’s remand determination are sustained.

With regard to Commerce’s analysis of respondents’ overrun sales, Laclede argues first that Commerce erred by relying upon information not properly on the record in reaching its remand determination. Specifically, Laclede contends that Commerce’s decision to expand the administrative record by soliciting additional information from Hyundai and Pusan was an abuse of discretion, and contravened the plain language of the court’s instructions in remanding this matter. The court disagrees.

Commerce was originally afforded sixty days within which to issue its remand determination, i.e. until December 12,1994. Laclede Steel, Slip Op. 94-160 at 30. On November 29, 1994, however, Commerce filed a consent motion requesting an additional forty-five days within which to [1078]*1078file its remand determination. Defendant’s consent motion for an extension of time specifically identified as one of the grounds justifying such an extension.the fact that Commerce might require more time “to obtain additional verifiable information from the respondents.” Defendant’s Consent Motion For Extension of Time to File Remand Results at 2 (Nov. 29, 1994). The court notes that Laclede expressly consented to this motion, thus acquiescing to possible expansion of the administrative record in this case. Id.

The court granted defendant’s consent motion by order dated December 8,1995; in so doing, the court implicitly acknowledged that any decision on the part of Commerce to collect additional information would be in conformance with the court’s order of remand. As the court stated in its initial review of this issue, Commerce’s “failure to adequately address: the number of home market customers buying alleged overruns; the product standards and uses of alleged overruns; and, the prices and profits on alleged overrun sales, necessitates a remand for reconsideration of these factors.” Laclede Steel, Slip Op. 94-160 at 8. The court therefore directed Commerce to fully analyze respondents’ overrun sales by “taking into account all of the relevant facts and circumstances particular to the sales in question.” Id. at 28 (emphasis added). This language clearly evinces the court’s intent that Commerce undertake any effort necessary to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the sales at issue.

Commerce, in its discretion, chooses how best to analyze the many factors involved in a determination of whether sales are made within the ordinary course of trade. Any decision to expand the administrative record upon remand is well within that discretion, absent express language from the court barring such action. Indeed, as prior caselaw makes clear, if nothing in the order of remand precludes the agency from requesting additional information which it deems necessary to comply with the court’s instructions, the agency is free to solicit such information. See, e.g., Win-Tex Prods., Inc. v. United States, 18 CIT 30, 34, 843 F. Supp. 709, 712 (1994). In this case, nothing in the court’s memorandum opinion and order barred Commerce from expanding the administrative record on remand. Accordingly, the court finds that Commerce did not abuse its discretion in soliciting additional information from Hyundai and Pusan. For the foregoing reasons, Commerce’s decision to expand the administrative record upon remand is sustained.

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Related

Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission
383 U.S. 607 (Supreme Court, 1966)
Ceramica Regiomontanam, S.A. v. United States
636 F. Supp. 961 (Court of International Trade, 1986)
Win-Tex Products, Inc. v. United States
18 Ct. Int'l Trade 30 (Court of International Trade, 1994)

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Bluebook (online)
19 Ct. Int'l Trade 1076, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/laclede-steel-co-v-united-states-cit-1995.