NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0028n.06
No. 25-1386 FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Jan 14, 2026 FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
) LACINO HAMILTON, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE Plaintiff-Appellee, ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN v. ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN ) JAMES FLEMING, et al., ) OPINION Defendants-Appellants. )
Before: BOGGS, BUSH, and READLER, Circuit Judges.
JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Lacino Hamilton served twenty-six years in prison for
the murder of his foster mother, Willa Bias. After that long period of incarceration, the Wayne
County Prosecutor’s Conviction Integrity Unit determined that Hamilton was unfairly convicted,
and his conviction was vacated. That conviction rested on the testimony of Oliver Cowan, a
frequent detainee in the holding area on the ninth floor of the Detroit Police Department (DPD)
headquarters. This ninth floor carried a special significance at the DPD because it was where
Hamilton alleges that James Fleming, a former DPD detective, and William Rice, a DPD Homicide
Section supervisor, participated in a scheme whereby they would give special treatment to
prisoners in exchange for falsified testimony. At the summary-judgment stage, the district court
denied qualified immunity to Fleming and Rice for their alleged misconduct leading up to
Hamilton’s conviction. We find no reversible error and AFFIRM. No. 25-1386, Hamilton v. Fleming
I.
We recount the facts underlying this appeal in the light most favorable to Hamilton, the
nonmovant. See Sagan v. United States, 342 F.3d 493, 497 (6th Cir. 2003).
In early 1994, the DPD began running an operation out of the ninth-floor prisoner lock-up
at the DPD headquarters. The homicide officers would place special jailhouse informants in cells
with other suspects with the expectation that the informants could overhear confessions and then
testify to them in court. In exchange, the informants received special treatment, including
favorable plea deals, trips to fast-food restaurants, television, alcohol, marijuana, and conjugal
visits in fifth-floor interrogation rooms. Not only did the officers on the ninth floor encourage
informants to listen for real confessions, but they also encouraged informants to offer false
testimony implicating suspects in lock-up. One of the informants regularly used by the DPD was
a man named Oliver Cowan.1 Cowan’s testimony as a jailhouse informant had led to the
incarceration of at least six homicide suspects before Hamilton ever entered the picture. The only
problem: Cowan was an unreliable informant.
Throughout DPD’s ninth-floor scheme, Rice was a lieutenant in the Homicide Division,
and was “thoroughly knowledgeable with every homicide investigation that was opened or
ongoing.” R. 50-29, Rice Affidavit, PageID 3676. Rice knew of the scheme and was integral to
procuring favors and reduced sentences for the informants based on the help they gave to DPD.
On one occasion, Rice even went over the head of the prosecutor’s office to advocate directly to
the judge for a reduced sentence because of an informant’s help in twenty homicide cases.
1 Cowan’s name is spelled in several ways throughout the record, but Cowan seems to be the most common, so that is the spelling we adopt. -2- No. 25-1386, Hamilton v. Fleming
Fleming, on the other hand, had only joined the homicide unit that year, becoming a part of the
squad in early 1994. These were the relevant actors on the DPD side.
Now we come to Hamilton. In the summer of 1994, Willa Bias was murdered. The DPD’s
investigation quickly turned to Hamilton, Ms. Bias’s foster son, whom she had raised since he was
four years old. The DPD arrested Hamilton a little over a week after the murder. He was held
initially in the ninth-floor lock-up, where Cowan had been living for at least six or seven months.
On the same day as Hamilton’s arrest, Cowan awaited sentencing on his own criminal
charges. Cowan’s sentencing took place not in open court but in the jury room “away from the
prying eyes of the public.” R. 50-20, Cowan Sentencing Tr., PageID 3146. Cowan was set to
receive a five-to-fifteen-year sentence. But based on a DPD officer’s testimony, the court
sentenced Cowan to “one year probation, [and] one year [in the] William Dickerson facility,” and
“expected continuing cooperation with homicide on the cases referred to.” Id. at 3151. The DPD
officer at the hearing testified that he anticipated no problem with Cowan’s continued cooperation.
Still, the judge reminded Cowan that the failure to cooperate “would be a violation of probation
and [Cowan] could receive up to fifteen years.” Id. After sentencing, Cowan was to be taken to
the William Dickerson facility, a county jail. But that’s not where he went. He instead found
himself right back on the ninth floor—just in time for Hamilton’s arrival.
When Hamilton arrived, he was taken straight to the ninth-floor lock-up. He was placed
in a cell by himself and never interacted with Cowan. The next morning, Fleming signed Hamilton
out of the ninth floor and took him to an interrogation room on the fifth floor. Rice joined Fleming
there shortly after, but neither of the officers talked to Hamilton. Instead, Fleming handcuffed
Hamilton to the table, and the two officers left the room. Hamilton remained there for the next
five hours.
-3- No. 25-1386, Hamilton v. Fleming
While Hamilton waited in the interrogation room, Fleming returned to the ninth floor to
speak to two of the DPD’s informants—Cowan and Hewitt-El. Cowan was the more experienced
of the two and had recruited Hewitt-El into working with the DPD so that Hewitt-El could also
enjoy the perks offered to informants. Fleming began the conversation by asking Hewitt-El “if he
was ready to earn his keep.” R. 50-17, Hewitt-El Dep. Tr., PageID 3069. He then asked both
informants which of them wanted the Hamilton case. Cowan volunteered. Fleming then handed
Cowan two copies of a pre-written statement: one to sign and one to memorize for the preliminary
examination. Hewitt-El told Cowan to leave Hamilton alone—Hewitt-El felt bad for Hamilton
because Hamilton was only a teenager. Cowan responded that this was the only way to get his
deal.
The pre-written statement claimed that Hamilton confessed a murder to Cowan, with some
specific details included, such as where the murder took place, what time Hamilton supposedly
arrived and left, and where he left the body of his victim. The statement said that seven to ten days
prior, Hamilton had arrived at Willa Bias’s house at about 2:00 p.m. with the intent to kill his foster
brother. But the brother did not show. Instead, Ms. Bias was there. The statement continued that
after Hamilton argued with Ms. Bias, he “smoked” her, stole some of her money and other
valuables, and then left her body in the kitchen. R. 50-42, Cowan Statement, PageID 3846.
Hamilton then allegedly waited four to five more hours in the house hoping to kill his brother.
Again, his brother did not show, so, according to the statement, Hamilton left between 6 p.m. and
7 p.m.
After Cowan signed Fleming’s statement, the statement worked its way to Rice. Rice used
the statement as part of his basis for signing a warrant request, seeking charges against Hamilton.
But the warrant request contained two false assertions. First, the form stated that Officer Milton
-4- No. 25-1386, Hamilton v. Fleming
Kennedy was the officer in charge of the Hamilton case. He was not. Officer Kennedy did not
know why his name appeared on the form and believed that someone else added his name to it.
Second, a detail was added to Cowan’s statement. The warrant request stated that Hamilton wanted
to kill his foster brother to recover drug money. But Cowan’s statement never referenced drug
money. Based on this warrant request, the Wayne County Prosecutor’s Office charged Hamilton
with first-degree murder and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony.
Hamilton’s case quickly moved to a preliminary hearing to determine whether the state had
probable cause for the prosecution. At the hearing, the prosecution relied on a single witness to
connect Hamilton to the murder of Ms. Bias—Oliver Cowan. The judge at the preliminary hearing
found probable cause to bind Hamilton over for trial based wholly on the word of Cowan.
Cowan died before Hamilton’s trial, so the prosecution read Cowan’s preliminary exam
testimony into the trial record instead. On this evidence, Hamilton was convicted of second-degree
murder and use of a firearm during the commission of a felony. He was sentenced to fifty to eighty
years in prison.
After serving twenty-six years of his sentence, the Conviction Integrity Unit of the Wayne
County Prosecutor’s office recommended Hamilton’s release. It stated that the jury “did not hear
of the true nature of [Cowan]’s relationship with DPD and the inducements he received to testify
or the concerns that had arisen over testimony of jailhouse informants.” R. 50-7, Conviction
Integrity Unit Memo, PageID 2586. The Wayne County Circuit Court then vacated Hamilton’s
convictions and sentences, and Hamilton went free.
Hamilton sued Fleming, Rice, and Ruth Carter, the prosecuting attorney from his criminal
trial. The district court granted summary judgment to Carter based on absolute prosecutorial
-5- No. 25-1386, Hamilton v. Fleming
immunity but denied qualified immunity to both Fleming and Rice on all counts. Fleming and
Rice now bring this interlocutory appeal.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s denial of summary judgment based on qualified
immunity. Clark v. Abdallah, 131 F.4th 432, 444 (6th Cir. 2025). “A public official is entitled to
qualified immunity at summary judgment when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, the challenged conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” Heeter v. Bowers, 99 F.4th 900, 908 (6th Cir.
2024) (cleaned up).
III.
Fleming and Rice first argue that Hamilton’s claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477 (1994). They suggest that we have pendent appellate jurisdiction over the Heck claim
based on Lucier v. City of Ecorse, 601 F. App’x 372, 376 (6th Cir. 2015). But this case was
expressly overruled by Chaney-Snell v. Young, 98 F.4th 699, 709 (6th Cir. 2024). Chaney-Snell
stated that we “lack pendent appellate jurisdiction over Heck claims in qualified-immunity
appeals.” Id. Defendants’ argument on this point fails because we lack jurisdiction to consider it.
As an alternative theory, Defendants argue that Hamilton’s vacated state-court conviction
collaterally estops him from disputing the underlying facts of his claims. This argument fares no
better. The conviction was vacated, which includes vacatur of all interlocutory rulings. Peterson
v. Heymes, 931 F.3d 546, 554 (6th Cir. 2019). “And vacated rulings have no preclusive effect
under Michigan law.” Id.
-6- No. 25-1386, Hamilton v. Fleming
IV.
Fleming and Rice next assert that they were entitled to qualified immunity for each of
Hamilton’s claims. To grant qualified immunity, we undertake a two-pronged inquiry looking at
(1) “whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, show the
officer’s conduct violated a federal right,” and (2) “whether the right in question was clearly
established at the time of the violation.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655–56 (2014) (per
curiam) (cleaned up). To determine whether a right is clearly established, we look at whether “its
contours [are] sufficiently clear [such] that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quotation marks omitted).
“We do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory
or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). We
take each claim in turn.
A.
Hamilton had a right under Brady v. Maryland to receive all material exculpatory
information. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). The question on appeal is whether a police officer in 1994
would have had notice of his obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence. In other words, was the
right clearly established?
Our circuit precedent resolves the clearly established issue in Hamilton’s favor.2 A police
officer’s “Fourteenth Amendment obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence” has been clearly
established since at least 1975. Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 824 (6th Cir. 2019).
2 Hamilton’s claim that Defendants failed to preserve the clearly established question is in tension with our precedents. See Mills v. Cvitkovich, No. 25-3054, 2025 WL 3043564, at *3 (6th Cir. Oct. 31, 2025). But we need not go too far down this trail because the law was clearly established in any event. -7- No. 25-1386, Hamilton v. Fleming
“It was also clearly established that impeachment evidence, such as the fact that a witness was
coerced into making a fabricated statement, qualifies as exculpatory.” Id. (citing Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150, 153–55 (1972)). The right was clearly established in 1994 such that “any
reasonable police officer would know that suppressing exculpatory evidence was a violation of the
accused’s constitutional rights.” Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 382 (6th Cir. 2009).
Defendants also contest the merits of Hamilton’s Brady claim. In addition to showing that
Defendants suppressed exculpatory evidence, Hamilton must prove that “prejudice . . . ensued”
from that suppression. Clark, 131 F.4th at 455. Defendants here dispute the prejudice element on
the ground that the Brady evidence was cumulative. True, Hamilton was already aware that Cowan
received perks in exchange for testimony. And Defendants are correct that undisclosed cumulative
evidence does not amount to a Brady violation. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 300–
01 (6th Cir. 2010). But this does not mean that state actors can avoid Brady obligations by turning
over only some of the evidence “on the assumption that defense counsel will find the cookie from
a trail of crumbs.” Clark, 131 F.4th at 455 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting Barton v. Warden, S. Ohio
Corr. Facility, 786 F.3d 450, 468 (6th Cir. 2015)). Hamilton suspected only that Cowan was a
snitch, and his trial counsel merely insinuated that Cowan received inducements in exchange for
his testimony. We agree with the district court that this did not relieve Defendants of their
obligation to disclose that (1) Cowan was falsely testifying as part of the ninth-floor scheme,
(2) Fleming and Rice knew Cowan’s testimony was false and acted to induce it, or (3) the full
scope of Cowan’s deal with the state. Hamilton’s knowledge that Cowan had some sort of deal
does not have nearly the same effect as receiving evidence that police officers induced false
testimony from Cowan.
-8- No. 25-1386, Hamilton v. Fleming
Defendants relatedly contend that Hamilton was not prejudiced because the other evidence
presented at trial sufficed to convict Hamilton even had the Brady evidence been disclosed. But
as the district court correctly observed, the prosecution made Cowan’s testimony the center of its
case, and, taking the facts in a light most favorable to Hamilton, a reasonable jury could conclude
that the revelation that Defendants had procured false testimony from Cowan would have a
reasonable probability of affecting the outcome at trial. See Clark, 131 F.4th at 456 (“[A]
defendant undoubtedly suffers prejudice from the withholding of favorable impeachment evidence
when the prosecution’s case hinges on the testimony of one witness.” (quotations omitted)).
We affirm the district court on Hamilton’s Brady claim.
B.
Defendants next claim qualified immunity on Hamilton’s fabrication-of-evidence claim.
To prove this cause of action, Hamilton needs to show that Defendants “knowingly fabricated
evidence against [him], and that there is a reasonable likelihood that the false evidence could have
affected the judgment of the jury.” Mills v. Barnard, 869 F.3d 473, 484 (6th Cir. 2017) (cleaned
up). Defendants challenge the first part of this test. They make a single argument on appeal—that
Hamilton lacks sufficient evidence to show that Defendants knew that Cowan had been given
specific inducements to testify against Hamilton.3 While we do not have jurisdiction to review the
fact-based portions of sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges, see Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304,
313 (1995), we do have the power to “consider[] the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s profferred [sic]
evidence, drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, and making the legal
3 Defendants failed to make this argument before the district court. R. 44, MSJ, PageID 1376–77. This would ordinarily result in a forfeiture of the argument on appeal, but Hamilton failed to point out this forfeiture. So any forfeiture argument has itself been forfeited. See United States v. Shultz, 733 F.3d 616, 619 (6th Cir. 2013). We will address the argument on its merits. -9- No. 25-1386, Hamilton v. Fleming
determination of whether the defendant violated a clearly established right based on those now (at
least for purposes of this appeal) undisputed record facts,” Johnson v. Russell, 155 F.4th 759, 765
(6th Cir. 2025). And that is the course we take.
This case involves multiple defendants, so we must assess qualified immunity “in the
context of each individual’s specific conduct.” Hopper v. Plummer, 887 F.3d 744, 756 (6th Cir.
2018) (quoting Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corrs., 705 F.3d 560, 570 (6th Cir. 2013)). Start with
Fleming. Making all inferences in Hamilton’s favor, the evidence supports his fabrication-of-
evidence claim. Fleming took Hamilton out of the ninth-floor lockup at the DPD. Fleming then
proceeded back to the ninth-floor intake area and spoke with two prisoners: Cowan and Hewitt-
El. While with the prisoners, “Fleming asked Hewitt-El if he was ready to earn his keep.” R. 50-
17, Dep. Tr. of Hewitt-El, PageID 3069. He then turned to both prisoners and asked which of
them wanted to take the Hamilton case. Cowan volunteered. Fleming handed Cowan a pre-written
statement and told Cowan to memorize the statement for the preliminary examination. Cowan
later told Hewitt-El that Cowan had to go through with the testimony “to get his deal.” Fleming
never disclosed any of this to Hamilton or Hamilton’s counsel.
Fleming argues that the evidence is insufficient because the “earn his keep” statement was
directed to Hewitt-El, not Cowan. Context shows why this distinction does not matter. Fleming
made the statement while Hewitt-El was standing next to Cowan. Fleming then asked for a
volunteer to sign a prewritten statement in the Hamilton case. Whom the first statement was
directed at matters little given that Fleming immediately followed the statement by asking for a
volunteer to sign a prewritten statement.
Now look at Rice. Circumstantial evidence creates a disputed fact as to the extent of Rice’s
involvement with the fabricated evidence in Hamilton’s case. At the time, Rice was a lieutenant
-10- No. 25-1386, Hamilton v. Fleming
in the Homicide Division, and was “thoroughly knowledgeable with every homicide investigation
that was opened or ongoing.” R. 50-29, Rice Affidavit, PageID 3676. Rice participated in the
alleged ninth-floor snitch scheme and would sometimes talk with jailhouse informants like Hewitt-
El and Cowan.
Given this factual background, we turn to Rice’s direct involvement with Hamilton’s case.
Just before Cowan signed the statement saying he heard Hamilton confess to murder, Rice and
Fleming both visited Hamilton in the fifth-floor interrogation room where Fleming had placed him.
Shortly after Cowan signed the statement written by Fleming, Rice used the statement to request
a warrant seeking murder charges against Hamilton. This warrant request contained irregularities.
Rice approved the warrant request despite its inclusion of additional facts that were not part of
Cowan’s statement. Rice took no other steps to confirm the truth or falsity of Cowan’s statement
and never interrogated Hamilton about the statement’s claims.
In sum, Rice participated in a scheme where jailhouse informants gave statements in
exchange for favors. He knew that Oliver Cowan gave a statement implicating Hamilton at a time
when Hamilton was being held in a fifth-floor interrogation room. He then sought criminal charges
against Hamilton based on an embellished version of Cowan’s statement. Rice did not take any
steps to confirm the truth of Cowan’s statement despite the known risk of its falsity. A jury could
conclude from this information that Rice knew that the statement given by Cowan was fabricated.
This case resembles Jackson, 925 F.3d at 816. There, we held that a jury could conclude
that Officer Stoiker was part of the fabrication of evidence because he had left the room with
Officer Staimpel and then reentered with Staimpel, at which point Staimpel fabricated evidence
through a signed statement. Id. We said that a reasonable jury could conclude from this that
Stoiker played some part in the fabrication. Id. So too here. Rice was with Fleming just before
-11- No. 25-1386, Hamilton v. Fleming
Fleming took Cowan’s statement, though he was not in the room at the time. Rice then used the
statement, with his new allegation about drug money, to have Hamilton charged with murder.
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Hamilton, Fleming and Rice are not entitled
to qualified immunity on Hamilton’s fabrication-of-evidence claim.
C.
The district court denied summary judgment to Defendants on the malicious-prosecution
claim because the issue contained “genuine questions of material fact for the jury to resolve” as to
probable cause. R. 58, Op. & Order, PageID 4024. Whether a jury could find probable cause is
the incorrect question at summary judgment. When the facts are disputed, we take the
nonmovant’s version of the facts and look at the existence of probable cause as “a question of law
for the court and not a jury.” Gerics v. Trevino, 974 F.3d 798, 805 (6th Cir. 2020). Taking this
question as one of law, based on Hamilton’s version of facts, probable cause did not support
Hamilton’s prosecution.
Although police officers do not make the decision to prosecute, they may still be liable if
they supply falsehoods to a prosecutor “knowing that prosecutorial reliance is likely” and the
prosecutor actually relies on those falsehoods. Tanner v. Walters, 98 F.4th 726, 734 (6th Cir.
2024) (quoting Jones v. City of Elyria, 947 F.3d 905, 918 (6th Cir. 2020)). For his
malicious-prosecution claim, Hamilton must prove that “(1) [Defendants] made, influenced, or
participated in the decision to prosecute [Hamilton]; (2) there was no probable cause for the
prosecution; (3) as a consequence of the legal proceedings, [Hamilton] suffered a deprivation of
liberty apart from the initial arrest; and (4) the criminal proceeding was resolved in the
[Hamilton]’s favor.” Id. (quoting France v. Lucas, 836 F.3d 612, 625 (6th Cir. 2016)). Defendants
challenge elements 1, 2, and 4, but none of their arguments persuade.
-12- No. 25-1386, Hamilton v. Fleming
First, Fleming and Rice each may have influenced the prosecuting decision by fabricating
the evidence relied on to secure the charges against Hamilton. This creates a fact question on the
first element. See Jackson, 925 F.3d at 820–21 (concluding that a reasonable jury could find that
an officer’s misconduct “influenced the decision to bring charges” because the decision was based
on a witness statement “that a jury could reasonably find to have been fabricated” by the officer);
Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 312–13 (6th Cir. 2010) (concluding that a reasonable jury could
find that false testimony influenced the charging decision when it was the sole basis for the
magistrate’s probable cause determination).
Second, Defendants argue that probable cause existed for Hamilton’s prosecution separate
from Cowan’s statement. Probable cause “is not a high bar: It requires only the kind of fair
probability on which reasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act.” Kaley v. United
States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014) (cleaned up). Defendants argue that probable cause existed for
the prosecution based on circumstantial evidence against Hamilton as well as a statement that
Darnell Thompson, a friend of Hamilton, gave to the police saying that Hamilton confessed to the
murder. This evidence is relevant to the DPD’s decision to arrest Hamilton, but here we look at
the probable cause supporting the decision to prosecute. See Sykes, 625 F.3d at 310–11 (“In order
to distinguish appropriately this claim from one of false arrest, we must consider not only whether
the Defendants had probable cause to arrest the Plaintiffs but also whether probable cause existed
to initiate the criminal proceeding against the Plaintiffs.”). That means we look to the evidence
the prosecutor presented at the preliminary hearing. The preliminary hearing in Michigan is where
the prosecutor presents evidence to the magistrate asking to have the defendant bound over for
trial. See id. at 312. Because this is where the formal probable-cause determination takes place,
we look only to the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing. This is no different from
-13- No. 25-1386, Hamilton v. Fleming
warrants. Except in “the very rare case” involving an intentional omission of exculpatory evidence,
Mays v. City of Dayton, 134 F.3d 809, 806 (6th Cir. 1998), when looking at whether probable
cause supported a search warrant, we look to what evidence the officer presented in the warrant
application, not to other evidence the officer could have placed in the warrant application but chose
not to. See United States v. McPhearson, 469 F.3d 518, 524 (6th Cir. 2006). The same is true
here. If we want to know what evidence established probable cause for the prosecution, we look
to the evidence the prosecutor presented at the probable-cause hearing. See Sykes, 625 F.3d at
310–11; Peet v. City of Detroit, 502 F.3d 557, 566 (6th Cir. 2007).
The only evidence presented at the preliminary hearing was Cowan’s testimony. But
“probable cause, of course, is not supported by fabricated evidence.” Clark, 131 F.4th at 453. So
if Cowan’s testimony was fabricated, the prosecution was not supported by probable cause. Thus,
this element also comes down to a dispute of fact as to whether Fleming and Rice fabricated
Cowan’s testimony.
Third, Defendants have forfeited any argument that a vacated conviction is not a favorable
termination. Defendants dedicate all of two sentences to this argument in their opening brief. And
even then, the sentence only points out that Hamilton’s conviction was vacated; it does not make
an argument either way as to whether a vacated conviction counts as a favorable termination.
“[A]ddressing an issue on appeal ‘requires developed argument; a party is required to do more
than advert to an issue in a perfunctory manner.’” Howard v. Collins, 2025 WL 429916, at *8 (6th
Cir. Feb. 7, 2025) (quoting Puckett v. Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cnty. Gov’t, 833 F.3d 590, 611 (6th
Cir. 2016)).
-14- No. 25-1386, Hamilton v. Fleming
D.
Finally, Fleming and Rice argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Hamilton’s
civil-conspiracy claim. Defendants’ only argument on this point is that Hamilton lacks sufficient
facts to show a conspiracy to violate Hamilton’s rights. We disagree. A jury could reasonably
conclude that (1) Fleming and Rice engaged in a concerted plan to give favors to individuals on
the ninth floor in exchange for false statements, (2) they planned to use those false statements to
deny criminal defendants their rights, and (3) they took steps in furtherance of this plan. Hamilton
has presented sufficient evidence that he was a victim of this plan and Defendants deprived him of
his constitutional rights.
For each of Hamilton’s claims, Defendants were properly denied qualified immunity.
V.
For the reasons outlined above, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.
-15-